CHOMSKY: I think in part we're slightly talking at cross-purposes, because of a different use of the term creativity. In fact, I should say that my use of the term creativity is a little bit idiosyncratic and therefore the onus falls on me in this case, not on you. But when I speak of creativity, I'm not attributing to the concept the notion of value that is normal when we speak of creativity. That is, when you speak of scientific creativity, you're speaking, properly, of the achievements of a Newton. But in the context in which I have been speaking about creativity, it's a normal human act.
喬姆斯基：我想，由于對創(chuàng)造性這個詞的用法不同，我們倆人有些分歧。實(shí)際上，我使用此詞的方式略有其特殊性，這個責(zé)任全在于我。當(dāng)我談及這個詞時，我沒有賦予這個概念通常所具有的價值觀念。當(dāng)談到科學(xué)創(chuàng)造性，人們便聯(lián)想到比如牛頓的創(chuàng)造。但在我援引此字的背景里，是人類的一般活動。
I'm speaking of the kind of creativity that any child demonstrates when he's able to come to grips with a new situation: to describe it properly, react to it properly, tell one something about it, think about it in a new fashion for him and so on. I think it's appropriate to call those acts creative, but of course without thinking of those acts as being the acts of a Newton.
我所說的創(chuàng)造性是任何一個兒童在新的環(huán)境里所表現(xiàn)出來的斗爭：他學(xué)習(xí)恰到好處地描寫這個環(huán)境，恰如其分地對它產(chǎn)生反應(yīng)，談?wù)撍?，用一種對孩子來說是新鮮的方式來思索它。我想可以把這種行為看作是創(chuàng)造性，但未必是屬于牛頓式的創(chuàng)造行為。
In fact it may very well be true that creativity in the arts or the sciences, that which goes beyond the normal, may really involve properties of, well, I would also say of human nature, which may not exist fully developed in the mass of mankind, and may not constitute part of the normal creativity of everyday life.
也許在藝術(shù)和科學(xué)領(lǐng)域里的創(chuàng)造性需要某些特性，這種特性不屬于人類大眾，也不是日常生活中的一般創(chuàng)造性。
Now my belief is that science can look forward to the problem of normal creativity as a topic that it can perhaps incorporate within itself. But I don't believe, and I suspect you will agree, that science can look forward, at least in the reasonable future, to coming to grips with true creativity, the achievements of the great artist and the great scientist. It has no hope of accommodating these unique phenomena within its grasp. It's the lower levels of creativity that I've been speaking of.
我確信科學(xué)可以納入一般創(chuàng)造性的主題。但我并不認(rèn)為（漏翻了and I suspect you will agree）在短時期內(nèi)它便可以同真正的創(chuàng)造性、同一個偉大的藝術(shù)家或一個大學(xué)者的事業(yè)相抗衡，它毫無將這些非凡奇才據(jù)為己有的希望，我所說的是創(chuàng)造性的最低檔次。
Now, as far as what you say about the history of science is concerned, I think that's correct and illuminating and particularly relevant in fact to the kinds of enterprise that I see lying before us in psychology and linguistics and the philosophy of the mind.
您關(guān)于科學(xué)史的觀點(diǎn)我認(rèn)為非常正確、清晰，并完全符合我們在心理學(xué)、語言學(xué)和精神哲學(xué)領(lǐng)域里要做的工作。
That is, I think there are certain topics that have been repressed or put aside during the scientific advances of the past few centuries.
我認(rèn)為在最近幾個世紀(jì)，隨著科學(xué)的進(jìn)步，某些詞匯被取消或排擠出去了。
For example, this concern with low-level creativity that I'm referring to was really present in Descartes also. For example, when he speaks of the difference between a parrot, who can mimic what is said, and a human, who can say new things that are appropriate to the situation, and when he specifies that as being the distinctive property that designates the limits of physics and carries us into the science of the mind, to use modern terms, I think he really is referring to the kind of creativity that I have in mind; and I quite agree with your comments about the other sources of such notions.
如我使用的低層次的創(chuàng)造性在笛卡爾那里就出現(xiàn)過。當(dāng)?shù)芽栒劶胞W鵡與人的區(qū)別時，他認(rèn)為鸚鵡具有復(fù)制語言的能力，而人則可以說出適應(yīng)情景的新東西。他明確提出這個顯著特性，指出了物理的限度，并把我們引入精神科學(xué)。為了使用現(xiàn)代詞匯，我記得他使用了類似于創(chuàng)造性這樣的詞。我同意您關(guān)于這些觀念的其他出處的意見。
Well, these concepts, even in fact the whole notion of the organisation of sentence structure, were put aside during the period of great advances that followed from Sir William Jones and others and the development of comparative philology as a whole.
這些概念——事實(shí)上，句子結(jié)構(gòu)組織的所有觀念——在隨威廉·瓊斯及其他人而來的巨大進(jìn)步時期和比較語文學(xué)發(fā)展中都被排除了。
But now, I think, we can go beyond that period when it was necessary to forget and to pretend that these phenomena did not exist and to turn to something else. In this period of comparative philology and also, in my view, structural linguistics, and much of behavioural psychology, and in fact much of what grows out of the empiricist tradition in the study of mind and behaviour, it is possible to put aside those limitations and bring into our consideration just those topics that animated a good deal of the thinking and speculation of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to incorporate them within a much broader and I think deeper science of man that will give a fuller role-though it is certainly not expected to give a complete understanding to such notions as innovation and creativity and freedom and the production of new entities, new elements of thought and behaviour within some system of rule and schematism. Those are concepts that I think we can come to grips with.
但是目前，我想我們應(yīng)該是度過了必須遺忘、必須聲稱這些現(xiàn)象并不存在以便轉(zhuǎn)向其他事物的時代。在這個比較語文學(xué)時代——我認(rèn)為同時也是結(jié)構(gòu)語言學(xué)時代、行為主義心理學(xué)時代及所有那些源于精神和行為研究的知識傳統(tǒng)時代——有可能排除這些界限，重視那些給予17、18世紀(jì)大部分思想和思辨以活力的詞匯，并可能把它們?nèi)谌胍粋€更廣泛、更深入的人的科學(xué)里。這門科學(xué)將把更廣泛的角色給予眾多觀念，諸如革新、創(chuàng)造性、自由、新實(shí)體的產(chǎn)生，思想新要素的產(chǎn)生及其規(guī)則體系和模式里的行為產(chǎn)生等等，這是一些我們可以掌握的概念。
ELDERS: Well, may I first of all ask you not to make your answers so lengthy? [Foucault laughs.]
埃勒德：首先我能否請您不要回答得這么長？
When you discuss creativity and freedom, I think that one of the misunderstandings, if any misunderstandings have arisen, has to do with the fact that Mr. Chomsky is starting from a limited number of rules with infinite possibilities of application, whereas you, Mr. Foucault, are stressing the inevitability of the "grille" of our historical and psychological determinisms, which also applies to the way in which we discover new ideas.
