Nine Freedom and the Foundation of Right(2)

第九章　自由與權(quán)利的基礎(chǔ)(2)

THE FOUNDATION OF LAW

法律的基礎(chǔ)

It is a telling sign of the di?culty and complexity of Hegel’s political thought that it has been subject to such con?icting interpretations. This is especially the case with regard to Hegel’s views on the foundation of law. Hegel has sometimes been read as a voluntarist, as someone who bases right on the will rather than reason.9 In this vein, Hegel has been seen as the last great spokesman in the modern voluntarist tradition, which begins with Hobbes and Grotius and blossoms in Rousseau and Kant. However, Hegel has also been read as just the opposite: as a rationalist, as someone who derives right from reason and gives it a value independent of the will.10 Accordingly, some scholars have placed Hegel in the natural law tradition, a tradition which ultimately goes back to Aristotle and Aquinas. Finally, Hegel has also been understood as an historicist, as someone who thinks that law is ultimately based on the history and culture of a people.11 In this respect Hegel has been placed in the tradition of Montesquieu, M?ser and Herder, who saw law as one part of the spirit of a nation.

? ? 黑格爾的政治思想一直遭到如此多的相互沖突的闡釋，這本身就是它的困難與復(fù)雜性的極具說(shuō)服力的表征。這種情形尤其適合于黑格爾關(guān)于法律基礎(chǔ)的觀點(diǎn)。黑格爾當(dāng)時(shí)被解讀為一個(gè)意志論者，這種人把權(quán)利建立在意志而非理性的基礎(chǔ)之上9。通過(guò)這種方式，黑格爾一直被視為現(xiàn)代意志論傳統(tǒng)中最后一位偉大的代言人，這種傳統(tǒng)始于霍布斯和格勞秀斯，而在盧梭和康德那里達(dá)到鼎盛。然而，黑格爾也被解讀為與之勢(shì)不兩立者，認(rèn)為權(quán)利來(lái)源于理性并且賦予它們獨(dú)立于意志的價(jià)值的理性主義者10。相應(yīng)地，某些學(xué)者把黑格爾放進(jìn)自然法的傳統(tǒng)之中，這個(gè)傳統(tǒng)最終可以回溯到亞里士多德或者阿奎那。最后，黑格爾還被理解為一個(gè)歷史主義者，這種人認(rèn)為法律最終建基于一個(gè)民族的歷史與文化11。在這方面，黑格爾被放入孟德斯鳩、摩塞爾和赫爾德的傳統(tǒng)之中，他們把法律看作是民族精神的一部分。

It is a no less striking sign of the subtlety and sophistication of Hegel’s political thought that all these interpretations are both right and wrong, both partially correct and partially incorrect. It was Hegel’s grand aim to synthesize all these traditions, to preserve their truths and cancel their errors in a single coherent account of the basis of law. In a phrase, Hegel’s doctrine was a rational historicism or an historicist rationalism, a rational voluntarism and a voluntarist rationalism.

? ? 所以這些闡釋既對(duì)又錯(cuò)，既部分正確，又部分錯(cuò)誤，這也是黑格爾政治思想既錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜又微渺難識(shí)的一個(gè)同樣引人注目的表征。黑格爾的偉大目標(biāo)就是綜合所有這些傳統(tǒng)，在一個(gè)關(guān)于法律基礎(chǔ)的一以貫之的解釋中保存它們的真理和刪除它們的錯(cuò)誤。用一個(gè)詞組來(lái)說(shuō)，黑格爾的學(xué)說(shuō)是一種理性的歷史主義或者一種歷史主義的理性主義、一種理性的意志論和意志主義的理性主義。

But such apparent oxymorons raise the ultimate question: Did Hegel really have a coherent doctrine? Before we can assess this question, we must ?rst examine the strengths and weaknesses of the opposing interpretations, and consider more closely what Hegel accepted and rejected from these con?icting traditions.

? ? 但是這種表面上的矛盾修辭法（oxymorons）提出了根本的問(wèn)題：黑格爾真的有一個(gè)一以貫之的學(xué)說(shuō)嗎？在我們能夠評(píng)估這個(gè)問(wèn)題之前，我們必須首先來(lái)考查一下這些相互對(duì)立的闡釋的力量與缺點(diǎn)，更為切近地考察黑格爾從這些傳統(tǒng)中接受與拒絕了什么。

There is much evidence in favor of the voluntarist interpretation.? Hegel justi?es right on the basis of freedom, which he understands as the expression of the will (PR §4A). Furthermore, he de?nes the good in terms of the will, as the unity of the particular will with the concept of the will (PR §129). Finally, he places himself ?rmly in the voluntarist tradition when he states that Rousseau was right to make the will the basis of the state (PR §258R). It is indeed of the ?rst importance to see that Hegel denied one of the fundamental premises of the natural law tradition: that value exists within the realm of nature, independent of the will (VRP III, 93). He accepts one of the basic theses of Kant’s Copernican revolution in ethics: that the laws of reason are created by us and and not imposed upon us by nature.

? ? 有許多證據(jù)偏向意志論的闡釋。黑格爾在自由的基礎(chǔ)上證明了權(quán)利的正當(dāng)性，他把權(quán)利理解為意志的表現(xiàn)（PR第4節(jié)補(bǔ)充）。此外，他根據(jù)意志把“善”定義為特殊的意志與意志概念的統(tǒng)一性（PR第129節(jié)）。最后，在他陳述盧梭把意志當(dāng)作國(guó)家的基礎(chǔ)是對(duì)立的之時(shí)，他把自己堅(jiān)定地放入到意志論的傳統(tǒng)之中（PR第258節(jié)附釋）。事實(shí)上第一重要的是看到，黑格爾否定了自然法傳統(tǒng)的一個(gè)根本前提——價(jià)值存在于自然的領(lǐng)域之中，獨(dú)立于意志（VRP. Ⅲ.第93節(jié)）。他接受了康德在倫理學(xué)中的哥白尼式的革命的一個(gè)基本論題：理性的法則是我們創(chuàng)造的，而非自然加諸我們的。

However, there is also much evidence against the voluntarist reading. It is a central thesis of the voluntarist tradition that whatever the will values is good simply because the will values it. But Hegel protests against the purely formal and abstract will chie?y because the will alone cannot be a source of the law (PR §§135–40).? It is also a basic premise of the voluntarist tradition that nothing can be good in itself or in nature, independent of human agreements or contracts. But Hegel insists that some things are valuable in themselves, whether they are enshrined into law or recognized by governments (PR §100R). Hegel’s distance from the voluntarist tradition could not be greater when he attacks the social contract theory. If we make right depend on the will of the individual, he argues, we undermine all obligation because a person will have the right to quit the contract whenever he dissents from it (PR §§29R, 258R).

