Three Absolute Idealism

第三章　絕對(duì)觀念論(3)

Understood as the thesis that everything is an appearance of the idea, absolute idealism is compatible with realism, i.e. the doctrine that objects exist apart from and prior to consciousness. The appearances of the idea might be material objects as well as self-conscious subjects, and indeed the whole realm of nature prior to the development of humanity. Hegel assumes throughout his Naturphilosophie that nature exists apart from and prior to human consciousness, and that the development of humanity presupposes and only arises from the prior development of the organic powers of nature.

在被理解為“每一事物都是理念的顯現(xiàn)”這一論題時(shí)，絕對(duì)觀念論就與實(shí)在論（realism）相容了。而按照實(shí)在論，對(duì)象在意識(shí)之外并且先在于意識(shí)。理念的表象，可能是質(zhì)料性客體，也可能是自我意識(shí)著的主體，并且實(shí)際上整個(gè)自然領(lǐng)域先于人類(lèi)的發(fā)展。黑格爾在《自然哲學(xué)》中始終假定，自然外在于并先于人類(lèi)意識(shí)而存在，人類(lèi)的發(fā)展預(yù)設(shè)了有機(jī)的自然力量的先在發(fā)展，并且只能源出于這種發(fā)展。

Hegel’s absolute idealism is also compatible with naturalism. If naturalism is the general thesis that everything in nature happens according to laws, then absolute idealism sanctions naturalism, because it holds that everything that happens in nature happens of necessity. It is also compatible with the more speci?c thesis that everything in nature conforms to mechanical laws, i.e. laws where the cause of any event is some prior event in time. Hegel does not deny the mechanism of nature because he regards its workings as the necessary means for the realization of ends. Absolute idealism is incompatible only with a naturalism that claims everything is explicable only according to mechanical laws. The proper antithesis of absolute idealism is therefore neither realism nor naturalism but a radical or narrow mechanism that claims to be the only paradigm of explanation.

黑格爾的絕對(duì)觀念論也兼容自然主義（naturalism）。如果說(shuō)自然主義是這樣一種普泛的論點(diǎn)，即自然中所有事物的發(fā)生都合乎規(guī)律，那么絕對(duì)觀念論贊同自然主義，因?yàn)樗J(rèn)為自然中所有事物的發(fā)生都出自必然性。它也與一種更特殊的論點(diǎn)相兼容，即自然界的每一事物都符合機(jī)械法則，亦即任何事件的原因乃是某一時(shí)間在先的事件。黑格爾并不否認(rèn)自然的機(jī)械論，因?yàn)樗J(rèn)為自然的機(jī)械論運(yùn)作乃是實(shí)現(xiàn)目的的必要手段。絕對(duì)觀念論僅僅與下面這種自然主義不相容，這種自然主義主張任何事物唯有依據(jù)機(jī)械法則才是可解釋的。因此，與絕對(duì)觀念論正相反對(duì)的論點(diǎn)，既不是實(shí)在論也不是自然主義，而是一種激進(jìn)的或狹隘的機(jī)械論，它要求成為唯一的解釋范式。

According to Hegel’s absolute idealism, then, the whole dispute between materialism and idealism is misconceived. The absolute idea is neither subjective nor objective because it is the form or structure that inheres equally in both. We cannot reduce the subject down to the object, as if it were only material, and neither can we reduce the object down to the subject, as if it were only ideal. Both the subjective and objective are equally real, and the opposition between them is apparent from our everyday experience; it is indeed a necessary condition for the self-realization of the absolute that it divides itself into the subjective and objective (as we shall see, pp. 93–5). Nevertheless, this opposition does not diminish the identity or unity of the absolute, because as the formal and ?nal cause, as the intelligible principle of all things, it can be either subjective or objective.

那么，根據(jù)黑格爾的絕對(duì)觀念論，唯物論和觀念論之間的整個(gè)爭(zhēng)論都遭到了誤解。絕對(duì)理念既非主觀的也非客觀的，因?yàn)樗沁@兩者同等固有的形式或結(jié)構(gòu)。我們不能把主體還原為客體，仿佛它僅僅是質(zhì)料的，同樣我們也不能把客體還原為主體，仿佛它僅僅是觀念的。主觀和客觀是同樣實(shí)在的，二者之間的對(duì)立明顯來(lái)自我們的日常經(jīng)驗(yàn)；這種對(duì)立實(shí)際上是“絕對(duì)”自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的必要條件，即它將自身分裂為主觀和客觀（我們?cè)诘?3–95頁(yè)看到這一點(diǎn)）。然而，這一對(duì)立并沒(méi)有削弱“絕對(duì)”的同一性或統(tǒng)一性，因?yàn)樽鳛樾问揭蚝湍康囊?，作為所有事物的可理解原則，它可以要么是主觀的，要么是客觀的。

Although Hegel insists that the absolute idea realizes itself in the realm both of subjectivity and of objectivity, there is still a sense in which his absolute idealism gives pride of place to subjectivity over objectivity. It is one of Hegel’s fundamental criticisms of Spinoza that he did not su?ciently honor subjectivity and recognize its status over nature; he made subjectivity one attribute of substance, an attribute having the same status as matter, and indeed only one of an in?nite number of attributes. For Hegel, however, subjectivity is the highest manifestation, organization and development of the absolute. The absolute fully realizes itself only in the realm of history, and most of all in the domain of culture, i.e. in art, religion and philosophy. Hegel restores to Spinoza’s monism the idea of a great chain of being, a hierarchy of natural forms, which begins with matter, develops progressively through minerals, vegetables and animals, and ?nally culminates in humanity itself. The absolute is therefore better realized in the realm of subjectivity than objectivity. Although the absolute could indeed exist apart from and prior to subjectivity, it still could not fully realize or develop its nature without subjectivity. Nature without subjectivity could indeed exist, but it would be like the sapling that never grew into a mighty oak.