當(dāng)你們談?wù)搫?chuàng)造性和自由時，我想有一個誤會，如果有的話。這個誤會來源自喬姆斯基先生從有限的規(guī)則同操作的無限可能性出發(fā)；而您，福柯先生，您強(qiáng)調(diào)心理及歷史決定論的“柵欄”的不可避免性，它也作用于我們發(fā)現(xiàn)新思想的方法。
Perhaps we can sort this out, not by analysing the scientific process, but just by analysing our own thought process.
也許，不分析科學(xué)程序而分析我們自己的思想程序，可以解決這個問題。
When you discover a new fundamental idea, Mr. Foucault, do you believe, that as far as your own personal creativity is concerned something is happening that makes you feel that you are being liberated; that something new has been developed? Perhaps afterwards you discover that it was not so new. But do you yourself believe that, within your own personality, creativity and freedom are working together, or not?
當(dāng)您發(fā)現(xiàn)了一個重要的新思想，福柯先生，這涉及到您個人的創(chuàng)造性，您認(rèn)為這件事是自由的象征，是某個新事物的誕生嗎？您可能隨后發(fā)現(xiàn)這是個錯誤嗎？您認(rèn)為在您的品格里，創(chuàng)造性和自由同時在起作用嗎？
FOUCAULT: Oh, you know, I don't believe that the problem of personal experience is so very important...
?？拢亨?，要知道，我不認(rèn)為個人經(jīng)驗問題很重要……
ELDERS: Why not?
埃勒德：為什么？
FOUCAULT: ...in a question like this. No, I believe that there is in reality quite a strong similarity between what Mr. Chomsky said and what I tried to show: in other words there exist in fact only possible creations, possible innovations. One can only, in terms of language or of knowledge, produce something new by putting into play a certain number of rules which will define the acceptability or the grammaticality of these statements, or which will define, in the case of knowledge, the scientific character of the statements.
?？拢骸谶@個問題上。不，事實(shí)上我認(rèn)為在喬姆斯基先生所講的及我試圖表明的之間存在著極為相似的東西。換句話說，事實(shí)上只有可能的創(chuàng)造，可能的革新。在語言及認(rèn)識領(lǐng)域只有讓一些規(guī)則發(fā)揮作用才能產(chǎn)生一些新東西。這些規(guī)則會確定敘述的可接受性或是否符合語法規(guī)則。在認(rèn)識范圍內(nèi)，這些規(guī)則或許會確定敘述的科學(xué)性。
Thus, we can roughly say that linguists before Mr. Chomsky mainly insisted on the rules of construction of statements and less on the innovation represented by every new statement, or the hearing of a new statement. And in the history of science or in the history of thought, we placed more emphasis on individual creation, and we had kept aside and left in the shadows these communal, general rules, which obscurely manifest themselves through every scientific discovery, every scientific invention, and even every philosophical innovation.
因此，在喬姆斯基先生之前的語言學(xué)家特別重視敘述結(jié)構(gòu)的規(guī)則而并不強(qiáng)調(diào)新敘述中所表現(xiàn)出的革新或?qū)λ慕邮堋Ｔ诳茖W(xué)史或思想史中，人們習(xí)慣于重視個人的創(chuàng)造而把一般的規(guī)則類型撇在一邊。而恰是后者在整個科學(xué)發(fā)現(xiàn)、整個科學(xué)發(fā)明中默默地起作用，甚至也貫穿于整個哲學(xué)革新中。
And to that degree, when I no doubt wrongly believe that I am saying something new, I am nevertheless conscious of the fact that in my statement there are rules at work, not only linguistic rules, but also epistemological rules, and those rules characterise contemporary knowledge.
在這方面，當(dāng)我錯誤地以為我說出了什么新東西時，我意識到事實(shí)上在我的敘述中有規(guī)則在起作用，并不僅僅是語言學(xué)規(guī)則，還有知識規(guī)則，它們構(gòu)成了現(xiàn)代認(rèn)識的特點(diǎn)。
CHOMSKY: Well, perhaps I can try to react to those comments within my own framework in a way which will maybe shed some light on this.
喬姆斯基：我試著用更清晰的方法談?wù)勥@些論點(diǎn)。
Let's think again of a human child, who has in his mind some schematism that determines the kind of language he can learn. Okay. And then, given experience, he very quickly knows the language, of which this experience is a part, or in which it is included.
回過頭來再看看孩子們的例子。兒童具有了一些模式，它可以確定兒童所能學(xué)會的語言方式。那好，以他的經(jīng)驗，兒童很快地學(xué)會了作為此經(jīng)驗一部分的語言，或者說是包含在此經(jīng)驗里的語言。
Now this is a normal act; that is, it's an act of normal intelligence, but it's a highly creative act.
這是正常的行為，是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的智力行為，是具有相當(dāng)創(chuàng)造性的行為。
If a Martian were to look at this process of acquiring this vast and complicated and intricate system of knowledge on the basis of this ridiculously small quantity of data, he would think of it as an immense act of invention and creation. In fact, a Martian would, I think, consider it as much of an achievement as the invention of, let's say, any aspect of a physical theory on the basis of the data that was presented to the physicist.
如果一個火星人注意到了建立在極為有限的材料基礎(chǔ)上的龐大復(fù)雜的知識獲取程序，他會認(rèn)為這是一個巨大發(fā)明，是創(chuàng)造性行為。事實(shí)上我想，火星人會認(rèn)為這是一個成功，可以同物理學(xué)家在自己掌握的材料基礎(chǔ)上發(fā)明了物理理論相媲美。
However, if this hypothetical Martian were then to observe that every normal human child immediately carries out this creative act and they all do it in the same way and without any difficulty, whereas it takes centuries of genius to slowly carry out the creative act of going from evidence to a scientific theory, then this Martian would, if he were rational, conclude that the structure of the knowledge that is acquired in the case of language is basically internal to the human mind; whereas the structure of physics is not, in so direct a way, internal to the human mind. Our minds are not constructed so that when we look at the phenomena of the world theoretical physics comes forth, and we write it down and produce it; that's not the way our minds are constructed.
然而，如果這個火星人發(fā)現(xiàn)所有正常兒童都能很快完成這個創(chuàng)造性行為，沒有絲毫困難，方法也都相似，而摸索出它的科學(xué)理論卻需要幾代奇才的共同努力（注：這里的“科學(xué)理論”應(yīng)為泛指，并非特指“它的科學(xué)理論”），火星人自然會得出在語言方面獲取知識的結(jié)構(gòu)位于人類精神的里面的結(jié)論。而物理結(jié)構(gòu)不是這樣直接的。人們觀察世上的一種現(xiàn)象，物理理論便會從中涌現(xiàn)出來，我們只要把它記錄下來、生產(chǎn)出來就可以了。精神不是這樣的，我們的精神不是這樣構(gòu)成的。
Nevertheless, I think there is a possible point of connection and it might be useful to elaborate it: that is, how is it that we are able to construct any kind of scientific theory at all? How is it that, given a small amount of data, it's possible for various scientists, for various geniuses even, over a long period of time, to arrive at some kind of a theory, at least in some cases, that is more or less profound and more or less empirically adequate?