? ? 然而，也有存在著大量的反對(duì)意志論的解讀的證據(jù)。意志論傳統(tǒng)的一個(gè)核心論題：無(wú)論意志是什么，價(jià)值都是善的，這僅僅是因?yàn)橐庵局匾曀?。但是黑格爾反?duì)純粹形式的和抽象的意志，這主要是因?yàn)椋瑔螁我庵静荒艹蔀榉傻膩?lái)源（PR第135—140節(jié)）。意志論的傳統(tǒng)還有一個(gè)基本的前提，即如果不依賴于人的統(tǒng)一或者契約，沒(méi)有什么自在地或者依其本性是善的。但是，黑格爾堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，某些事物自在地是有價(jià)值的，無(wú)論政府是否莊嚴(yán)地把它們載入法律，或者奉為神圣（PR，第100節(jié)附釋）。在黑格爾攻擊社會(huì)契約論之時(shí)，他和意志論傳統(tǒng)之間的距離已經(jīng)無(wú)以復(fù)加了。他論證說(shuō)，如果我們使得權(quán)利依賴于個(gè)體的意志，那么，我們就侵蝕了所有義務(wù)的基礎(chǔ)，因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)人有權(quán)利放棄契約，無(wú)論他是否對(duì)它持有異議（PR，第29節(jié)附釋，258節(jié)附釋）。

There is just as much evidence for the rationalist as the voluntarist interpretation. Hegel seems to endorse the central principle of rationalism when he writes that ‘in a political constitution nothing should be recognized as valid unless it agrees with the right of reason’ (VVL IV, 506/281).12 Although Hegel bases right on the will, it is necessary to add that he de?nes the will in terms of reason, so that it seems to amount to little more than an imperative of practical reason. Hence he stresses that there is no separation between the will and thought because the will is really only ‘a(chǎn) special manner of thinking’: ‘thinking translating itself into existence, thinking as the drive to give itself existence’ (PR §4A). It is also noteworthy that Hegel makes a sharp distinction between the objective will and the subjective will, where he virtually identi?es the objective will with rational norms. He then stresses that the norms of practical reason have an objective validity whether or not they are recognized by the subjective will, which consists in only individual desires (PR §§126, 131, 258R). When he stresses the objectivity of norms against the formality and particularity of the subjective will he is clear that their objectivity consists in their rationality (PR §§21R, 258R).

? ? 理性主義闡釋的證據(jù)與意志論闡釋的幾乎同樣多。當(dāng)黑格爾寫(xiě)道，“在一個(gè)政治憲政中，沒(méi)有什么應(yīng)該被承認(rèn)為有效的，除非它同樣是理性的權(quán)利”（VVL，IV, 506/281）12，他似乎推崇理性主義的核心原則。盡管黑格爾把權(quán)利建基于意志之上，但是有必要補(bǔ)充一點(diǎn)，他是依據(jù)理性定義意志的。因此，這似乎不多不少相當(dāng)于實(shí)踐理性的命令。他強(qiáng)調(diào)說(shuō)，意志與思想不可分離，因?yàn)橐庵緦?shí)際上只是“思想的一種具體方式”：“思想把它自身翻譯為存在，思想作為賦予它自身的存在的沖動(dòng)”（PR第4節(jié)補(bǔ)充）。還有一點(diǎn)值得注意，黑格爾在主觀意志和客觀意志之間作了明顯的區(qū)分，他實(shí)際上將客觀意志等同于理性的規(guī)范。然后，他強(qiáng)調(diào)說(shuō)，實(shí)踐理性的規(guī)范具有客觀的有效性，無(wú)論它們是否得到只存在于個(gè)體欲望中的主觀意志的承認(rèn)（PR第126節(jié)，131節(jié)，258節(jié)附釋）。當(dāng)他強(qiáng)調(diào)與主觀意志相對(duì)立的規(guī)范的客觀性之時(shí)，他對(duì)于規(guī)范的客觀性就在于它們的理性之中這一點(diǎn)了然于胸（PR第21節(jié)附釋、第258節(jié)附釋）。

Still, there are at least two serious di?culties with the rationalist interpretation. First, Hegel never accepted the natural law doctrine, so central to rationalism, that norms exist in nature or in some eternal realm, independent of human activity. For Hegel, the ultimate basis of the law – and here he shows his voluntarist loyalities – lies in freedom, which cannot be understood apart from the will.? Second, although Hegel insists that the will consists in and depends on thinking, he also stresses the converse as well: that thinking consists in and depends on willing (PR §4A). This is not a mere gesture on Hegel’s part, a routine recognition of the equality of opposites; rather, it re?ects his teaching, which he develops at great length in the Encyclopedia (§§440–82), that all the stages in the development of spirit are simply ‘the way by which it produces itself as will’ (PR §4R). True to the voluntarist tradition, therefore, Hegel assigns primacy to the role of the will in the development of reason. Reason is for him essentially a form of practical intelligence.

? ? 但是仍然至少有兩個(gè)嚴(yán)重的困難困擾著理性主義的闡釋。首先，黑格爾從來(lái)不曾接受自然法學(xué)說(shuō)，而這種學(xué)說(shuō)對(duì)于理性主義是如此核心，以至于規(guī)范就存在于自然或者某種永恒的領(lǐng)域之中，獨(dú)立于人類活動(dòng)。對(duì)黑格爾而言，法律的最終基礎(chǔ)——在這里，他顯示了對(duì)于意志論的忠誠(chéng)——在于不能從自由之外得到理解的自由之中。其次，盡管黑格爾堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，意志就在于思維之中，并且賴于思維，但是他也強(qiáng)調(diào)相反的一面：思維就存在于意志之中，并且端賴于意志（PR第4節(jié)補(bǔ)充）。從黑格爾的角度而言，這不僅僅是一種姿態(tài)、一種按部就班的對(duì)于對(duì)立者的平等性的承認(rèn)，毋寧說(shuō)，它反映了他在《哲學(xué)百科全書(shū)》中詳盡無(wú)遺地發(fā)展出來(lái)的學(xué)說(shuō)（第440—82節(jié)），亦即，精神發(fā)展的所有階段都僅僅是“它產(chǎn)生作為意志的它自身的方式”（PR第4節(jié)附釋）。因此，對(duì)于意志論傳統(tǒng)來(lái)說(shuō)，真實(shí)的是黑格爾在理性的發(fā)展進(jìn)程中把優(yōu)先性分配給了意志的角色。理性對(duì)他來(lái)說(shuō)本質(zhì)上是實(shí)踐理智的形式。

The historicist interpretation has no less evidence in its behalf than the voluntarist and rationalist readings. In his youth Hegel was deeply in?uenced by the historicist tradition.13 He acknowledged that debt in the Philosophy of Right when he praised Montesquieu’s ‘genuinely philosophical viewpoint’ that ‘legislation in general and its particular determinations should not be considered in isolation and in the abstract but rather as dependent moments within one totality, in the context of all the other determinations, which constitute the character of a nation and an age’. It is within such a context, Hegel signi?cantly adds, that laws ‘gain their genuine signi?cance and hence also their justi?cation’ (PR §3R). In the Philosophy of Right Hegel would endorse other central doctrines of historicism.? First, that though they can be changed, constitutions cannot be made (§§273R, 298A). Second, that the policies of a government should be in accord with the spirit of a nation, in agreement with its concrete circumstances and way of life, and not imposed from above by some leader or committee (§§272, 274, 298A).