盡管黑格爾強(qiáng)調(diào)絕對(duì)理念同時(shí)在主觀性和客觀性中實(shí)現(xiàn)自身，但是在某種意義上，他的絕對(duì)觀念論仍然賦予主觀性之于客觀性更高的地位。黑格爾對(duì)斯賓諾莎的一個(gè)根本批評(píng)是，斯賓諾莎沒(méi)有給予主觀性以充分的榮耀，承認(rèn)它高于自然的地位；斯賓諾莎將主觀性當(dāng)作實(shí)體的一個(gè)屬性，一種與物質(zhì)具有同等地位的屬性，因而實(shí)際上僅僅是無(wú)限多樣的屬性之一種。然而，對(duì)黑格爾來(lái)說(shuō)，主觀性是“絕對(duì)”最高的展示、組織和發(fā)展。只是在歷史領(lǐng)域，并且主要是在文化領(lǐng)域，亦即在藝術(shù)、宗教和哲學(xué)中，“絕對(duì)”才充分實(shí)現(xiàn)自身。黑格爾把存在巨鏈的理念——一種有關(guān)自然形式的等級(jí)制，恢復(fù)到了斯賓諾莎的一元論的水平，這種理念從物質(zhì)開(kāi)端，漸進(jìn)地發(fā)展到礦物、植物和動(dòng)物，最后在人類(lèi)自身中達(dá)到頂峰。因此，相比于客觀性領(lǐng)域，“絕對(duì)”在主觀性領(lǐng)域更好地實(shí)現(xiàn)了自身。盡管“絕對(duì)”事實(shí)上能夠外在于和先于主觀性而存在，但是沒(méi)有主觀性，它就不能充分實(shí)現(xiàn)或發(fā)展它的本性。沒(méi)有主觀性的自然確實(shí)能夠存在，但它就像是一棵從未成長(zhǎng)為參天橡樹(shù)的小樹(shù)苗。

The important role of subjectivity in Hegel’s idealism, combined with his statement that the absolute must be conceived as subject as well as substance, has been one of the main sources of a very popular, but ultimately mistaken, reading of his absolute idealism.? According to this reading, Hegel’s absolute idealism is a form of cosmic subjectivism or supersubjectivism. It is essentially the doctrine that the absolute is spirit, the divine universal subject, and that this subject creates the entire world. This interpretation makes Hegel’s idealism a form of subjective idealism, though of a higherorder and more metaphysical kind. The subject is no longer ?nite (i.e. empirical and individual) but in?nite (i.e. rational and universal). This in?nite self would not be simply the Kantian transcendental subject, which is purely formal; rather, it would be the Kantian transcendental subject with all restrictions removed, i.e. one that is not individuated and that has the power to create the content as well as the form of experience. Although the material world exists independent of the ?nite subject, it does not exist independent of the in?nite subject, who has posited the whole realm of nature through its in?nite activity.

主觀性在黑格爾觀念論中的重要地位，同他關(guān)于“絕對(duì)”必須既被設(shè)想為主體也被設(shè)想為實(shí)體的陳述結(jié)合在一起，成為關(guān)于黑格爾絕對(duì)觀念論的一種十分流行但根本上錯(cuò)誤的解讀的一個(gè)主要根源。根據(jù)這種解讀，黑格爾的絕對(duì)觀念論是某種形式的宇宙的主觀主義或超級(jí)主觀主義。它本質(zhì)性是這種學(xué)說(shuō)，即“絕對(duì)”是精神，是神圣普遍的主體，這一主體創(chuàng)造了整個(gè)世界。這種解讀使得黑格爾的觀念論變成某種形式的主觀觀念論，盡管是更高級(jí)的和更形而上學(xué)的類(lèi)型。主體不再是有限的（亦即經(jīng)驗(yàn)的和個(gè)體的），而是無(wú)限的（亦即理性的和普遍的）。這一無(wú)限的自我，將不僅僅是康德式的、純形式的先驗(yàn)主體；相反，它將是去掉了所有限制的康德式的先驗(yàn)主體，亦即一種不再是個(gè)別化的、并且有能力既創(chuàng)造經(jīng)驗(yàn)形式也創(chuàng)造經(jīng)驗(yàn)內(nèi)容的主體。盡管物質(zhì)世界獨(dú)立于有限主體而存在，但它不能獨(dú)立于這一無(wú)限主體而存在，這一無(wú)限主體通過(guò)它的無(wú)限活動(dòng)而設(shè)定了整個(gè)自然領(lǐng)域。

There are several problems with this reading. First, Hegel thinks that even if we eliminate the restrictions on the transcendental subject – even if we remove the thing-in-itself and the given content of experience – we still have subjective idealism because the forms of thinking are true only for the subject and not of the world itself (EPW §42A3, 45A). Second, Hegel maintains that the opposition between the subjective and objective has no meaning within the absolute idea, so that it cannot be regarded as exclusively subjective or objective (EPW §24A1). Third, Hegel maintains that the subjectivity of the absolute is only its final stage of organization and development; it is only the result, not the beginning. In the beginning, considered in itself, the absolute is not subject but substance.

這種解讀存在幾個(gè)問(wèn)題。首先，黑格爾認(rèn)為，即使我們可以消除對(duì)先驗(yàn)主體的各種限制——即使我們移除物自身和被給與的經(jīng)驗(yàn)內(nèi)容——我們擁有的仍然是主觀的觀念論，因?yàn)樗枷氲男问絻H只對(duì)于主體而非世界自身而言是真實(shí)的（EPW§ 42A3，45A）。其次，黑格爾主張，在絕對(duì)理念內(nèi)部，主觀與客觀之間的對(duì)立沒(méi)有意義，因此不能用一種相互排斥的眼光來(lái)看待主觀或客觀（EPW§ 24A1）。第三，黑格爾主張，“絕對(duì)”的主觀性僅僅是其組織和發(fā)展的最后階段；這只是結(jié)果，而非開(kāi)端。在開(kāi)端處，在它自身中考察的話，絕對(duì)不是主體而是實(shí)體。

THE SYNTHESIS OF IDEALISM AND REALISM, FREEDOM AND NECESSITY

觀念論與實(shí)在論、自由與必然的綜合

It should be clear by now that one purpose of Hegel’s absolute idealism is to transcend the stalemate between idealism and naturalism. Absolute idealism would somehow preserve the merits, and negate the ?aws, of these limited standpoints. Both were conceived as one-sided abstractions, false of the whole but true of one of its parts. But what, more precisely, were these standpoints? And how, more concretely, were they to be synthesized?