但我認(rèn)為存在一個交點(diǎn)，應(yīng)該也對它進(jìn)行研究：我們怎樣做才能制定出一個科學(xué)理論來？尤其當(dāng)看到一些學(xué)者及一些天才所掌握的材料是那樣的少，即使用了相當(dāng)長的時間，但最后卻得到了一個或多或少比較深刻的理論，而此理論能與實(shí)踐相吻合。
This is a remarkable fact.
這是令人贊嘆的。
And, in fact, if it were not the case that these scientists, including the geniuses, were beginning with a very narrow limitation on the class of possible scientific theories, if they didn't have built into their minds somehow an obviously unconscious specification of what is a possible scientific theory, then this inductive leap would certainly be quite impossible: just as if each child did not have built into his mind the concept of human language in a very restricted way, then the inductive leap from data to knowledge of a language would be impossible.
事實(shí)上，如果這些科學(xué)家，包括那些天才不是在極為有限的條件下開始他們的可能存在的科學(xué)理論研究的話，就沒有可能實(shí)現(xiàn)歸納性的跳躍。同樣，一個兒童如果沒有極為有制約的人類語言概念的話，就永遠(yuǎn)不會出現(xiàn)從素材到語言知識的歸納性跳躍。
So even though the process of, let's say, deriving knowledge of physics from data is far more complex, far more difficult for an organism such as ours, far more drawn out in time, requiring intervention of genius and so on and so forth, nevertheless in a certain sense the achievement of discovering physical science or biology or whatever you like, is based on something rather similar to the achievement of the normal child in discovering the structure of his language: that is, it must be achieved on the basis of an initial limitation, an initial restriction on the class of possible theories. If you didn't begin by knowing that only certain things are possible theories, then no induction would be possible at all. You could go from data anywhere, in any direction. And the fact that science converges and progresses itself shows us that such initial limitations and structures exist.
當(dāng)然，依據(jù)材料進(jìn)行知識分流（注：derive和“分流”無關(guān)吧）的程序在物理領(lǐng)域里要復(fù)雜得多，對于像我們?nèi)梭w一樣的組織來說也更為困難，需要相當(dāng)長的時間，必需天才的介入。從某種意義上說，物理學(xué)或生物科學(xué)或其他學(xué)科的成功都建立在某種程序之上，這種程序類似正常兒童發(fā)現(xiàn)語言結(jié)構(gòu)的程序。這個程序應(yīng)該在最初的限制基礎(chǔ)上，在可能存在的理論分類的制約基礎(chǔ)上得以完成。如果最初人們就不知道只有某些材料可以通向理論，那么任何歸納法都無從談起，材料可以把你引向任何方向?？茖W(xué)自行匯合和進(jìn)步的事實(shí)說明起初的限制和這些結(jié)構(gòu)都是存在的。
If we really want to develop a theory of scientific creation, or for that matter artistic creation, I think we have to focus attention precisely on that set of conditions that, on the one hand, delimits and restricts the scope of our possible knowledge, while at the same time permitting the inductive leap to complicated systems of knowledge on the basis of a small amount of data. That, it seems to me, would be the way to progress towards a theory of scientific creativity, or in fact towards any question of epistemology.
如果我們確實(shí)想發(fā)展科學(xué)創(chuàng)造的理論，或者在這種情況下發(fā)展藝術(shù)創(chuàng)造理論，我想我們應(yīng)準(zhǔn)確地把注意力集中在總體條件上。一方面這些條件限制和制約了我們可能獲得的知識面，而另一方面，它們又使我們得以實(shí)現(xiàn)通向知識復(fù)雜體系的歸納性跳躍。我認(rèn)為這條道路可以通向科學(xué)創(chuàng)造性的理論，或者找到解決認(rèn)識問題的辦法。
ELDERS: Well, I think if we take this point of the initial limitation with all its creative possibilities, I have the impression that for Mr. Chomsky rules and freedom are not opposed to each other, but more or less imply each other. Whereas I get the impression that it is just the reverse for you, Mr. Foucault. What are your reasons for putting it the opposite way, for this really is a very fundamental point in the debate, and I hope we can elaborate it.
埃勒德：那好。假如我們接受這個最初限制及它的所有創(chuàng)造可能性的說法。我的印象是在喬姆斯基先生那里規(guī)則和自由是不相抵觸，它們相互包含；而在?？孪壬抢飬s正好相反。您這樣認(rèn)為的理由是什么？這是今天這場辯論會的重點(diǎn)，希望我們能深入地談一談。
To formulate the same problem in other terms: can you think of universal knowledge without any form of repression?
為了換個角度，您能否使用大眾知識形式，沒有任何抑制地談一下這個問題？
FOUCAULT: Well, in what Mr. Chomsky has just said there is something which seems to me to create a little difficulty; perhaps I understood it badly.
?？拢汉冒桑赡芪椅春芎玫乩斫鈫棠匪够壬v的話，但我覺得有一個小難點(diǎn)。
I believe that you have been talking about a limited number of possibilities in the order of a scientific theory. That is true if you limit yourself to a fairly short period of time, whatever it may be. But if you consider a longer period, it seems to me that what is striking is the proliferation of possibilities by divergences.
我認(rèn)為您談了在科學(xué)理論方面的一些可能性的限制。如果您局限在一個比較短的時期蚋，情況的確是這樣的。但如果您涉及到一個長的時期，令人驚奇的是輻散狀的可能性的膨脹。
For a long time the idea has existed that the sciences, knowledge, followed a certain line of "progress", obeying the principle of "growth", and the principle of the convergence of all these kinds of knowledge. And yet when one sees how the European understanding, which turned out to be a world-wide and universal understanding in a historical and geographical sense, developed, can one say that there has been growth? I, myself, would say that it has been much more a matter of transformation.
長期以來，人們曾認(rèn)為科學(xué)、知識是循著某條“進(jìn)步”的路線，服從于“增長”的原則和匯聚各種各樣知識的原則。但是當(dāng)看到歐洲的理解方式是如何發(fā)展的，在歷史和地域方面它最后成為世界的和普遍的理解方式，我們還能說這是增長嗎？我看還不如說是轉(zhuǎn)變。
Take, as an example, animal and plant classifications. How often have they not been rewritten since the Middle Ages according to completely different rules: by symbolism, by natural history, by comparative anatomy, by the theory of evolution. Each time this rewriting makes the knowledge completely different in its functions, in its economy, in its internal relations. You have there a principle of divergence, much more than one of growth. I would much rather say that there are many different ways of making possible simultaneously a few types of knowledge. There is, therefore, from a certain point of view, always an excess of data in relation to possible systems in a given period, which causes them to be experienced within their boundaries, even in their deficiency, which means that one fails to realise their creativity; and from another point of view, that of the historian, there is an excess, a proliferation of systems for a small amount of data, from which originates the widespread idea that it is the discovery of new facts which determines movement in the history of science.