? ? 歷史主義的闡釋能夠?yàn)樽约赫业阶C據(jù)并不比意志論的和理性主義的解讀少。在青年時(shí)期，黑格爾深受歷史主義傳統(tǒng)的影響。13他在《法哲學(xué)》中表彰了孟德斯鳩的“真正哲學(xué)的觀點(diǎn)”。他說(shuō)：“立法就其一般的和特殊的規(guī)定而言，不應(yīng)該被看作是獨(dú)立的和抽象的，而毋寧應(yīng)該被看作是一個(gè)總體性中的、在所有其他規(guī)定的語(yǔ)境中的相互依賴的環(huán)節(jié)，這些環(huán)節(jié)構(gòu)成了一個(gè)民族和一個(gè)時(shí)代的特征?！边@是他承認(rèn)自己從歷史主義中受惠良多。黑格爾意味深長(zhǎng)地補(bǔ)充說(shuō)，正是在這種語(yǔ)境之中，法律“贏得了它們真正的意義和它們因此而得到的證成”（PR第3節(jié)附釋）。在《法哲學(xué)》中，黑格爾贊同歷史主義的其他核心觀點(diǎn)。首先，盡管憲政可能會(huì)改變，但是它們不能被創(chuàng)制（第273節(jié)附釋、第298節(jié)補(bǔ)充）。其次，一個(gè)政府的政策應(yīng)該和民族精神相一致，和它具體的環(huán)境與生活方式保持相符合，而不是由某個(gè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)或委員會(huì)自上而下地強(qiáng)加的（第272節(jié)、274節(jié)、298節(jié)補(bǔ)充）。

But the historicist interpretation too su?ers from fatal problems.? Hegel makes a sharp distinction between the historical explanation of a law and its conceptual demonstration, warning us in the ?rmest tones never to confuse them (PR §3R). To establish the moral validity of a law, he argues, it is not su?cient to show that it arose of necessity from its historical circumstances. Since circumstances are constantly changing, this cannot provide a general justi?cation for a law or institution. If we show that a law came from speci?c circumstances in the past, that is all the more reason to conclude that it is no longer valid under new circumstances in the present.? Hegel also could not accept the relativism implicit within historicism. If we attempt to justify a law by showing that it plays a crucial role in a culture, then we have to accept the value of all laws and institutions, no matter how morally reprehensible. It is indeed telling that Hegel points out just this consequence of historicism with regard to slavery (PR §3R). Such a consequence was su?cient for him to reject the doctrine that sanctioned it.

? ? 但是歷史主義的闡釋也遭受了某些致命的困難。黑格爾明顯地區(qū)分了法律的歷史闡釋和它的概念的證明，以最堅(jiān)定的音調(diào)警告我們不要混淆它們（PR第3節(jié)附釋）。他論證說(shuō)，為了建立起法律的道德有效性，指出它必然來(lái)自它的歷史環(huán)境是不夠的。既然環(huán)境在不斷地發(fā)生變化，它就不可能提供法律或者制度的一般性的證成。如果我們顯示出法律來(lái)源于過(guò)去的某些特定的環(huán)境，那么，就更加有理由推斷出，在當(dāng)前的新的環(huán)境之中，它就不再有效了。黑格爾也不能接受蘊(yùn)含在歷史主義之中的相對(duì)主義。如果我們?cè)噲D通過(guò)指出法律在文化中扮演至關(guān)重要的角色來(lái)證成法律，那么，我們就必須接受所有法律和制度的價(jià)值，而不管它們?cè)诘赖律鲜侨绾问艿街肛?zé)。非常具有說(shuō)服力的是，黑格爾聯(lián)系奴隸制來(lái)公正地指出了歷史主義的這種后果（PR第3節(jié)附釋）。那樣一個(gè)后果足以讓他拒絕這種認(rèn)可奴隸制的學(xué)說(shuō)。

It is one of Hegel’s striking departures from historicism – and one of his most telling endorsements of the natural law tradition – that he insisted that there are certain universal and necessary principles of morality and the state. Hence in the Philosophy of Right he states that everyone deserves certain basic rights just in so far as they are human beings, regardless of whether they are Catholics, Protestants or Jews (§209); and he is clear that there are some fundamental goods that are inalienable and imprescriptable for all persons in so far as they are free beings, such as the right to have religious beliefs and to own property (§66). Then, in a later essay, Hegel praises the monarch of Württemberg for introducing a rational constitution that comprises ‘universal truths of constitutionalism’ (VVL, IV, 471/254). Among these truths are equality before the law, the right of the estates to consent to new taxes, and the representation of the people.

? ? 黑格爾背離歷史主義的一個(gè)引人注目之處是——也是他推崇自然法傳統(tǒng)時(shí)最具說(shuō)服力的一點(diǎn)——他堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，道德和國(guó)家有幾條特定的和必然的原則。因此，在《法哲學(xué)》中，他聲明，所有人都應(yīng)該得到最基本的權(quán)利，只是因?yàn)樗麄兪侨?，而不管他們是天主教徒、新教徒還是猶太人（第209節(jié)）；他非常清楚，有某些最基本的善對(duì)于所有人而言都是不可剝奪的和不可侵犯的，因?yàn)樗麄兪亲杂傻拇嬖谡?，比如具有宗教信仰的?quán)利和擁有財(cái)產(chǎn)的權(quán)利（第66節(jié)）。然后，在他的晚期論文中，黑格爾表彰了維滕堡的君主，因?yàn)樗捎昧税皯椪髁x的普遍真理”的理性憲法（VVL，IV, 471/254）。這些真理中包含法律面前一律平等，同意新稅收的產(chǎn)權(quán)，代表人民的權(quán)利。

The problems with all three readings raise anew the question: Does Hegel really have a single coherent doctrine, one that saves the strengths and cancels the weaknesses of voluntarism, rationalism and historicism? He indeed does have such a doctrine, though it is profoundly metaphysical, resting upon his absolute idealism.

? ? 所有這三種解讀所具有的難題又提出了新的問(wèn)題：黑格爾真的有一套唯一的一以貫之的學(xué)說(shuō)，而這個(gè)學(xué)說(shuō)節(jié)省力量，并去除了意志主義、理性主義和歷史主義的缺點(diǎn)？他的確有一套這樣的學(xué)說(shuō)，盡管它是極度形而上學(xué)的，建立在他的絕對(duì)觀念論的基礎(chǔ)之上？

Hegel’s theory about the sources of normativity is based on his social and historical conception of reason, which ultimately derives from his Aristotelian view that universals exist only in re or in particular things. The fundamental claim behind this conception is that reason is embodied in the culture and language of a people at a speci?c place and time. There are two more basic theses behind this claim, both of them deeply Aristotelian. First, the embodiment thesis: that reason exists as the speci?c ways of talking, writing and acting among a speci?c people at a speci?c time. This thesis states that to understand reason, we must ?rst ask ‘Where is reason?’, ‘In what does it exist?’ It claims that the answer must lie in the language, traditions, laws and history of a speci?c culture at a speci?c time and place. Second, a teleological thesis: that reason also consists in the telos of a nation, the fundamental values or goals that it strives to realize in all its activities. The teleological thesis derives from Hegel’s immanent teleology, which he applies to the historical world as well as the natural. Hegel thinks that just as each organism in the natural world has a formal–?nal cause, so each organism in the social world has such a cause, which consists in its de?ning values or ideals. In his philosophy of history Hegel will argue that these values and ideals play a decisive role in determining the actions of people in a culture, even if they do not pursue them in an organized and co-ordinated manner, and even if they are not aware of them (pp. 267–70).