現(xiàn)在應(yīng)該很清楚了，黑格爾絕對(duì)觀念論的一個(gè)目的，是揚(yáng)棄觀念論（idealism）與自然主義（naturalism）之間的僵硬對(duì)立。絕對(duì)觀念論以某種方式保存這些有限立場(chǎng)的優(yōu)點(diǎn)，否定其缺陷。二者都被設(shè)想為片面的抽象，就整體而言為假，但是就片面而言為真。但是，更為確切地說(shuō)，這些立場(chǎng)究竟是什么？并且，更為具體地說(shuō)，如何實(shí)現(xiàn)它們的綜合？

For Hegel, and the entire romantic generation of the 1790s, the standpoint of realism or ‘dogmatism’ represented the philosophy of Spinoza; and the standpoint of idealism or ‘criticism’ represented the philosophy of Fichte. Fichte had declared that these are the only two possible positions, and he demanded that one choose between them. But his ultimatum was rejected by Hegel and the romantic generation, who saw merits in both standpoints. The great strength of Fichte’s idealism was its concept of radical freedom, the right and power of the self to create itself and its entire world. Fichte’s concept of the self-positing ego – that the self is only what it makes of itself – was irresistibly attractive to the generation of the 1790s, who wanted to break down all the limits of the traditional order and to create a new heaven and earth. The great virtue of Spinoza’s naturalism is that it saw the divine in nature and not as a supernatural heaven existing beyond it. Spinoza’s naturalism seemed to reconcile the demands of science and faith by naturalizing the divine and divinizing nature. Given the strengths of both positions, it was the ideal of the entire romantic generation to synthesize Fichte’s freedom and Spinoza’s naturalism.

對(duì)黑格爾和18世紀(jì)90年代整個(gè)浪漫主義的一代來(lái)說(shuō)，實(shí)在論或“獨(dú)斷論”的立場(chǎng)以斯賓諾莎哲學(xué)為代表；觀念論或“批判論”的立場(chǎng)以費(fèi)希特哲學(xué)為代表。費(fèi)希特曾經(jīng)公開(kāi)宣布，只有兩種可能的立場(chǎng)，并且要求人們二者選一。但黑格爾和浪漫派的一代拒絕了費(fèi)希特的最后結(jié)論，他們看到了兩種立場(chǎng)中的長(zhǎng)處。費(fèi)希特觀念論的偉大力量是它激進(jìn)的自由概念，是“自我”創(chuàng)造自己以及整個(gè)世界的權(quán)利和能力。費(fèi)希特“設(shè)定自我的自我”概念——自我僅僅是它從自身之中創(chuàng)造出來(lái)的東西——對(duì)18世紀(jì)90年代的那一代人來(lái)說(shuō)，有著無(wú)法抵制的誘惑。他們想要打破傳統(tǒng)秩序的所有限制，開(kāi)創(chuàng)一個(gè)新天地。斯賓諾莎自然主義的優(yōu)點(diǎn)是，它看到了自然中的神圣，而這種神圣并非存在于自然彼岸的一種超自然的天堂。通過(guò)神圣者的自然化和自然的神圣化，斯賓諾莎的自然主義似乎實(shí)現(xiàn)了科學(xué)與信仰這兩種需求的和解?？紤]到兩種立場(chǎng)的力量，整個(gè)浪漫的一代的理想，就是綜合費(fèi)希特的自由與斯賓諾莎的自然。

But this ideal seems to be a mere dream, requiring a squaring of the circle. The problem is that Fichte’s concept of freedom and Spinoza’s naturalism seem utterly irreconcilable, just as Fichte had insisted. According to Fichte’s concept, freedom consists in the power of the self to make itself whatever it chooses to be; the self has no nature prior to its own choices. The self has the power of choice, the capacity to do one action or the other, completely independent of prior causes. Fichte realized that we do not now have such radical freedom, and that most of our character is determined by external causes in nature; he still insisted, however, that such freedom should be an ideal or goal for action. The self should strive to gain more control over nature, so that its entire character depends on nothing but its own free activity. Such a radical concept of freedom is undermined, in two respects, by Spinoza’s naturalism. First, Spinoza’s naturalism is deterministic. According to Spinoza, God acts from the necessity of his own nature alone, and cannot do otherwise any more than a triangle can have its three angles be less than 180 degrees; since all human thoughts and actions are simply modes of the divine nature, they too must be necessary. What I think or do will be simply what God thinks and does through me; someone cannot act otherwise any more than the eternal divine nature can change. Second, Spinoza’s naturalism is also quietistic, undermining any motivation to change the world.? For Spinoza, the essence of God is perfect and eternal: and since everything expresses or manifests the essence of God, everything should be perfect and eternal. Why, then, bother to change things?? Despite Spinoza’s own radical politics, his metaphysics seemed to undercut motivation for social and political change, or at least to o?er consolation to those who could not change it. For Fichte, though, philosophy should end in a call for action: the world is not rational yet we should strive to make it so. What the dogmatist hypostasized – a self in harmony with its world – Fichte wanted to make into the goal of action.