咱們以動物和植物的分類為例。從中世紀(jì)以來，根據(jù)截然不同的規(guī)則，人們已經(jīng)重寫多少遍了？有從符號學(xué)角度分類的，有從自然史、從人體比較解剖學(xué)、從進(jìn)化論等各種角度分類的。而每一次重寫都使知識在它的功能、結(jié)構(gòu)、內(nèi)部關(guān)系方面發(fā)生全新的變化。這里有一個輻散原則，它遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過增長原則。我更傾向于認(rèn)為有眾多方式都可以使少量知識同時得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。因此，從某種觀點(diǎn)看，在一特定時期內(nèi)總是有與可能系統(tǒng)相關(guān)的材料過剩情況，它促使在局限的貧乏的條件下進(jìn)行實(shí)驗，但卻阻礙了創(chuàng)造性。從另一觀點(diǎn)看，即從史學(xué)家的觀點(diǎn)看，總是系統(tǒng)過多過濫而材料相應(yīng)不足。因而普遍產(chǎn)生了這樣的想法：科學(xué)史的進(jìn)程取決于新現(xiàn)象的發(fā)現(xiàn)。
CHOMSKY: Here perhaps again, let me try to synthesise a bit. I agree with your conception of scientific progress; that is, I don't think that scientific progress is simply a matter of the accumulated addition of new knowledge and the absorption of new theories and so on. Rather I think that it has this sort of jagged pattern that you describe, forgetting certain problems and leaping to new theories. .
喬姆斯基：我概括一下我的想法。我同意您關(guān)于科學(xué)進(jìn)步的觀念。就是說我不認(rèn)為這是個新知識積累的問題、而是汲取新理論的問題，等等。（這里是并列關(guān)系不是轉(zhuǎn)折關(guān)系，用“而是”不妥）更確切地說，我認(rèn)為它是走著一條您描繪的彎彎曲曲的路，同時置某些問題于腦后以便趕緊占有新的理論。
FOUCAULT: And transforming the same knowledge.
?？拢汉娃D(zhuǎn)變相同的知識。
CHOMSKY: Right. But I think that one can perhaps hazard an explanation for that. Oversimplifying grossly, I really don't mean what I'm going to say now literally, one might suppose that the following general lines of an explanation are accurate: it is as if, as human beings of a particular biologically given organisation, we have in our heads, to start with, a certain set of possible intellectual structures, possible sciences. Okay?
我想還可以深入地解釋一下。簡言之，我下面要說的大體上假設(shè)為正確的：作為一個特定的生物學(xué)構(gòu)造的人類，一開始在我們頭腦里就有某種可能存在的智力結(jié)構(gòu)的規(guī)則、某個可能存在的科學(xué)的規(guī)則。
Now, in the lucky event that some aspect of reality happens to have the character of one of these structures in our mind, then we have a science: that is to say that, fortunately, the structure of our mind and the structure of some aspect of reality coincide sufficiently so that we develop an intelligible science.
如果有幸，現(xiàn)實(shí)中的一個現(xiàn)象有我們頭腦里的某個結(jié)構(gòu)的特點(diǎn)，我們便擁有了一門學(xué)科。也就是說，極為幸運(yùn)，我們頭腦的結(jié)構(gòu)和現(xiàn)實(shí)現(xiàn)象的結(jié)構(gòu)恰到好處地吻合了，我們就發(fā)展了一門顯而易懂的學(xué)科。
It is precisely this initial limitation in our minds to a certain kind of possible science which provides the tremendous richness and creativity of scientific knowledge. It is important to stress-and this has to do with your point about limitation and freedom-that were it not for these limitations, we would not have the creative act of going from a little bit of knowledge, a little bit of experience, to a rich and highly articulated and complicated array of knowledge. Because if anything could be possible, then nothing would be possible.
就是我們頭腦中的這種對某些學(xué)科的原始限制提供了科學(xué)知識的巨大財富和創(chuàng)造性。有必要強(qiáng)調(diào)一下，如果沒有這些限制我們就不可能有創(chuàng)造行為。這是從微不足道的知識、不足掛齒的經(jīng)驗中把我們引導(dǎo)到極為復(fù)雜、清晰的知識和創(chuàng)造行為?，F(xiàn)在我又回到限制與自由的關(guān)系問題上了。因為如果一切都是可能的，那就沒有什么是可能的了。
But it is precisely because of this property of our minds, which in detail we don't understand, but which, I think, in a general way we can begin to perceive, which presents us with certain possible intelligible structures, and which in the course of history and insight and experience begin to come into focus or fall out of focus and so on; it is precisely because of this property of our minds that the progress of science, I think, has this erratic and jagged character that you describe.
恰恰由于我們頭腦里的這種特性，我們得以發(fā)現(xiàn)某些有可能理解的結(jié)構(gòu)。我們對頭腦的這種特性還未有細(xì)致的了解，但已開始發(fā)現(xiàn)它了。這種特性在歷史的長河中、在研究的進(jìn)展中、在經(jīng)驗的積累中時隱時現(xiàn)……也正是由于這種特性，科學(xué)的進(jìn)步具有您描繪的混沌、碰撞之特點(diǎn)。
That doesn't mean that everything is ultimately going to fall within the domain of science. Personally I believe that many of the things we would like to understand, and maybe the things we would most like to understand, such as the nature of man, or the nature of a decent society, or lots of other things, might really fall outside the scope of possible human science.
這并不意味著最終一切都被包括進(jìn)科學(xué)領(lǐng)域之中。我個人認(rèn)為許多我們不惜任何代價企盼能夠理解的東西，比如人性、情理社會的性質(zhì)及許多其他問題，事實(shí)上都是人文科學(xué)力所不能及的。
ELDERS: Well, I think that we are confronted again with the question of the inner relation between limitation and freedom. Do you agree, Mr. Foucault, with the statement about the combination of limitation, fundamental limitation? .
埃勒德：我想我們又一次面對限制與自由之間的原始關(guān)系問題。?？孪壬?，您是否肯定同意限制的組合、基本的限制……
FOUCAULT: It is not a matter of combination. Only creativity is possible in putting into play of a system of rules; it is not a mixture of order and freedom.
?？拢哼@不是組合問題。只有從規(guī)則體系出發(fā)才談得上可能的創(chuàng)造性，這不是自由與規(guī)則的摻和。
Where perhaps I don't completely agree with Mr. Chomsky, is when he places the principle of these regularities, in a way, in the interior of the mind or of human nature.
可能我與喬姆斯基先生意見不完全一致的地方是他把規(guī)則性的原則置于可以說是精神或人性的內(nèi)部。
If it is a matter of whether these rules are effectively put to work by the human mind, all right; all right, too, if it is a question of whether the historian and the linguist can think it in their turn; it is all right also to say that these rules should allow us to realise what is said or thought by these individuals. But to say that these regularities are connected, as conditions of existence, to the human mind or its nature, is difficult for me to accept: it seems to me that one must, before reaching that point-and in any case I am talking only about the understanding-replace it in the field of other human practices, such as economics, technology, politics, sociology, which can serve them as conditions of formation, of models, of place, of apparition, etc. I would like to know whether one cannot discover the system of regularity, of constraint, which makes science possible, somewhere else, even outside the human mind, in social forms, in the relations of production, in the class struggles, etc.