? ? 黑格爾關(guān)于規(guī)范性的來(lái)源的理論建基于社會(huì)的和歷史的理性概念之上，這種概念最終來(lái)源于他的亞里士多德式的觀點(diǎn)，即共相只存在于事物之中（in re）或者具體的事物之中。這種觀念背后的基本主張是，理性具體化為一個(gè)民族在特定的空間和時(shí)間中的文化和語(yǔ)言。在這種主張背后有兩個(gè)更加基本的論題，而且兩者都根本上是亞里士多德式的。首先，具體化的主題：理性作為特定時(shí)代中特定民族的談?wù)?、?xiě)作和行動(dòng)的具體方式？這個(gè)主題聲稱，為了理解理性，我們首先必須追問(wèn)“理性在哪兒？”“它存在于什么之中？”它主張，答案必定存在于特定的時(shí)空中的具體文化的語(yǔ)言、傳統(tǒng)、法律和歷史之中。其次，目的論的主題：理性也存在于一個(gè)民族的目的之中，一個(gè)民族在所有活動(dòng)中發(fā)奮要實(shí)現(xiàn)的基本價(jià)值和目標(biāo)之中。目的論的主題來(lái)源于黑格爾的內(nèi)在目的論，他把目的論既應(yīng)用于歷史之中，也應(yīng)用于自然之中。黑格爾認(rèn)為，正如每一個(gè)自然世界中的有機(jī)體都有一個(gè)形式——目的因，每一個(gè)社會(huì)世界中的有機(jī)體也有一個(gè)這樣的原因，而它就存在于它的確定的價(jià)值和理想之中。在歷史哲學(xué)中，黑格爾論證說(shuō)，這些價(jià)值和理想在規(guī)定某個(gè)文化中民族的行動(dòng)時(shí)扮演了至關(guān)重要的角色，即使他們沒(méi)有以一種組織嚴(yán)密和彼此呼應(yīng)的方式追求這些價(jià)值和理想，即使他們沒(méi)有覺(jué)察到它們（第267-270節(jié)）。

True to his immanent teleology, Hegel understands norms and values essentially as the formal–?nal causes of things. The norm or law for a thing consists in its formal–?nal cause, which is both its purpose and essence. In Aristotle, the form or essence of a thing and its purpose or end are essentially one and the same, because it is the purpose or end of a thing to realize or develop its inner essence or nature. Hence we determine whether something is good or bad, right or wrong, according to whether it realizes this purpose or essence. The good or right is that which promotes the realization of this end; the bad or wrong is that which prevents its realization.

? ? 黑格爾忠實(shí)于內(nèi)在目的論，把規(guī)范和價(jià)值理解為本質(zhì)上是事物的形式——目的因。一個(gè)事物的規(guī)范或者法律就在于它的形式——目的因之中，它既是事物的目標(biāo)又是它的本質(zhì)。在亞里士多德那里，一個(gè)事物的形式或者本質(zhì)和它的目標(biāo)或者目的本質(zhì)是一個(gè)東西和同一者，因?yàn)樗且粋€(gè)事物為了實(shí)現(xiàn)或者發(fā)展它的內(nèi)在本質(zhì)或本性的目標(biāo)或者目的。因此，我們依據(jù)某個(gè)事物是否實(shí)現(xiàn)了這種目標(biāo)或者本質(zhì)來(lái)規(guī)定這個(gè)事物是好的還是壞的，對(duì)的還是錯(cuò)的。那個(gè)促進(jìn)這種目的實(shí)現(xiàn)的東西就是好的或者對(duì)的，而壞的或者錯(cuò)的事物就是阻礙它實(shí)現(xiàn)的東西。

It is important to see that this formal–?nal cause has both a normative and an ontological status: a normative status because a thing ought to realize its essence; and an ontological status because this essence exists in things as their underlying cause and potentiality. It is for this reason that norms have an objective status for Hegel: the formal–?nal causes are in things whether or not we recognize or assent to them. It is also for this reason, however, that norms are not simply to be identi?ed with whatever happens to exist: the norm is what is essential to a thing, and it is not necessary that it is realized in all circumstances. Since the norm has an objective status, existing inherently in things, we cannot understand it, pace the voluntarists, as the result of convention or agreement; but since the norm is also the essence of a thing, its ideal or intrinsic nature that it might not realize in its speci?c circumstances, we also cannot reduce it down to any accidental or incidental facts, such as the present status quo, pace the historicists. Hence Hegel breaks decisively with one of the basic premises of the voluntarist tradition: the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought’, between facts and values. But in doing so he never fell into the historicist camp, which virtually con?ated ‘ought’ and ‘is’ by identifying the rational with any set of social and historical circumstances.

? ? 重要的是要看到，這個(gè)形式——目的因具有規(guī)范的和目的論的兩重身份：具有規(guī)范的身份，是因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)事物應(yīng)該實(shí)現(xiàn)它的本質(zhì)；而具有目的論的身份，是因?yàn)檫@個(gè)本質(zhì)作為它們的基礎(chǔ)性的原因和潛能存在于事物之中。正是由于這個(gè)原因，對(duì)于黑格爾而言，規(guī)范具有客觀的身份：形式——目的因在事物之中，無(wú)論我們是否認(rèn)識(shí)到或者贊成它們。然而，也正是由于這個(gè)原因，規(guī)范就不僅僅等同于碰巧存在的東西，規(guī)范是對(duì)于一個(gè)事物而言本質(zhì)的東西，它并不必然要在所有環(huán)境中實(shí)現(xiàn)。盡然規(guī)范有一個(gè)客觀的身份，內(nèi)在地存在于事物之中——請(qǐng)意志論者容我辯白——我們不能把它理解為約定俗成或者同意的結(jié)果，但是既然規(guī)范是一個(gè)事物的本質(zhì)，它的理想或者內(nèi)在的本性就有可能不能在具體的環(huán)境中實(shí)現(xiàn)，我們也不能徑直把它還原為任何意外的或者偶然的事實(shí)，——請(qǐng)歷史主義者容我辯白——比如目前的現(xiàn)狀。因此，黑格爾當(dāng)機(jī)立斷和意志論傳統(tǒng)的一個(gè)基本前提斷絕關(guān)系：在“是”與“應(yīng)當(dāng)”之間，在事實(shí)與價(jià)值之間做出區(qū)分。但是在這樣做時(shí)，他從來(lái)沒(méi)有掉進(jìn)歷史主義的陣營(yíng)，歷史主義由于把理性和任何一套社會(huì)和歷史環(huán)境等同起來(lái)而合并了“應(yīng)當(dāng)”與“是”。