但這個(gè)理想看起來(lái)僅僅是個(gè)夢(mèng)，近乎要求一種方的圓。問(wèn)題在于，正如費(fèi)希特所主張的那樣，他的自由概念和斯賓諾莎的自然概念完全是不可調(diào)和的。按照費(fèi)希特的概念，自由在于“自我以任意選擇是其所是”的方式創(chuàng)造自己的權(quán)力；自我沒(méi)有先于其選擇的本性。自我具有選擇的力量，具有完全獨(dú)立于先在的原因而這樣做或那樣做的能力。費(fèi)希特意識(shí)到，我們現(xiàn)在并沒(méi)有這種激進(jìn)的自由，我們大多數(shù)品格都是由外部的自然原因決定的；然而，他仍然主張這種自由應(yīng)當(dāng)是一個(gè)理想或行動(dòng)的目標(biāo)。自我應(yīng)當(dāng)努力獲取對(duì)自然的更多控制，以便它的整個(gè)品格僅僅取決于它自己的自由活動(dòng)而非其他。這種激進(jìn)的自由概念，在兩個(gè)方面，被斯賓諾莎的自然主義侵蝕了基礎(chǔ)。首先，斯賓諾莎的自然主義是決定論的。按照斯賓諾莎，上帝僅根據(jù)他自己本性的必然性而行動(dòng)，并且不會(huì)越雷池一步，就像三角形的內(nèi)角和不會(huì)超過(guò)180°一樣；由于人類(lèi)的所有思想和行為都僅僅是神圣自然的樣式，因此也都是必然的。我的所思所為只不過(guò)是上帝通過(guò)我的思和為；一個(gè)人不能以別的方式行動(dòng)，只能在外部神圣自然能夠變化的范圍內(nèi)行動(dòng)。其次，斯賓諾莎的自然主義也是寂靜主義的，它侵蝕了任何試圖改變世界的動(dòng)機(jī)的基礎(chǔ)。對(duì)斯賓諾莎來(lái)說(shuō)，上帝的本質(zhì)是完美的和永恒的：而由于每一事物都是上帝本質(zhì)的表達(dá)或顯示，因此每一事物都應(yīng)當(dāng)是完美的和永恒的。那么，為何要自尋煩惱改變事物呢？撇開(kāi)斯賓諾莎自己的激進(jìn)政治學(xué)不談，他的形而上學(xué)看起來(lái)從根本上削弱了社會(huì)和政治變革的動(dòng)機(jī)，或者至少是給那些無(wú)力變革的人提供了某種安慰。然而，對(duì)費(fèi)希特來(lái)說(shuō)，哲學(xué)應(yīng)當(dāng)終結(jié)于對(duì)行動(dòng)的召喚：世界還不是理性的，我們應(yīng)當(dāng)為使之理性化而努力奮斗。獨(dú)斷論者只是假設(shè)自我與其世界的和諧一致，費(fèi)希特則想把它變成行動(dòng)的目標(biāo)。

The hopelessness of trying to wed Fichte’s idealism with Spinoza’s naturalism becomes all the more apparent when we consider Hegel’s critique of Fichte. Like all the romantics, Hegel had been sharply critical of Fichte’s dualism, his distinction between the noumenal or intelligible realm of freedom and the phenomenal or sensible realm of necessity. This dualism seemed to eternalize the alienation between the self and nature, making it impossible for them ever to become one. But there was good reason behind the Fichtean dualism. Like Kant, Fichte had been forced to postulate such a dualism to ensure the possibility of freedom. His reasoning seemed inescapable: since freedom involves choice, the power to do otherwise, and since everything in nature is determined, such that it is necessary and cannot be otherwise, freedom is possible only if it is taken outside the sphere of nature entirely and placed in an intellectual or noumenal realm. For Hegel and the romantics, dualism was not the solution but the problem. However, this made the problem of freedom all the more urgent. How is freedom possible in Spinoza’s monistic and naturalistic world?

如果我們考慮到黑格爾對(duì)費(fèi)希特的批判，那么，實(shí)現(xiàn)費(fèi)希特的觀念論和斯賓諾莎的自然主義聯(lián)姻的無(wú)望，就變得越發(fā)明顯了。像所有浪漫主義者一樣，黑格爾已經(jīng)對(duì)費(fèi)希特的二元論、他關(guān)于本體或可知的自由王國(guó)與現(xiàn)象或可感的必然王國(guó)的區(qū)分，提出了尖銳的批評(píng)。這種二元論似乎將自我與自然之間的異化永恒化了，使得二者最終合一成為不可能的事。但是，在費(fèi)希特的二元論背后，有一些好的理由。和康德一樣，費(fèi)希特被迫假設(shè)這種二元論以確保自由的可能性。他的推理似乎是無(wú)可避免的：由于自由包含著選擇亦即以別樣方式做某事的能力，并且由于自然中的每一事物都是被決定的，以至于它是必然的和不可能采取別樣方式的。因此，唯有當(dāng)被帶到整個(gè)自然領(lǐng)域之外和放置于理智或本體的領(lǐng)域中，自由才是可能的。對(duì)黑格爾和浪漫主義者來(lái)說(shuō)，二元論并不是解決問(wèn)題的方案而正是問(wèn)題本身。然而，這使得自由問(wèn)題變得更加急迫。在斯賓諾莎一元論的和自然主義的世界中，自由如何可能呢？

Hegel’s answer to this question lay, in part, with his idealist reinterpretation of Spinoza. Since his absolute idealism restored subjectivity as the purpose and pinnacle of nature, Hegel reinstated one aspect of Fichte’s idealism. In one sense Fichte was right after all: the self should be the ?rst principle. Fichte was indeed correct in placing self-consciousness at the center of all things, as the basis to explain nature, for self-consciousness is the purpose of nature, the highest degree of organization and development of all its living powers. Where Fichte went astray, however, was in interpreting the final cause as the first cause. He had wrongly assumed that the ego is the fundamental ontological principle of nature when it is really only its purpose or end. The ?rst cause is nothing less than Spinoza’s substance, which does indeed act from the necessity of its own nature alone.

黑格爾對(duì)這一問(wèn)題的回答，部分在于他對(duì)斯賓諾莎的觀念論的重新闡釋。由于他的絕對(duì)觀念論將主體性重置為自然的目的與頂峰，黑格爾恢復(fù)了費(fèi)希特觀念論的一個(gè)方面。畢竟在某種意義上費(fèi)希特是對(duì)的：自我應(yīng)當(dāng)是第一原則。確實(shí)，費(fèi)希特正確地把自我意識(shí)放在了所有事物的中心地位，當(dāng)作解釋自然的基礎(chǔ)，因?yàn)樽晕乙庾R(shí)是自然的目的，是自然全部活力的最高程度的組織和發(fā)展。然而，費(fèi)希特走偏的地方在于，他把目的因解釋成了第一因。他錯(cuò)誤地假定，自我是自然的基礎(chǔ)性的本體論原則，而它實(shí)際上僅僅是自然的目的或終點(diǎn)。第一因恰恰是斯賓諾莎的實(shí)體，而它確實(shí)只根據(jù)自然自身的必然性而行動(dòng)。

Hegel’s absolute idealism also gave human agency a much greater role in the cosmos than anything imagined by Spinoza.? Spinoza had made man into a mode of the single divine substance.? Since substance has an independent essence and existence, and since a mode has a dependent essence and existence, man depends on God but not God on man. God has an eternal, complete and selfsu?cient existence, which remains the same despite the activity of man. For Hegel, however, God depends on human beings as much as they depend on God. For it is only through human activity and self-awareness that the divine ?nally realizes itself. If there were no human self-awareness and activity, the divine nature would still exist, to be sure, yet it would remain imperfect, potential, inchoate and indeterminate. It is only through our activity, then, that we perfect, complete and realize the divine, so that human activity is divine itself. By giving such a greater role to human agency, Hegel believed he could do some justice to Fichte’s activism. Since it is only through our activity that the divine realizes itself, we have good reason to act, and indeed a divine mission. In acting we help to realize the essence of God himself.