如果問題在于這些規(guī)則是否的確通過人的精神在發(fā)揮作用，很好；史學(xué)家和語言學(xué)家是否能來思考一下這個問題，很好，那么這些規(guī)則就應(yīng)該使我們能夠掌握這些個體的言論和思想。但我們難以接受這些規(guī)則與人的精神或人的性質(zhì)有關(guān)聯(lián)的說法。如同生存條件一樣：我覺得在觸及這點(diǎn)之前，應(yīng)把這些規(guī)則置于人類實(shí)踐的其他領(lǐng)域中去，如經(jīng)濟(jì)、技術(shù)、政治以及社會的實(shí)踐中去。這些領(lǐng)域能為這些規(guī)則提供形成條件、顯露條件及范例。我設(shè)想使科學(xué)成為可能的這個規(guī)則體系、制約體系似乎也存在于其他地方，甚至在人類精神之外，存在于社會形式中、生產(chǎn)關(guān)系中、階級斗爭里等等。
For example, the fact that at a certain time madness became an object for scientific study, and an object of knowledge in the West, seems to me to be linked to a particular economic and social situation.
比如在某些時期，瘋狂成為歐洲科學(xué)研究和學(xué)問的主題，這個事實(shí)使我覺得它同經(jīng)濟(jì)形勢、獨(dú)特的社會形勢有關(guān)聯(lián)。
Perhaps the point of difference between Mr. Chomsky and myself is that when he speaks of science he probably thinks of the formal organisation of knowledge, whereas I am speaking of knowledge itself, that is to say, I think of the content of various knowledges which is dispersed into a particular society, permeates through that society, and asserts itself as the foundation for education, for theories, for practices, etc.
可能喬姆斯基先生與我之間的分歧在于當(dāng)他談及科學(xué)時，他大概想到的是知識的形式組織，而我談的是知識本身，也就是說各種分散在特定社會里的知識內(nèi)容，它在這個社會里無處不在，構(gòu)成教育、理論、實(shí)踐等的基礎(chǔ)。
ELDERS: But what does this theory of knowledge mean for your theme of the death of man or the end of the period of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries?
埃勒德：這種知識理論同您的19－20世紀(jì)末的人類死亡主題相比意味著什么？
FOUCAULT: But this doesn't have any relation to what we are talking about.
福柯：這同咱們今天談?wù)摰氖虑楹翢o關(guān)系。
ELDERS: I don't know, because I was trying to apply what you have said to your anthropological notion. You have already refused to speak about your own creativity and freedom, haven't you? Well, I'm wondering what are the psychological reasons for this.
埃勒德：我不知道。我只是想把您說過的話運(yùn)用到您的人類學(xué)概念中去。您已經(jīng)拒絕談?wù)撃约旱膭?chuàng)造性和您的自由，不是嗎？我想是什么心理因素……
FOUCAULT: [Protesting.] Well, you can wonder about it, but I can't help that.
?？拢汉冒?，您可以去想，但我?guī)筒涣嗣Α?/p>
ELDERS: Ah, well.
埃勒德：噢，是嗎。
FOUCAULT: I am not wondering about it.
福柯：這不關(guān)我的事。
ELDERS: But what are the objective reasons, in relation to your conception of understanding, of knowledge, of science, for refusing to answer these personal questions?
埃勒德：但您拒絕回答有關(guān)您個人問題的客觀理由是什么呢？這同您的理解概念、知識概念、科學(xué)概念有關(guān)。
When there is a problem for you to answer, what are your reasons for making a problem out of a personal question?
在您解決問題時，為什么要把個個的事轉(zhuǎn)變成問題呢？
FOUCAULT: No, I'm not making a problem out of a personal question; I make of a personal question an absence of a problem.
不，我并未把個人的事當(dāng)作一個問題，對我來說個人的事不是問題。
Let me take a very simple example, which I will not analyse, but which is this: How was it possible that men began, at the end of the eighteenth century, for the first time in the history of Western thought and of Western knowledge, to open up the corpses of people in order to know what was the source, the origin, the anatomical needle, of the particular malady which was responsible for their deaths?
我舉一個非常簡單的例子，不加任何分析。在18世紀(jì)末期，人類如何能夠剖開尸體以便找出致死的根源呢？這在西方的思想認(rèn)識史中是前所未有的。
The idea seems simple enough. Well, four or five thousand years of medicine in the West were needed before we had the idea of looking for the cause of the malady in the lesion of a corpse.
原因似乎很簡單。但這是西方醫(yī)學(xué)界用了四千年或五千年的時間才產(chǎn)生出從病損尸體中尋找病因的想法。
If you tried to explain this by the personality of Bichat, I believe that would be without interest. If, on the contrary, you tried to establish the place of disease and of death in society at the end of the eighteenth century, and what interest industrial society effectively had in quadrupling the entire population in order to expand and develop itself, as a result of which medical surveys of society were made, big hospitals were opened, etc.; if you tried to find out how medical knowledge became institutionalised in that period, how its relations with other kinds of knowledge were ordered, well, then you could see how the relationship between disease, the hospitalised, ill person, the corpse, and pathological anatomy were made possible.
要從比沙的個性中尋找答案我想是沒有意義的。相反，如果你給18世紀(jì)末社會的疾病和死亡問題一席之地，注意到這個工業(yè)社會的人中增加了4倍，而這是對社會展開了健康調(diào)查并開設(shè)了大醫(yī)院的結(jié)果；如果再努力搞清楚醫(yī)學(xué)知識在此期間是如何鞏固下來的，它同其他形式的知識是如何結(jié)合在一起的，就會掌握疾病、病人、醫(yī)院里的病員、尸體和病理解剖學(xué)之間的關(guān)系了。
Here is, I believe, a form of analysis which I don't say is new, but which in any case has been much too neglected; and personal events have almost nothing to do with it.
我認(rèn)為這就是一種分析形式。我并不認(rèn)為它是新方法，但卻被人極為忽視。個人的事情在這方面一般不起任何作用。
ELDERS: Yes, but nevertheless it would have been very interesting for us to know a little bit more about your arguments to refute this.
埃勒德：好的，但我們還是希望能更充分地了解您的理由。
Could you, Mr. Chomsky-and as far as I'm concerned, it's my last question about this philosophical part of the debate-give your ideas about, for example, the way the social sciences are working? I'm thinking here especially about your severe attacks on behaviourism. And perhaps you could even explain a little the way Mr. Foucault is now working in a more or less behaviouristic way. [Both philosophers laugh.]
喬姆斯基先生，您是否能和我們談?wù)勆鐣茖W(xué)運(yùn)作的方式？這是這場討論會哲學(xué)部分的最后一個問題。這尤其使我想到您給予行為主義的嚴(yán)厲抨擊。或許您還可以解釋一下?？孪壬壳笆褂玫幕蚨嗷蛏俚男袨橹髁x方式。
CHOMSKY: I would like to depart from your injunction very briefly, just to make one comment about what Mr. Foucault just said.