In fundamental respects, Hegel’s Aristotelian doctrine places him very ?rmly in the scholastic branch of the natural law tradition.? It was indeed Aristotle’s metaphysics that inspired some of the classics of that tradition, such as Hooker’s Lawes of Ecclesiastical Politie (1597) and Suarez’s De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore (1612). Hegel was fully aware of his debt to the Aristotelian natural law tradition, which he was intent on preserving and continuing. It is indeed for this reason that he subtitles the Philosophy of Right ‘Natural Law and Political Science in Outline’. It would be a serious mistake, however, to see Hegel’s theory simply as a revival of the traditional scholastic doctrine. For, in two basic respects, Hegel transforms that tradition so that it accords with his modern age. First, Hegel identi?es the formal–?nal cause not with perfection, the traditional concept, but with freedom itself, in accord with the modern de?nition of humanity given by Rousseau, Kant and Fichte. Second, he applies his immanent teleology on the social and historical plane, so that it applies to the entire spirit of a nation, the whole social and political organism. Thus Hegel took the central concept of the historicists – the Volksgeist, the spirit of a nation – and cast it in Aristotelian terms, so that it became the underlying formal–?nal cause of a nation.? When we put both these points together – that the formal–?nal cause is freedom and that all nations have such a formal–?nal cause – we get the fundamental thesis of Hegel’s philosophy of history: that the goal of world history consists in the self-consciousness of freedom. Armed with this thesis, Hegel believed he could take into account the truth of historicism while still avoiding its relativisitic consequences. Since the self-awareness of freedom is the goal of world history, it provides a single measure or criterion of value. We can now talk about progress, appraising cultures according to whether they promote or hinder the realization of this goal.

? ? 在某些基本的方面，黑格爾-亞里士多德式的學(xué)說(shuō)把他堅(jiān)定地置于自然法傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)院派的支脈之中。的確，是亞里士多德的形而上學(xué)啟發(fā)了這個(gè)傳統(tǒng)的某些經(jīng)典作品，比如胡克的《教會(huì)國(guó)家組織的法律》（Laws of Ecclesiatical Politie）（1597年）和蘇阿雷茲的《論法律及神作為立法者》（De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore）（1612年）。黑格爾完全意識(shí)到他從亞里士多德式的自然法傳統(tǒng)受益良多，而他也刻意保存和延續(xù)這種傳統(tǒng)。確實(shí)，正是出于這個(gè)原因，他為《法哲學(xué)》配的副標(biāo)題是“自然法和政治科學(xué)概要”。然而，把黑格爾的理論僅僅看作傳統(tǒng)的經(jīng)院主義學(xué)說(shuō)的復(fù)興，將會(huì)是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的錯(cuò)誤。因?yàn)?，在兩個(gè)基本的方面，黑格爾改造了那個(gè)傳統(tǒng)，以使它和現(xiàn)時(shí)代協(xié)調(diào)一致。首先，黑格爾并沒(méi)有把形式—目的因等同于完美這個(gè)傳統(tǒng)的概念，而是把它等同于自由自身，而自由又和盧梭、康德以及費(fèi)希特給出的關(guān)于人性的現(xiàn)代定義相一致。其次，他是在社會(huì)和歷史的層面上運(yùn)用他的內(nèi)在目的論的，因此，它運(yùn)用于整個(gè)民族精神、整個(gè)社會(huì)和政治有機(jī)體。因此，黑格爾是以亞里士多德的方式接受了歷史主義者的核心概念——民族精神（Geist）——并改造了它，結(jié)果，它變成了一個(gè)國(guó)家的奠基性的形式—目的因。當(dāng)我們把這些觀點(diǎn)——形式—目的因是自由，而所有民族都有一個(gè)形式—目的因——匯聚在一起之時(shí)，我們就得到了黑格爾歷史哲學(xué)的基本論題：世界歷史的目標(biāo)存在于自由的自我意識(shí)之中。由于用這些裝備武裝起了自己，黑格爾認(rèn)為他既能夠重視歷史主義的真理，同時(shí)又可以避免它的相對(duì)主義的后果。既然自由的自我覺(jué)察是世界歷史的目標(biāo)，那么，它就提供了價(jià)值標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的唯一尺度?，F(xiàn)在我們能夠討論進(jìn)步，依據(jù)諸文化是否促進(jìn)或者阻礙這個(gè)目標(biāo)的實(shí)現(xiàn)來(lái)評(píng)判它們。

Understanding Hegel’s normative theory in Aristotelian terms enables us to explain what at ?rst sight seems an irresolvable contradiction: namely, Hegel’s insistence upon the objective status of value and his claim that values are made by human beings. This apparent contradiction is resolved as soon as we recall the Aristotelian distinction between the order of explanation and the order of existence (pp. 56–7). While Hegel thinks that the formal–?nal cause is ?rst in the order of explanation, he does not think that it is ?rst in the order of existence. It is only through the activity of particular wills, he argues, that it comes into existence. So, although having normative status does not depend on the wills of individuals, these norms are still realized or actualized only in and through these individual wills. The voluntarist then made the classic confusion: he assumed that what is ?rst in order of existence – the particular will – is also ?rst in the order of essence and explanation.

? ? 依據(jù)亞里士多德來(lái)理解黑格爾的規(guī)范理論，能夠使我們解釋乍一眼看起來(lái)似乎是一個(gè)不可解決的矛盾的東西了：也就是說(shuō)，黑格爾堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為價(jià)值的客觀身份，而他又主張，價(jià)值是人為的。一旦我們回憶起亞里士多德在解釋的次序和存在的次序之間所作的區(qū)分（第56-57頁(yè)），這種表面上的矛盾就渙然冰釋了。盡管黑格爾認(rèn)為，形式—目的因在解釋的次序中是第一位的，但是，他的確不認(rèn)為它在存在的次序中也是第一位的。他論證說(shuō)，只有通過(guò)特殊意志的活動(dòng)，他才能夠進(jìn)入存在。因此，盡管具有規(guī)范性的身份并不依賴于個(gè)體的意志，但是這些規(guī)范仍舊只能在并且通過(guò)個(gè)體意志才得以實(shí)現(xiàn)或者現(xiàn)實(shí)化。那么，意志論者的混淆就是經(jīng)典的：他斷言說(shuō)，在存在的次序中處于第一位的東西——特殊意志——在本質(zhì)和解釋的次序中也處于第一位。

We are now ?nally in a position to understand, in summary fashion, how Hegel’s social-historical teleology preserves the truths and cancels the errors of the rationalist, voluntarist and historicist traditions. The rationalists were correct that values are within nature and that they have an objective status; but they were wrong to see them as eternal norms above history or as static essences within nature; rather, these values are realized only in history and through the activity of particular individuals. The voluntarists were right to stress the central role of freedom, and to emphasize the role of the will in bringing values into existence; but they went astray in thinking that the will alone – rather than reason – is the source of normativity. Finally, the historicists were correct to see norms embodied in the way of life of a people; but they were too indiscriminate, identifying the formal–?nal cause, the norm of historical change, with any speci?c set of social and historical circumstances. Since they did not understand history in teleological terms, the historicists confused the historical explanation of values with their conceptual demonstration: the historical explanation focuses on the factual causes, whereas conceptual demonstration accounts for the underlying formal–?nal cause.