黑格爾的絕對(duì)觀念論也賦予了人類(lèi)行為（human agency）以一種比斯賓諾莎想象的任何事物更重要的宇宙中的位置。斯賓諾莎曾經(jīng)把人變成唯一神圣實(shí)體的樣式。由于實(shí)體具有獨(dú)立的本質(zhì)與實(shí)存，并且由于樣式具有依存的本質(zhì)與實(shí)存，人依存于上帝而不是上帝依存于人。上帝具有永恒、完全和自足的實(shí)存，盡管有人的活動(dòng)，它仍舊保持同一。然而，對(duì)黑格爾而言，正像人類(lèi)依存于上帝一樣，上帝也依存于人類(lèi)。因?yàn)橹挥型ㄟ^(guò)人類(lèi)活動(dòng)及其自我覺(jué)知，神圣者才能最終實(shí)現(xiàn)它自己。如果沒(méi)有人的自我覺(jué)知和行為，神圣自然誠(chéng)然還在，但它將保持為一種完美的、潛在的、未充分發(fā)展的和不確定的存在。那么，只有通過(guò)我們的活動(dòng)，我們才能使神圣者完美、完全和實(shí)現(xiàn)，因此，人類(lèi)活動(dòng)自身就是神圣的。通過(guò)賦予人類(lèi)行為以更重要的作用，黑格爾相信，他可以公正地對(duì)待費(fèi)希特的行動(dòng)主義。由于神圣者唯有通過(guò)我們的行動(dòng)才能實(shí)現(xiàn)自身，我們因此有了好的行動(dòng)理由，事實(shí)上是有了神圣的使命。在行動(dòng)中，我們幫助上帝自身實(shí)現(xiàn)其本質(zhì)。

These aspects of absolute idealism soften the sting of Spinoza’s determinism; but they do not remove it. Even if the self is the height of creation, and even if its acts realize the divine nature, it is still the case that the divine acts from the necessity of its own nature alone, so that all acts of the self will be necessary too. It is precisely in this regard that Hegel makes his most important move in reconciling Fichte and Spinoza: re-interpreting the concept of freedom itself. In his lectures on world history Hegel often uses Fichte’s language in describing freedom. He states that the self is selfpositing, and that it is what it makes of itself (VG 55. 58/48, 50).? Yet, despite the apparent similarity of language, Hegel’s underlying concept is very di?erent from Fichte’s.27 Contrary to Fichte, Hegel thinks that freedom involves necessity, and he accepts Spinoza’s de?nition of freedom in the Ethica: ‘That thing is called free that exists from the necessity of its own nature alone and is determined into action by itself alone’ (Part I, def. 7).28 Both Fichte and Hegel see freedom in terms of self-determination; but their concepts are similar in name only. Self-determination in Hegel means that (1) I have a speci?c essence or nature, and that (2) it is natural and necessary for it to be realized. Fichte denies both these points, because (1) his self is only what it posits itself to be, having no preexisting essence or nature, and (2) it can choose between di?erent courses of action.

絕對(duì)觀念論的這些方面，雖然軟化了斯賓諾莎決定論之刺，但并沒(méi)有移除它。即使自我是創(chuàng)造的頂端，即使它的行動(dòng)使神圣自然成為現(xiàn)實(shí)，事情的真相仍然是，神圣者依據(jù)其自身本性的必然性而行動(dòng)，因此自我的所有行為也將是必然的。正是在這一點(diǎn)上，黑格爾在調(diào)和費(fèi)希特與斯賓諾莎方面邁出了最重要的一步：重新闡釋自由概念本身。在世界歷史講演錄中，黑格爾經(jīng)常使用費(fèi)希特的語(yǔ)言來(lái)描述自由。他說(shuō)自我是自我設(shè)定，并且它就是它的自我創(chuàng)造（VG 55.58/48，50）。然而，盡管存在語(yǔ)言上的表面相似，黑格爾的基礎(chǔ)性概念是不同于費(fèi)希特的。27與費(fèi)希特相反，黑格爾認(rèn)為自由與必然性相關(guān)，并且他接受了斯賓諾莎在《倫理學(xué)》中給“自由”下的定義：“凡是僅僅由自身本性的必然性而存在、其行為僅僅由它自身決定的東西叫作自由”（Part I，def.7）28。費(fèi)希特和黑格爾都根據(jù)自我規(guī)定來(lái)理解自由，但他們的概念不過(guò)是形名相似而已。在黑格爾這里，自我規(guī)定意味著：（1）我具有某種特殊的本質(zhì)或本性；（2）它的實(shí)現(xiàn)是自然而必然的。費(fèi)希特則完全否認(rèn)這兩點(diǎn)，因?yàn)椋?）他的“自我”僅僅是它的自我設(shè)定，沒(méi)有任何預(yù)先存在的本質(zhì)或本性；（2）它能夠在不同的行動(dòng)方案之間做選擇。

The question arises, however, how any ?nite agent or human being can be free in Spinoza’s sense. Spinoza’s concept of freedom seems to apply only to God, because he alone acts from the necessity of his own nature. All ?nite modes of the single in?nite substance are determined into action by other ?nite modes, and so on ad infinitum. Ultimately, Hegel adopts the same solution to this problem as Spinoza: I am free in so far as I am really identical with the whole universe; I realize this freedom only in so far as I become aware of this identity through philosophy, what Spinoza calls the intellectual love of God. The same concept resurfaces in Hegel through his concept of reconciliation, which teaches the self to accept the necessity of the world in so far as he ?nds his identity in it.