在滿足您的要求之前，我希望簡單地概述一下福柯先生剛才的一席話。
I think that illustrates very nicely the way in which we're digging into the mountain from opposite directions, to use your original image. That is, I think that an act of scientific creation depends on two facts: one, some intrinsic property of the mind, another, some set of social and intellectual conditions that exist. And it is not a question, as I see it, of which of these we should study; rather we will understand scientific discovery, and similarly any other kind of discovery, when we know what these factors are and can therefore explain how they interact in a particular fashion.
我想這番話恰到好處地說明了您對我們的寫照：我們倆人分頭在一座大山下挖隧道。我認(rèn)為科學(xué)創(chuàng)造行為依附于兩點(diǎn)：首先是精神內(nèi)在的特性，其次是社會條件和智力條件的特定總體。問題不在于搞清我們應(yīng)研究其中的哪一個。當(dāng)我們了解并能夠解釋這些因素相互起作用的方式后，我們便理解了科學(xué)發(fā)明及其他發(fā)現(xiàn)。
My particular interest, in this connection at least, is with the intrinsic capacities of the mind; yours, as you say, is in the particular arrangement of social and economic and other conditions.
我尤其對精神的內(nèi)在能力感興趣，而您尤為關(guān)注的是社會、經(jīng)濟(jì)和其他方面條件的組織。
FOUCAULT: But I don't believe that difference is connected to our characters-because at this moment it would make Mr. Elders right, and he must not be right.
福柯：但我不認(rèn)為分歧同我們的性格有關(guān)。如若有關(guān)的話，埃勒德就得理了，而他不應(yīng)有理。
CHOMSKY: No, I agree, and...
喬姆斯基：對，我同意，但……
FOUCAULT: It's connected to the state of knowledge, of knowing, in which we are working. The linguistics with which you have been familiar, and which you have succeeded in transforming, excluded the importance of the creative subject, of the creative speaking subject; while the history of science such as it existed when people of my generation were starting to work, on the contrary, exalted individual creativity. .
福柯：這同知識狀態(tài)有關(guān)，同我們在工作中的認(rèn)識有關(guān)。您對語言學(xué)駕輕就熟，并已成功地將它進(jìn)行了改造，排除了創(chuàng)造性主體，即創(chuàng)造性言語主體的重要性。但科學(xué)史就不同了，當(dāng)我們這輩人著手開始研究它時，它已對個體的創(chuàng)造性大為贊揚(yáng)……
CHOMSKY: Yes.
喬姆斯基：是的。
FOUCAULT: ...and put aside these collective rules.
福柯：……并避開共同規(guī)則。
CHOMSKY: Yes, yes.
QUESTION: Ah...
ELDERS:
? Yes, please go on.
QUESTION: It goes a bit back in your discussion, but what I should like to know, Mr. Chomsky, is this: you suppose a basic system of what must be in a way elementary limitations that are present in what you call human nature; to what extent do you think these are subject to historical change? Do you think, for instance, that they have changed substantially since, let's say, the seventeenth century? In that case, you could perhaps connect this with the ideas of Mr. Foucault?
一名與會者：我想往前追溯一下你們的討論。喬姆斯基先生，我想知道的是您從根本上設(shè)想了一個基本限制體系，它體現(xiàn)在您稱之為人性的概念里面。您認(rèn)為它在何種程度上受制于歷史的變遷呢？舉例說，您認(rèn)為自從17世紀(jì)它們就被大量地進(jìn)行改造了嗎？在此情況下，您能否把這種觀點(diǎn)同?？孪壬挠^點(diǎn)相聯(lián)系呢？
CHOMSKY: Well, I think that as a matter of biological and anthropological fact, the nature of human intelligence certainly has not changed in any substantial way, at least since the seventeenth century, or probably since Cro-Magnon man. That is, I think that the fundamental properties of our intelligence, those that are within the domain of what we are discussing tonight, are certainly very ancient; and that if you took a man from five thousand or maybe twenty thousand years ago, and placed him as a child within today's society, he would learn what everyone else learns, and he would be a genius or a fool or something else, but he wouldn't be fundamentally different.
喬姆斯基：好吧，我想這是個生物學(xué)和人類學(xué)方面的問題。從17世紀(jì)以來，人的智力特點(diǎn)肯定沒有多大變化，可能從克羅馬農(nóng)人算起也沒有多大變化。我想我們智力的主要特性，這是今晚討論會中經(jīng)常提及的，肯定是相當(dāng)古老的。如果一個五千年前或兩萬年前的人轉(zhuǎn)世到當(dāng)今社會的一個孩子身上，他能夠像其他所有人一樣學(xué)會各種東西。也許他會是一個奇才，也可能是個笨蛋，但肯定不會有本質(zhì)差異。
But, of course, the level of acquired knowledge changes, social conditions change-those conditions that permit a person to think freely and break through the bonds of, let's say, superstitious constraint. And as those conditions change, a given human intelligence will progress to new forms of creation. In fact this relates very closely to the last question that Mr. Elders put, if I can perhaps say a word about that.
當(dāng)然獲取知識的水平發(fā)生了變化，社會條件也變化了。這使當(dāng)代人可以自由地思考、斬斷同迷信壓近的關(guān)系。隨著這些條件的變化，一定的人類智力朝著新的創(chuàng)造方式進(jìn)步。這也是對埃勒德先生最后一個問題的回答。對此我想再說一點(diǎn)。
Take behavioural science, and think of it in these contexts. It seems to me that the fundamental property of behaviourism, which is in a way suggested by the odd term behavioural science, is that it is a negation of the possibility of developing a scientific theory. That is, what defines behaviourism is the very curious and self-destructive assumption that you are not permitted to create an interesting theory.
讓我們把行為主義科學(xué)放在這一背景中看看。行為科學(xué)這個怪詞使我聯(lián)想起行為主義的主要特性，我感覺這個特性對發(fā)展科學(xué)理論的可能性起著負(fù)作用。好奇的和自毀的假設(shè)為行為主義下了定義，據(jù)此假設(shè)，我們不可能創(chuàng)立一個有意義的理論。
If physics, for example, had made the assumption that you have to keep to phenomena and their arrangement and such things, we would be doing Babylonian astronomy today. Fortunately physicists never made this ridiculous, extraneous assumption, which has its own historical reasons and had to do with all sorts of curious facts about the historical context in which behaviourism evolved.