? ? 現(xiàn)在我們終于站在某個(gè)立場(chǎng)上以簡(jiǎn)明扼要的方式理解，黑格爾的社會(huì)—?dú)v史目的論如何保存了理性主義、意志主義和歷史主義的傳統(tǒng)。諸價(jià)值在自然之中，它們具有客觀的身份，在這一點(diǎn)上理性主義者是正確的；但是他們把諸價(jià)值看作是凌駕于歷史之上的永恒規(guī)范，或者自然之中的靜止的本質(zhì)，在這一點(diǎn)是錯(cuò)誤的；毋寧說(shuō)，這些價(jià)值只有在歷史之中和通過(guò)特殊個(gè)體的行動(dòng)才得以實(shí)現(xiàn)。意志論者強(qiáng)調(diào)自由的核心作用，著重指出意志在把價(jià)值帶向存在過(guò)程中的作用，是對(duì)的；但是他們認(rèn)為單單意志——而非理性——是規(guī)范性的來(lái)源，亦誤入歧途。最后，歷史主義者認(rèn)為規(guī)范體現(xiàn)在一個(gè)民族的生活方式之中，這是對(duì)的；但是他們?cè)诎研问健康囊?，歷史變遷的規(guī)范，等同于任何一套特定的社會(huì)和歷史環(huán)境之時(shí)，也太不加區(qū)別了！因?yàn)樗麄儾灰詺v史主義的方式理解歷史，所以歷史主義者混淆了價(jià)值的歷史解釋和它們的概念性的證明：歷史的解釋聚焦于事實(shí)性的原因，而概念的證明解釋奠基性的形式—目的因。

So, ultimately, Hegel’s normative doctrine was original, profound and coherent. In a remarkable fashion it fused the rationalist, voluntarist and historicist traditions, preserving their truths and cancelling their errors. But there should also be no doubt that the doctrine was deeply speculative and metaphysical, resting upon Hegel’s Aristotelian metaphysics. Hegel made at least three basic metaphysical claims: (1) that universals exist in re, (2) that we can apply such formal–?nal causes to organisms in the natural world, and (3) that we can also apply them to ‘organisms’ in the social-political world. All these claims added together yield absolute idealism. We have seen Hegel’s rationale for the ?rst claim in chapter Three and his justi?cation for the second in chapter Four; we will consider his defense of the third claim in chapter Eleven. Whatever the success of Hegel’s arguments, it should be clear that his entire account is intelligible and defensible only as a metaphysics. So if we insist on a non-metaphysical reading of Hegel’s social and political theory, we cannot appreciate its foundation.

? ? 因此，最終，黑格爾的規(guī)范學(xué)說(shuō)是匠心獨(dú)運(yùn)的、入木三分的和始終如一的。它以某種令人矚目的方式融合了理性主義、意志主義和歷史主義的傳統(tǒng)，保存了它們的真理并且去除了它們的錯(cuò)誤。但是毫無(wú)疑問(wèn)的是，這個(gè)學(xué)說(shuō)從根本上說(shuō)是思辨的和形而上學(xué)的，建立在黑格爾的亞里士多德式的形而上學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)之上。黑格爾至少提出了三條基本的形而上學(xué)的主張：（1）共相存在于事物當(dāng)中（in re）；（2）我們能夠把這種形式—目的因應(yīng)用到自然世界的有機(jī)體之中；（3）我們也能把它應(yīng)用到社會(huì)—政治世界的“有機(jī)體”之中。所有這些主張加在一起就產(chǎn)生了絕對(duì)唯心主義。我們?cè)谇叭轮幸呀?jīng)看到過(guò)黑格爾第一個(gè)主張的基本原理，在第四章中看到過(guò)他關(guān)于第二個(gè)主張的證明；我們將在第十一章考察他為第三個(gè)主張所作的辯護(hù)。無(wú)論黑格爾的論證的成功之處在哪里，有一點(diǎn)是明白無(wú)誤的，即，他整個(gè)的解說(shuō)只有作為一種形而上學(xué)才是可理解的和可辯護(hù)的。因此，如果我們堅(jiān)持對(duì)于黑格爾的社會(huì)和歷史的理論做一種非形而上學(xué)的解讀，那么，我們就不能理解這種基礎(chǔ)。

MACHIAVELLI’S CHALLENGE

馬基雅維利的挑戰(zhàn)

For Hegel, the question of right – ‘How are we to justify the law?’ – was never only a matter of its mode of justi?cation but also one of its application. The rationalist, voluntarist and historicist traditions really only quarrelled about how to justify right; but they took it for granted that it had an application to the political world. It was one of Hegel’s great merits as a political thinker that he fully recognized and struggled with the issue of its application. Beginning in his later Frankfurt years, Hegel saw the force of Machiavelli’s challenge: that moral principles cannot be applied to the political world because if people act according to them they destroy themselves.? Some of Hegel’s central and characteristic doctrines arose from his attempt to answer Machiavelli.

? ? 對(duì)黑格爾而言，權(quán)利的問(wèn)題——“我們?nèi)绾稳プC成法律？”——從來(lái)都不是一個(gè)僅僅事關(guān)證成模式的問(wèn)題，而且還是一個(gè)它的應(yīng)用的問(wèn)題。理性主義、意志主義和歷史主義的傳統(tǒng)實(shí)際上只是在為如何證成法律而爭(zhēng)論不休；但是，它們都想當(dāng)然地認(rèn)為，它可以應(yīng)用到政治世界。黑格爾作為政治思想家的最大功績(jī)之一是，他充分認(rèn)識(shí)到它的應(yīng)用的問(wèn)題并與之進(jìn)行斗爭(zhēng)。在他后法蘭克福歲月的一開(kāi)始，黑格爾就看到了馬基雅維利的挑戰(zhàn)的壓力（force）：道德原則不能被應(yīng)用到政治世界之中，因?yàn)槿绻忻褡甯鶕?jù)道德原則而行動(dòng)，那么，他們就會(huì)自取滅亡。黑格爾的學(xué)說(shuō)中某些最為核心和最具特色的方面就源自于他回答馬基雅維利的嘗試。

As an idealistic youth, Hegel had the greatest con?dence in the power of moral principles in the political world. In April 1795 he wrote Schelling that he expected a revolution in Germany from the Kantian philosophy.14 He saw himself as a Volkserzieher, an educator of the people, who would promulgate the principles of the Kantian philosophy to the public. If the people were only aware of their natural rights, he believed, they would demand them and overthrow their oppressors. Still, Hegel’s early moral idealism was not really as naive as it seemed. It was based on his hope that his native Württemberg would be liberated by invading French armies, which would impose a new modern constitution. The French army had already invaded his homeland in 1796; though it had soon retreated, its return seemed imminent. If the French had already created new republics in Milan, Rome and Switzerland, why should Württemberg not be next? Like many young Swabians, among them Schelling and H?lderlin, Hegel saw himself as ‘ein Patriot’, someone who believed that the Swabian constitution should be reformed along modern French lines.15