然而，問(wèn)題來(lái)了，任何有限的行動(dòng)者或人能夠在斯賓諾莎的意義上是自由的嗎？斯賓諾莎的自由概念似乎僅僅適用于上帝，因?yàn)樗话凑账约罕拘缘谋厝恍远袆?dòng)。唯一無(wú)限實(shí)體的所有有限樣式，其行動(dòng)都被其他有限樣式所決定，如此循環(huán)往復(fù)以至無(wú)窮。最后，黑格爾對(duì)這個(gè)問(wèn)題采取了與斯賓諾莎同樣的解決方案：只要我和宇宙整體是真正同一的，我就是自由的；只有我通過(guò)哲學(xué)意識(shí)到這種同一性，我才是實(shí)現(xiàn)了自由，斯賓諾莎稱之為對(duì)上帝的理智之愛(ài)。通過(guò)“和解”這一概念，“自由”在黑格爾這里獲得一個(gè)新的面貌：它教導(dǎo)自我通過(guò)發(fā)現(xiàn)它在世界中的身份而接受世界的必然性。

It should be clear that Hegel’s concept of freedom implies a form of compatibilism, the doctrine that the claims of freedom and determinism can be made compatible. Hegel upholds the fundamental dictum of all compatibilism: to say that the self is free does not mean that its acts are undetermined; my willing to do something does not exclude, but indeed implies, that I have been determined to will it. In adopting such compatibilism Hegel believed that he could avoid the need to postulate any form of dualism to save freedom. Even if all my actions were part of the natural order and could not be otherwise, I was still free in doing them as long as I wanted to do so. We will later investigate some of the problems of this compatibilism (pp. 263–6).

顯然，黑格爾的自由概念中暗含某種形式的相容論，亦即自由的要求和決定論的要求是能夠相容的。黑格爾贊成所有相容論的一條基礎(chǔ)性格言：說(shuō)自我是自由的，并不意味著他的行動(dòng)是不被其他事物決定；我想做某事并不排除，相反倒是暗含著，我是被決定地想要去做。通過(guò)采取這種意義上的相容論，黑格爾認(rèn)為，他可以不必為了拯救自由而假定任何形式的二元論。即便我的所有行動(dòng)都是自然秩序的一部分而別無(wú)選擇，在做這些事情的時(shí)候，我仍然是自由的，只要這些事情是我想做的。后文（第263–266頁(yè)）我們還將對(duì)這一相容論的某些問(wèn)題進(jìn)行考察。

THE MYTH OF PANLOGICISM?

泛邏輯主義的神話？

One of the fundamental issues of Hegel’s absolute idealism concerns the status of contingency. Some scholars maintain that Hegel’s position commits him to ‘panlogicism’, i.e. the doctrine that everything happens of necessity according to reason. Others hold, however, that Hegel fully recognizes the reality of contingency, and that he is indeed one of the ?rst modern philosophers to argue for the necessity of contingency.29 For these scholars, the panlogicist interpretation is best consigned to the dustbin of intellectual history as one of the Hegel myths and legends.30

黑格爾絕對(duì)觀念論的一個(gè)基礎(chǔ)性的問(wèn)題，是對(duì)偶然性地位的關(guān)注。有些學(xué)者認(rèn)為，黑格爾的立場(chǎng)犯了“泛邏輯主義”的錯(cuò)誤，亦即每一事物都依照理性的必然性而發(fā)生。然而，另一些學(xué)者認(rèn)為，黑格爾充分承認(rèn)偶然性的實(shí)在性，實(shí)際上他是論證過(guò)偶然性的必然性的首批現(xiàn)代哲學(xué)家之一。29在這些學(xué)者看來(lái)，這種泛邏輯主義的解釋最好作為一個(gè)關(guān)于黑格爾的神話和傳奇扔到思想史的垃圾箱里去。30

Both interpretations have a point. The panlogicists have a strong case, insu?ciently appreciated by their critics. Their interpretation follows from two premises, both of them indisputable. First, Hegel holds that the absolute is causi sui, existing from the necessity of its own nature alone. Second, Hegel also maintains that the absolute is all reality, having nothing outside itself to limit it. Both premises entail that everything exists by the necessity of the divine nature. If, per contra, we introduce something contingent into Hegel’s system, it would have to be outside the absolute, which would limit it and make it ?nite. Hegel therefore seems to be as committed to panlogicism as Spinoza, who holds that everything exists of necessity in the single in?nite substance.

兩種闡釋都有道理。泛邏輯主義者有一個(gè)很強(qiáng)的理由，是他們的批評(píng)者沒(méi)有充分領(lǐng)會(huì)的。他們的闡釋是從兩個(gè)無(wú)可置疑的前提推斷出來(lái)的：其一，黑格爾認(rèn)為絕對(duì)是自因（causi sui），只依據(jù)其本性的必然性而存在；其二，黑格爾還主張，絕對(duì)即是全部實(shí)在，沒(méi)有任何在它之外限制它的事物存在。這兩個(gè)前提蘊(yùn)含著，所有事物都依據(jù)神圣自然的必然性而存在。與之相反（per contra），如果我們將一些偶然的事物引進(jìn)黑格爾體系，那么，它就會(huì)在絕對(duì)之外存在著，從而限制絕對(duì)，使之變得有限。因此，黑格爾看似犯了與斯賓諾莎泛邏輯主義同樣的錯(cuò)誤，后者認(rèn)為所有事物出于唯一的無(wú)限實(shí)體的必然性而存在。

The advocates of contingency also have a point. Hegel insists that philosophy must explain the ?nite world; and he holds that one of the central characteristics of ?nitude is contingency, the fact that something could be or not be. If, therefore, philosophy is to explain the ?nite world, it must establish the necessity of contingency.? Indeed, Hegel regards Spinoza’s failure to explain ?nitude as the main ?aw of his system. Hegel would be guilty of just such failure, though, if he could not explain the reality of contingency itself.