舉例說，如果物理學(xué)提出的假設(shè)是以現(xiàn)象及其表現(xiàn)為本，那么我們今天仍在研究巴比倫的天文。幸好物理學(xué)家們從未提出這種荒謬可笑的假設(shè)。但這種假設(shè)有其歷史緣由并涉及在歷史背景中的所有各種奇異事物，行為主義便是在此背景下得以發(fā)展的。
But looking at it purely intellectually, behaviourism is the arbitrary insistence that one must not create a scientific theory of human behaviour; rather one must deal directly with phenomena and their interrelation, and no more something which is totally impossible in any other domain, and I assume impossible in the domain of human intelligence or human behaviour as well. So in this sense I don't think that behaviourism is a science. Here is a case in point of just the kind of thing that you mentioned and that Mr. Foucault is discussing: under certain historical circumstances, for example those in which experimental psychology developed, it was-for some reason which I won't go into-interesting and maybe important to impose some very strange limitations on the kind of scientific theory construction that was permitted, and those very strange limitations are known as behaviourism. Well, it has long since run its course, I think. Whatever value it may have had in 1880, it has no function today except constraining and limiting scientific inquiry and should therefore simply be dispensed with, in the same way one would dispense with a physicist who said: you're not allowed to develop a general physical theory, you're only allowed to plot the motions of the planets and make up more epicycles and so on and so forth. One forgets about that and puts it aside. Similarly one should put aside the very curious restrictions that define behaviourism; restrictions which are, as I said before, very much suggested by the term behavioural science itself.
如果從純精神角度看這個問題，行為主義可概括為武斷地禁止建立一個人類行為的科學(xué)理論。此外它還開始直接研究現(xiàn)象及現(xiàn)象之間的關(guān)系，僅此而已。這在其他領(lǐng)域里是絕對不可能的事情，在智力或人類行為領(lǐng)域也絕對行不通。在此意義上說，我不認(rèn)為行為主義是一種科學(xué)。我現(xiàn)在回答您的問題，回到?？孪壬劦降膯栴}上來。在歷史的某些環(huán)境中，比如說實(shí)驗心理學(xué)發(fā)展的環(huán)境中，把奇怪的限制強(qiáng)加于可信的科學(xué)理論的建設(shè)中是令人感興趣的，也是非常重要的，這種限制被稱為行為主義。出于某種考慮，在此我不詳加解釋了。這種想法曾盛行一時。在1880年，這種想法可能具有某些價值，但是現(xiàn)在，它唯一的作用就是限制和扼殺科學(xué)調(diào)查，因此應(yīng)該干脆擺脫它。正如一位物理學(xué)家所說：“你們無權(quán)提出一個普通物理學(xué)的理論，而只有研究天體運(yùn)動和發(fā)現(xiàn)新本輪的權(quán)利?！比藗兺浟诉@些。必須擺脫確定行為主義的奇怪限制，這些限制本身由行為科學(xué)的詞匯表達(dá)出來的。
We can agree, perhaps, that behaviour in some broad sense constitutes the data for the science of man. But to define a science by its data would be to define physics as the theory of meter-readings. And if a physicist were to say: yes, I'm involved in meter-reading science, we could be pretty sure that he was not going to get very far. They might talk about meter-readings and correlations between them and such things, but they wouldn't ever create physical theory.
從廣義上看，行為構(gòu)成了人文科學(xué)的素材，我們同意這點(diǎn)。但通過這些素材來確定一門科學(xué)便又回到把物理學(xué)確定為閱讀測量儀器的理論上了。如果有一位物理學(xué)家聲稱：“我致力于閱讀測量方面的理論?！笨隙ㄋ粫叱龆噙h(yuǎn)。他可以談?wù)摐y量，談?wù)摐y量之間的關(guān)系，但卻永遠(yuǎn)創(chuàng)立不出一個物理學(xué)理論。
And so the term itself is symptomatic of the disease in this case. We should understand the historical context in which these curious limitations developed, and having understood them, I believe, discard them and proceed in the science of man as we would in any other domain, that is by discarding entirely behaviourism and in fact, in my view, the entire empiricist tradition from which it evolved.
在這種情況下，詞語僅是征候性的。我們應(yīng)該了解這些奇怪限制發(fā)展的歷史背景，然后就像在其他領(lǐng)域里一樣拋開它，在人類科學(xué)方面繼續(xù)前進(jìn)，同時徹底淘汰行為主義。依我看，還有其他所有源自行為主義的經(jīng)驗論傳統(tǒng)。
QUESTION: So you are not willing to link your theory about innate limitations, with Mr. Foucault's theory of the "grille". There might be a certain connection. You see, Mr. Foucault says that an upsurge of creativity in a certain direction automatically removes knowledge in another direction, by a system of "grilles". Well, if you had a changing system of limitations, this might be connected.
一與會者：您并不期望把您的天賦限制理論同福柯先生的“柵欄”理論相溝通，可能在這兩者之間存在著某種關(guān)系。比如說?？孪壬J(rèn)為在某些方面的剩余創(chuàng)造性通過“柵欄”理論相溝通，可能在這兩者之間存在著某種關(guān)系。比如說?？孪壬J(rèn)為在某些方面的剩余創(chuàng)造性通過“柵欄”體系自動轉(zhuǎn)換了知識。如果您的限制體系做一變動的話，您們的觀點(diǎn)就十分接近了。
CHOMSKY: Well, the reason for what he describes, I think, is different. Again, I'm oversimplifying. We have more possible sciences available intellectually. When we try out those intellectual constructions in a changing world of fact, we will not find cumulative growth. What we will find are strange leaps: here is a domain of phenomena, a certain science applies very nicely; now slightly broaden the range of phenomena, then another science, which is very different, happens to apply very beautifully, perhaps leaving out some of these other phenomena. Okay, that's scientific progress and that leads to the omission or forgetting of certain domains. But I think the reason for this is precisely this set of principles, which unfortunately, we don't know, which makes the whole discussion rather abstract, which defines for us what is a possible intellectual structure, a possible deep-science, if you like.
喬姆斯基：我認(rèn)為這些理由是不同的。我講得過于簡單了。很多的可實(shí)現(xiàn)的科學(xué)在理智在是可以理解的。當(dāng)我們在一個千變?nèi)f化的世界里檢驗精神結(jié)構(gòu)時，我們得不到累積的增長，卻得到奇怪的距離：對某些現(xiàn)象解釋得極好，但對某些現(xiàn)象又解釋不了。有些人忘記了這些。這是科學(xué)進(jìn)步的一部分，同時也導(dǎo)致了遺漏或遺忘某些領(lǐng)域。這個過程的原因恰恰就是原則的總體。不幸的是我們還不了解這個總體，這使得所有的確定結(jié)構(gòu)討化，一個深奧的科學(xué)討論變得十分抽象。
ELDERS: Well, let's move over now to the second part of the discussion, to politics. First of all I would like to ask Mr. Foucault why he is so interested in politics, because he told me that in fact he likes politics much more than philosophy.
埃勒德：讓我們過渡到討論會的第二部分：政治。首先我想問下?？孪壬?，這是您對我說過的，為什么您對政治和哲學(xué)傾注了同樣的熱情？
FOUCAULT: I've never concerned myself, in any case, with philosophy. But that is not a problem. [He laughs.]