? ? 還是一個(gè)年輕的觀念論者之時(shí)，黑格爾對(duì)于道德原則在政治世界中的力量抱有絕對(duì)的信心。在1795年4月，他給謝林的信中說(shuō)，他期望康德哲學(xué)給德國(guó)帶來(lái)一場(chǎng)革命。14他自認(rèn)為是一個(gè)民族教育家（volkserzieher），這個(gè)民族教育家要向民眾大肆鼓吹康德哲學(xué)的原則。他相信，只要這個(gè)民族覺(jué)察到了他們的自然權(quán)利，他們就會(huì)要求這些權(quán)利，并推翻他們的壓迫者。不過(guò)，黑格爾早期的道德觀念論實(shí)際上沒(méi)有像它看起來(lái)那么天真幼稚。它基于他的這樣一種期望，即，他的祖國(guó)維滕堡將會(huì)由于法國(guó)軍隊(duì)的入侵而獲得解放，他們將會(huì)強(qiáng)加給維滕堡一部新憲法。1796年，法國(guó)軍隊(duì)已經(jīng)侵入了他的故鄉(xiāng)；盡管它很快就撤退了，但是似乎它的返回指日可待。如果說(shuō)法國(guó)已經(jīng)在米蘭、羅馬和瑞士創(chuàng)立了一個(gè)新的共和國(guó)，那么維滕堡為什么不可以是下一個(gè)？就像許多斯瓦布的年輕人，其中包括謝林和荷爾德林，黑格爾同樣把自己看作“一個(gè)愛(ài)國(guó)者”。愛(ài)國(guó)者們相信，斯瓦布的憲法應(yīng)該依照現(xiàn)代法國(guó)精神來(lái)進(jìn)行改革。15

Eventually, these hopes crashed against reality. The rude awakening came with the Congress of Rastatt, a peace conference between the French and German empires, which took place between December 1797 and April 1799. Hegel knew of the proceedings of this conference from inside sources: his friends H?lderlin and Isaak von Sinclair attended the conference and gave him detailed reports about their discussions with the Württemberg delegates. Along with H?lderlin and Sinclair, Hegel became deeply disillusioned by the outcome of the conference. It showed that the French had no interest in exporting their revolution but only in acquiring power for themselves. Furthermore, the states of the German Empire acted only in their self-interest and sacri?ced nothing for the empire as a whole. For Hegel and his friends, the congress con?rmed a sad reality that everyone knew but no one would admit: there was no longer a Holy Roman Empire.

? ? 最終，這些愿望在現(xiàn)實(shí)面前撞得粉碎。隨著猛然的醒悟而來(lái)的拉斯塔特議會(huì)、在法蘭西帝國(guó)和德意志帝國(guó)之間的和平會(huì)議，發(fā)生在1797年11月和1799年4月之間。黑格爾從內(nèi)部渠道多少了解了這次會(huì)議的進(jìn)程：他的朋友荷爾德林和伊薩克·馮·辛克萊參加了這次會(huì)議，并且以報(bào)告的形式告訴他其和維滕堡代表之間進(jìn)行磋商的細(xì)節(jié)。和荷爾德林與辛克萊一道，黑格爾對(duì)于會(huì)議的成果有一種深深的幻滅之感。這顯示出，法國(guó)人根本沒(méi)有興趣輸出他們的革命，而只對(duì)為他們自己獲得權(quán)力感興趣。此外，德意志帝國(guó)的各國(guó)家僅僅代表它們自己國(guó)家的利益行動(dòng)，而不肯為作為整體的帝國(guó)犧牲任何東西。對(duì)黑格爾和他的朋友而言，議會(huì)證實(shí)了一個(gè)悲哀的現(xiàn)實(shí)，即所有人都知道但是無(wú)人愿意承認(rèn)，神圣羅馬帝國(guó)已經(jīng)一去不返。

Rastatt taught Hegel a deeply sobering lesson about the political world: that politicians act not to realize their ideals but to maximize their power. They would make treaties but violate them whenever it suited their self-interest. It was pointless to condemn politicians on moral grounds, Hegel realized. They acted from sheer necessity, for the sake of mere survival. In the political world one was either victor or loser, perpetrator or victim. Since ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, moral ideals apply to the political world only if we can act on them; but experience shows we cannot, because if we do act on them we destroy ourselves, and no one has an obligation to allow their self-destruction.

? ? 拉斯塔特國(guó)會(huì)在政治世界方面給了黑格爾一個(gè)十分沉痛的教訓(xùn)：政治家們的行動(dòng)不是為了實(shí)現(xiàn)他們的理想，而是為了使他們的權(quán)力最大化。他們也許會(huì)訂立條約，但是只要是符合他們的自我利益，他們隨時(shí)會(huì)違反它們。黑格爾意識(shí)到，站在道德的立場(chǎng)上責(zé)備政治家根本上是無(wú)的放矢。他們的行動(dòng)是出自純粹的必然性，僅僅為了幸存的目的。在政治世界，一個(gè)人要么是成功者，要么是失敗者，要么是作惡之人，要么是受害之人。既然“應(yīng)當(dāng)”意味著“能夠”，那么，只有在我們能夠根據(jù)道德理想而行動(dòng)的時(shí)候，道德理想才會(huì)應(yīng)用于政治世界；但是經(jīng)驗(yàn)指出，我們不能依據(jù)它們行動(dòng)，因?yàn)槿绻覀円罁?jù)它們而行動(dòng)，我們就會(huì)自取滅亡，而沒(méi)有人有義務(wù)允許他們自取滅亡。

The lesson was pure Machiavelli. It was indeed no accident that Hegel would soon invoke his name in his ?rst major work on political philosophy, his essay on the German constitution, the socalled Verfassungsschrift, which he wrote from 1799 to 1800 after the disillusionment of Rastatt.16 One of the most striking features of Hegel’s tract is its outspoken defense of Machiavelli, who still had a terrible reputation in eighteenth-century Germany. If you read Machiavelli’s theory in the context of his times, Hegel argued, it shows itself to be ‘one of the truest and greatest conceptions of a genuine political head of the greatest and noblest kind’ (I, 555/ 221). Hegel’s sympathy for Machiavelli derived not least from the similarity he saw between his own situation and Machiavelli’s. Like Italy in the sixteenth century, Germany was now torn asunder by foreign powers; furthermore, the independent states of the empire were like the independent Italian cities, which acted only for their own self-interest and to aggrandize their power. On Hegel’s reading, Machiavelli’s perfectly legitimate overriding interest was the salvation of Italy, the end of anarchy and the achievement of Italian unity (I, 556/221).