偶然性的支持者也有他們的道理。黑格爾主張哲學(xué)必須解釋有限世界；他認(rèn)為有限存在的核心特征之一就是偶然性，亦即這樣一種事實(shí)：有些事物可能存在也可能不存在。因此，如果哲學(xué)要去解釋有限世界，它就必須確立偶然性的必然性。確實(shí)，黑格爾認(rèn)為，不能解釋有限是斯賓諾莎體系的主要缺陷。然而，如果黑格爾不能解釋偶然性自身的實(shí)在性，他也將對(duì)這種無(wú)能感到羞愧。

It is important to see that it would not satisfy Hegel to limit contingency to appearances in the subjective sense, i.e. what appears to, and exists only for, the ?nite understanding. When Hegel insists that philosophy explain ?nitude he means appearance in the stronger objective sense, where it signi?es the manifestation, expression or embodiment of the idea, whether it is perceived by the ?nite intellect or not. It was one of Hegel’s main criticisms of Schelling that he had limited ?nitude to appearances in the subjective sense; because he could not explain it on the basis of the absolute, he ended, like Spinoza, condemning ?nitude as an illusion.

重要的是要看到，將偶然性限制于主觀意義上的現(xiàn)象——亦即對(duì)有限知性顯現(xiàn)且僅只就有限知性而言存在的東西——之上，是不能令黑格爾感到滿意的。當(dāng)黑格爾主張哲學(xué)要解釋有限性時(shí)，他是指在更強(qiáng)的客觀意義的現(xiàn)象。它指的是理念的展示、顯現(xiàn)或體現(xiàn)，無(wú)論它是否為有限知性所知覺(jué)到。黑格爾對(duì)謝林的一個(gè)主要批評(píng)是，謝林將有限性限制于主觀意義上的現(xiàn)象上；因?yàn)樗荒茉诮^對(duì)的基礎(chǔ)上對(duì)其加以解釋，因此最終像斯賓諾莎一樣將有限性譴責(zé)為幻象。

The question remains, however, whether Hegel can explain the reality of contingency in the stronger objective sense. It is precisely here that absolute idealism faces its most intractable problem. We shall soon see how Hegel faced this di?culty in the case of the particularity and di?erence of the ?nite world (pp. 94–5). He will show that particularity and di?erence arise of necessity from the self-di?erentiation of absolute life. But contingency eludes easy explanation in these terms. Although the metaphor of life makes it possible to understand how the universal becomes particular, and how the one becomes the many, it cannot explain how the necessary becomes contingent. There is a straightforward contradiction here: what happens of necessity cannot be otherwise; but the contingent can be otherwise. It was on these grounds that the late Schelling attacked Hegel’s system, which, he argued, con?ated the realms of essence and existence. While the realm of essence is necessary, that of existence is irreducibly contingent, a surd for all thought.31

然而，問(wèn)題還在于，黑格爾能否在一種更強(qiáng)的客觀意義上解釋偶然性的實(shí)在性。確切地說(shuō)，絕對(duì)觀念論在這里遇到了它最難以駕馭的問(wèn)題。我們很快就會(huì)看到，黑格爾在有限世界的特殊性與差異的情況中是如何面臨這一困難的（第94–95頁(yè)）。他將指出，特殊性與差異必然起源于絕對(duì)生命的自我差異化。但是，偶然性并不能從這些術(shù)語(yǔ)中得到簡(jiǎn)單的說(shuō)明。盡管生命的隱喻使得普遍如何變?yōu)樘厥夂鸵蝗绾巫優(yōu)槎嗄軌虻靡岳斫?，但它不能解釋必然如何變?yōu)榕既?。這里存在一種簡(jiǎn)單明了的矛盾：出于必然而發(fā)生的事物不可能是偶然的，但偶然發(fā)生的事物則可以是必然的。晚年謝林正是基于這些理由攻擊黑格爾的體系，他認(rèn)為黑格爾將本質(zhì)的領(lǐng)域與存在的領(lǐng)域混為一談。本質(zhì)的領(lǐng)域是必然的，而存在的領(lǐng)域是一種無(wú)可化約的偶然性，是一切思想的無(wú)理數(shù)。31

The problem deepens, however, as soon as we explore what an explanation of contingency would mean. Such an explanation would have to show the necessity of contingency. But this could mean either of two things. First, that the speci?c content of the contingent is really necessary, so that only the appearance of contingency is necessary. Second, that it is necessary that there is contingency, so that the speci?c content of the contingent is not really necessary. The ?rst possibility gives contingency only a subjective status, and so does not really explain its objective appearance. The second possibility gives the contingent objective status; but it also limits the absolute, because there is something that exists outside it.? In general, if we argue that the absolute needs something not itself to become itself, then we must again admit that the absolute is ?nite after all.

然而，一旦我們探究偶然性的解釋意味著什么時(shí)，問(wèn)題就深化了。這樣一種解釋不得不顯示出偶然性的必然性，而這可能意味著兩種不同的東西。首先，偶然物的特定內(nèi)容實(shí)際上是必然的，因此，只是偶然物的顯現(xiàn)是必然的。其次，存在著偶然性這一點(diǎn)是必然的，因此偶然性的特定內(nèi)容實(shí)際上不是必然的。第一種可能性賦予偶然性的只是主觀的身份，因此不能真正解釋它的客觀顯現(xiàn)。第二種可能性賦予了偶然物以客觀的身份；但它也限制了絕對(duì)，因?yàn)橛心澄镌谒獯嬖谥?。一般?lái)說(shuō)，如果我們主張絕對(duì)需要某種非它自身之物變?yōu)樗陨淼脑?，我們就必須再次承認(rèn)絕對(duì)畢竟是有限的。

It must be said that Hegel’s defenders do not admit the depth of this problem. Some content themselves with pointing out that Hegel recognizes the necessity of contingency. But this is only to state a desideratum. It leaves both the problem of how contingency comes from necessity, and of how the realm of contingency, once it is admitted, does not limit the absolute. Others point out that Hegel holds that only the general features of reality are necessary, admitting that its particular features are contingent.32 But this interpretation introduces a dualism between form and content into Hegel’s system; and it too accepts a reality outside the absolute. Still others point out that contingency is an essential moment of the dialectic, because one constantly discovers that the necessity of each lower stage depends on a higher stage, which is contingent itself.33 Although this is an accurate account of the dialectic, it still does not give an objective contingency, because the contingency holds only for the consciousness or level of re?ection going through the dialectic.? The philosopher, who sees things from the perspective of the whole, should know that everything happens of necessity.