我從未搞過哲學(xué)，但問題不在這兒。
Your question is: why am I so interested in politics? But if I were to answer you very simply, I would say this: why shouldn't I be interested? That is to say, what blindness, what deafness, what density of ideology would have to weigh me down to prevent me from being interested in what is probably the most crucial subject to our existence, that is to say the society in which we live, the economic relations within which it functions, and the system of power which defines the regular forms and the regular permissions and prohibitions of our conduct. The essence of our life consists, after all, of the political functioning of the society in which we find ourselves.
您的問題是：為什么我也非常熱衷于政治？為了簡捷地回答您，我說：為什么我不能熱衷于它？什么樣的聾啞、失明，什么樣林林總總的思想體系能有權(quán)阻止我對我們最重要的生存問題的關(guān)注呢？這是我們生活于其中的社會，在其中運(yùn)行經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系并確定合法形式、決定我們行為準(zhǔn)則的體制。我們生活的至關(guān)重要的焦點(diǎn)是我們所在社會的政治運(yùn)作。
So I can't answer the question of why I should be interested; I could only answer it by asking why shouldn't I be interested?
同樣我也無法回答關(guān)于我為什么對此熱心投入的問題。我只能以為什么我不應(yīng)對此熱衷來回答您。
ELDERS: You are obliged to be interested, isn't that so?
埃勒德：您不得不熱衷于此，是這樣的嗎？
FOUCAULT: Yes, at least, there isn't anything odd here which is worth question or answer. Not to be interested in politics, that's what constitutes a problem. So instead of asking me, you should ask someone who is not interested in politics and then your question would be well-founded, and you would have the right to say "Why, damn it, are you not interested?" [They laugh and the audience laughs.]
?？拢菏堑?，至少如此。對于值得探討的問題這沒有什么好奇怪的。對政治無動于衷這會是個真正的問題。去對一個不關(guān)心政治的人提此問題吧，而不要對我。那樣您有權(quán)對他高聲問道：“怎么，您對此不感興趣？”
ELDERS: Well, yes, perhaps. Mr. Chomsky, we are all very interested to know your political objectives, especially in relation to your well-known anarcho-syndicalism or, as you formulated it, libertarian socialism. What are the most important goals of your libertarian socialism?
埃勒德：是的，可能會這樣。喬姆斯基先生，我們所有人都特別想了解您的政治目標(biāo)，尤其是同無政府工團(tuán)主義的關(guān)系，或者就像您親自下的定義那樣，您同自由社會主義的關(guān)系。它的主要目標(biāo)是什么呢？
CHOMSKY: I'll overcome the urge to answer the earlier very interesting question that you asked me and turn to this one.
喬姆斯基：我忍痛割愛先不回答您前一個問題，這是個非常有意思的問題。我先回答現(xiàn)在這個問題。
Let me begin by referring to something that we have already discussed, that is, if it is correct, as I believe it is, that a fundamental element of human nature is the need for creative work, for creative inquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effect of coercive institutions, then, of course, it will follow that a decent society should maximise the possibilities for this fundamental human characteristic to be realised. That means trying to overcome the elements of repression and oppression and destruction and coercion that exist in any existing society, ours for example, as a historical residue.
首先我要談一個我們已經(jīng)說過的話題。如果我沒有搞錯的話，那就是人性的一個基本要素是對創(chuàng)造性勞動的需要，對創(chuàng)造性研究的需要，對沒有強(qiáng)制法規(guī)專橫限制的自由創(chuàng)造的需要，由此產(chǎn)生的一個情理社會應(yīng)能最大限度地提供實(shí)現(xiàn)人類基本特性的可能性。這意味著要戰(zhàn)勝壓抑、壓迫、破壞、限制諸因素，它們存在于所有的社會中，像歷史垃圾一樣存在于我們的社會之中。
Now any form of coercion or repression, any form of autocratic control of some domain of existence, let's say, private ownership of capital or state control of some aspects of human life, any such autocratic restriction on some area of human endeavour, can be justified, if at all, only in terms of the need for subsistence, or the need for survival, or the need for defence against some horrible fate or something of that sort. It cannot be justified intrinsically. Rather it must be overcome and eliminated.
所有生存領(lǐng)域里的強(qiáng)制、壓抑和專制控制的形式，比如資本的私有或國家在某些方面對人類生活的控制，所有強(qiáng)有加于人類活動的限制，只有當(dāng)它們僅是根據(jù)生存需要或與恐怖命運(yùn)抗?fàn)帟r才能是合法的。它不可能本質(zhì)性地合法，還不如將它摒棄。
And I think that, at least in the technologically advanced societies of the West we are now certainly in a position where meaningless drudgery can very largely be eliminated, and to the marginal extent that it's necessary, can be shared among the population; where centralised autocratic control of, in the first place, economic institutions, by which I mean either private capitalism or state totalitarianism or the various mixed forms of state capitalism that exist here and there, has become a destructive vestige of history.
我想，至少在科技方面比較先進(jìn)的西方社會里，我們能夠避免這些無用的、令人不快的需要。在某些范圍內(nèi)，可以同人民分享特權(quán)。經(jīng)濟(jì)體制的中央專制控制——我所指的既是私營資本主義也是國家極權(quán)政體，還包括那些分布在各處的國家資本主義五花八門的混雜形式——這些已成為歷史的破壞性殘渣余孽。
They are all vestiges that have to be overthrown, eliminated in favour of direct participation in the form of workers' councils or other free associations that individuals will constitute themselves for the purpose of their social existence and their productive labour.
所有這些殘余都應(yīng)被清除以利于勞工委員會或自由結(jié)合式的直接參與，這是個體在他們社會生活范圍和生產(chǎn)勞動范圍內(nèi)的自己的組織。
Now a federated, decentralised system of free associations, incorporating economic as well as other social institutions, would be what I refer to as anarcho-syndicalism; and it seems to me that this is the appropriate form of social organisation for an advanced technological society, in which human beings do not have to be forced into the position of tools, of cogs in the machine. There is no longer any social necessity for human beings to be treated as mechanical elements in the productive process; that can be overcome and we must overcome it by a society of freedom and free association, in which the creative urge that I consider intrinsic to human nature, will in fact be able to realise itself in whatever way it will.
一個聯(lián)邦的、分散的自由結(jié)合的體制在吸收了經(jīng)濟(jì)和社會的規(guī)章后就會構(gòu)成被我所稱的無政府工團(tuán)主義。我覺得對于一個先進(jìn)的科技社會，這是適合社會結(jié)構(gòu)的形式。在這樣的社會里，人類個體不會被變成工具、機(jī)械的齒輪。不再有把人類個體當(dāng)成生產(chǎn)線上的鏈環(huán)的社會需要（本文由微信公眾號“慧田哲學(xué)”推送）。我們應(yīng)該通過一個自由的社會和一個自由結(jié)合的社會來達(dá)到這一目的。在這樣的社會里，人性固有的創(chuàng)造沖動能夠以它自己界定的方式得以充分實(shí)現(xiàn)。
And again, like Mr. Foucault, I don't see how any human being can fail to be interested in this question. [Foucault laughs.]
重申一下，正如?？孪壬f，我不清楚一個人怎么能對這個問題無動于衷。