必須說(shuō)，黑格爾的捍衛(wèi)者并不承認(rèn)這個(gè)問(wèn)題的深度。有些人滿足于指出黑格爾認(rèn)識(shí)到了偶然性的必然性。但這只是表達(dá)了一個(gè)愿望。它既留下了偶然性如何來(lái)自必然性的問(wèn)題，也留下了如果一旦承認(rèn)偶然性領(lǐng)域，它如何不限制絕對(duì)的問(wèn)題。另一些人指出，黑格爾認(rèn)為，唯有實(shí)在的普遍特征才是必然的，同時(shí)承認(rèn)其特殊的特征是偶然的。32但這種解釋在黑格爾的體系中引入了形式與內(nèi)容之間的二元論，并且它也接納了絕對(duì)之外的實(shí)在。還有人指出，偶然性是辯證法的一個(gè)本質(zhì)環(huán)節(jié)，因?yàn)槿藗兘?jīng)常發(fā)現(xiàn)，每一低級(jí)階段的必然性都依賴于一個(gè)更高的階段，而后者自身是偶然的。33雖然這是對(duì)辯證法的準(zhǔn)確描述，但仍然沒(méi)有給出一種客觀的偶然性，因?yàn)榕既恍灾皇菍?duì)于意識(shí)或者經(jīng)歷辯證法的反思階段有效。而從整體的視角來(lái)看待事物的哲學(xué)家應(yīng)該認(rèn)識(shí)到，一切都是出于必然而發(fā)生的。

Critics of the ‘myth’ of panlogicism often argue that it was never Hegel’s intention to deduce the realm of the contingent. There is indeed strong evidence for this. Famously, Hegel had refused to derive Herr Krug’s pen;34 and in his Philosophy of Nature he stressed that philosophy cannot explain the multiplicity and variety of nature (§250). But this evidence is beside the point. It is perfectly possible for Hegel to be a panlogicist and to admit the limits of philosophical deduction. For these limits concern only the capacity of the philosopher to comprehend or reconstruct absolute necessity, which still exists whether he can reconstruct it or not. We must distinguish between what the philosopher could do in principle, were he in?nitely wise, and what he can do in practice, given the limits of the ?nite human intellect.

泛邏輯主義“神話”的批評(píng)者經(jīng)常認(rèn)為，黑格爾從來(lái)沒(méi)有試圖演繹出偶然的領(lǐng)域。確實(shí)存在支持這一點(diǎn)的強(qiáng)有力的證據(jù)。眾所周知，黑格爾曾經(jīng)拒絕推論出克魯格先生的筆34；在《自然哲學(xué)》中，他強(qiáng)調(diào)哲學(xué)無(wú)法解釋自然的多樣性和豐富性（第250節(jié)）。但這個(gè)證據(jù)并沒(méi)有切中要害。黑格爾完全可能既是一個(gè)泛邏輯主義者，又承認(rèn)哲學(xué)推論的限度。因?yàn)檫@些限制僅只與哲學(xué)家理解或重構(gòu)絕對(duì)必然性的能力有關(guān)；這一絕對(duì)必然性一直存在，無(wú)論哲學(xué)家能否重構(gòu)它。我們必須區(qū)分哲學(xué)家在原則上能做什么和在實(shí)踐上能做些什么，前者假定他有無(wú)限智慧，后者則考慮到人類(lèi)理智的諸種限制。

The di?culties of contingency are especially apparent in Hegel’s notorious di?culties in deriving nature from his logic. In the ?nal section of the Encyclopedia Logic Hegel argues that the idea ‘decides’ (sich entschliesst) to ‘dismiss’ nature out of itself (aus sich zu entlassen) (§244). There are two problems here. First, the idea should reveal nature from the necessity of its own nature, so that it cannot ‘decide’ or ‘resolve’ to do so. Second, the content of the logic is formal and abstract, and so it cannot derive the concrete content of nature. To be sure, the category of the idea, which ends the Logic, is a much richer category than that of being, with which it begins; but the idea is still only a logical category, having only other logical categories within itself. The identity of the idea with nature is therefore only an identity in thought, still leaving the contingent realm of nature outside itself. If the idea has any other content in itself, it is only because it has illegitimately presupposed it.

偶然性的各種困難，尤為明顯地出現(xiàn)在黑格爾從自己的邏輯中派生出自然這一臭名昭著的困境中。在《哲學(xué)百科全書(shū)·邏輯學(xué)》的最后一部分，黑格爾論證說(shuō)，理念“決定”（sich entschliesst）從自身中“釋放”出（aus sich zu entlassen）自然（第244節(jié)）。這里有兩個(gè)問(wèn)題。首先，理念應(yīng)該從其本性的必然性中揭示自然，不能“決定”或“決心”這樣做。其次，邏輯的內(nèi)容是形式的和抽象的，所以它不能派生出自然的具體內(nèi)容?？梢钥隙ǖ氖牵砟钸@一范疇，在《邏輯學(xué)》結(jié)束的地方要比在它的開(kāi)端處，內(nèi)容更加豐富；但理念還只是一個(gè)邏輯范疇，在自身之中只有其他邏輯范疇。因此，理念與自然的同一性，僅僅是思想中的同一性，仍然將自然這一偶然的領(lǐng)域留在了自身之外。如果理念在自身中有其它內(nèi)容的話，這僅僅是因?yàn)樗?jīng)非法地預(yù)設(shè)了它。

In the end, the problem of contingency presents Hegel with a dilemma. The realm of contingency must be inside or outside the system. If it is inside the system, then contingency has only a subjective status, so that there is no explanation of real contingency. If, however, it is outside the system, it has an objective status; but it then limits the absolute and introduces a dualism between form and content.

最后，偶然性問(wèn)題使黑格爾陷入一種兩難困境。偶然性領(lǐng)域必須在體系之內(nèi)或者之外。如果是在體系之內(nèi)，那么偶然性就只具有一種主觀的地位，因此不可能有關(guān)于真正的偶然性的解釋。然而，如果說(shuō)偶然性是在體系之外，它就具有客觀的地位；但是它因此限制了絕對(duì)，并引入了一種形式與內(nèi)容的二元論。