? ? 這個(gè)經(jīng)驗(yàn)純粹是馬基雅維利式的。實(shí)際上絕非偶然的是，黑格爾很快在他第一部論述政治哲學(xué)的重要著作，論述德國(guó)憲政的論文，所謂的《憲法論文》（Verfassungsschrift）中援引他的名字。這部著作寫(xiě)于對(duì)拉斯塔特議會(huì)的幻想破滅之后的1799年到1800年間。16黑格爾的這本小冊(cè)子一個(gè)最引人注目的特征是他公開(kāi)為馬基雅維利辯護(hù)，而在18世紀(jì)的德國(guó)，馬基雅維利仍然惡名昭著。黑格爾論證說(shuō)，如果你在他那個(gè)時(shí)代的語(yǔ)境中閱讀馬基雅維利的理論，它將顯示自己為“一個(gè)最偉大和最高貴的類型的真正的政治頭腦的最真實(shí)和最偉大的思想”（I, 555/221）。黑格爾對(duì)于馬基雅維利的心有戚戚，不只是源于他所看到的在他自己的處境和馬基雅維利的處境之間的相似性。就像十六世紀(jì)的意大利，現(xiàn)在的德國(guó)也由于外來(lái)的力量而四分五裂；此外，帝國(guó)的那些獨(dú)立的國(guó)家就像意大利那些獨(dú)立的城市，它們僅僅為了自己的利益而行動(dòng)和擴(kuò)張它們的武力。在黑格爾的解讀中，馬基雅維利完全無(wú)視立法的興趣是拯救意大利、結(jié)束無(wú)政府主義，以及達(dá)成意大利的統(tǒng)一（I, 556/221）。

Not surprisingly, given his sympathy for Machiavelli, some scholars have seen Hegel’s Verfassungsschrift as essentially a defense of Realpolitik. Realpolitik is the doctrine that politicians always act in their self-interest, that their self-interest consists in acquiring, maintaining or increasing power, and that therefore the principles of morality have no application to the political world. Such was the doctrine ascribed to Hegel by Friedrich Meinecke, the great scholar of German historicism.17 For Meinecke, there were three great ?gures in the history of Realpolitik: Machiavelli, Friedrich II and Hegel.? Though now largely forgotten, Meinecke’s interpretation has had some eminent followers, among them Ernst Cassirer, Karl Popper and Isaiah Berlin.18

? ? 毫不奇怪，鑒于他對(duì)于馬基雅維利的惺惺相惜，某些學(xué)者視黑格爾的《憲法論文》為本質(zhì)上是為實(shí)在政治（Realpolitik）辯護(hù)。實(shí)在政治（Realpolitik）是這樣一種學(xué)說(shuō)，即政治家總是出于他們的自我利益而行動(dòng)，他們的自我利益在于獲得、維持并增強(qiáng)權(quán)力，道德原則因此而不能應(yīng)用到政治世界之中。這就是弗里德里希·梅涅克，偉大的德國(guó)歷史主義學(xué)者，歸之于黑格爾的學(xué)說(shuō)。17對(duì)于梅涅克而言，在實(shí)在政治的歷史上，有三位偉大的人物：馬基雅維利、弗里德里希二世和黑格爾。盡管現(xiàn)在在很大程度上已被遺忘，但是梅涅克的闡釋已經(jīng)產(chǎn)生了一些頗負(fù)盛名的追隨者，其中包括恩斯特·卡西爾，卡爾·波普爾和以賽亞·柏林。18

Was Hegel really a champion of Realpolitik? This question raises anew the old controversy whether Hegel was a progressive or a reactionary. The consensus of contemporary scholarship is that Hegel was a liberal reformer, and the reactionary interpretation has now been so discredited that it has virtually attained the status of a myth.19 But many of the more liberal interpretations of Hegel are based upon a consideration of Hegel’s later Prussian context. They consider only his later Philosophy of Right, virtually ignoring the Verfassungsschrift.20 This still ignores the question whether Hegel was really championing Realpolitik in the Verfassungsschrift, and if so whether we should read his later work in the light of the earlier one.

? ? 黑格爾真的是實(shí)在政治的擁護(hù)者嗎？這個(gè)問(wèn)題重新挑起了那個(gè)古老的爭(zhēng)論，黑格爾是進(jìn)步論者還是反動(dòng)派？當(dāng)代學(xué)者一致同意，黑格爾是一個(gè)自由的改革派，而極端保守的闡釋現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)名譽(yù)掃地，以至于它實(shí)際上獲得了一個(gè)神話的身份。19但是許多對(duì)于黑格爾的更加自由主義色彩的闡釋建基于對(duì)黑格爾晚期的普魯士語(yǔ)境的考察之上。它們僅僅考慮他晚期的《法哲學(xué)》，而完全忽略了《憲法論文》。20這也就仍然忽視了追問(wèn)，黑格爾實(shí)質(zhì)上是否在《憲法論文》中擁護(hù)實(shí)在政治的問(wèn)題，以及如果答案是肯定的，那么我們是否應(yīng)該借助他早期的著作來(lái)解讀他的晚期著作的問(wèn)題。

A close examination of the Verfassungsschrift reveals considerable evidence for Meinecke’s interpretation. Four aspects of his theory seem to con?rm it conclusively. First, Hegel maintains that the essence of the state, its central and de?ning characteristic, is having power, the power to enforce and defend its policies and laws (VD I, 472–85/153–64). He excludes religion, culture, the form of government, national identity, from having any necessary role in the concept of the state. Second, Hegel argues that right consists in nothing more than the advantage of the state, as acknowledged and settled by treaties (I, 541/209). He then stresses that no state is bound by its treaties if other states do not act on them (I, 540; 208); and he is explicit that other states will not act on them (I, 565/229). Third, Hegel is convinced that in politics nothing really matters besides power. He stresses that there is no real di?erence between politics and Faustrecht, i.e. the right of the stronger, and that moral idealists delude themselves when they overlook the central fact that in politics ‘the truth lies in power’ (I, 529/199). Fourth, Hegel apparently identi?es right with historical necessity. In the introduction to the Verfassungsschrift he attacks moral idealists who tell us about how the political world ought to be and stresses that the way the world must be is the way it ought to be (I, 463/145).

? ? 仔細(xì)檢查《憲法論文》會(huì)暴露大量的梅涅克的闡釋的證據(jù)。他的理論的四個(gè)方面似乎確鑿無(wú)疑地證實(shí)了這一點(diǎn)。首先，黑格爾堅(jiān)持說(shuō)，國(guó)家的本質(zhì)，它的核心的和明確的特征，就是擁有權(quán)力，增強(qiáng)和捍衛(wèi)它的政策和法律的權(quán)力（VD I, 472—85/153-64）。他排除了宗教、文化、政府形式、民族認(rèn)同等在國(guó)家概念中扮演的必要角色。其次，黑格爾論證說(shuō)，權(quán)利無(wú)非就在于為條約所確定和固定的國(guó)家的優(yōu)點(diǎn)之中（I, 541/209）。然后，他強(qiáng)調(diào)，如果其他國(guó)家不依照條約而行動(dòng)，那么任何國(guó)家都不受條約的限制（I, 540；208）；他明確提到，其他國(guó)家也將不依據(jù)它們而行動(dòng)（I, 565/229）。第三，黑格爾確信，在政治和拳頭政治（Faustrecht），亦即強(qiáng)者的權(quán)利之間沒(méi)有真正的區(qū)別。當(dāng)?shù)赖吕硐胫髁x者忽視了在政治中“真理就在強(qiáng)權(quán)之中”這個(gè)關(guān)鍵事實(shí)之時(shí)，他們就是自我欺騙（I, 529/199）。第四，黑格爾明顯把權(quán)利等同于歷史的必然性。在《憲法論文》的引言中，他攻擊那些道德理想主義者，他們告訴我們政治世界應(yīng)當(dāng)如何如何，并且強(qiáng)調(diào)這個(gè)世界必定會(huì)成為的樣子就是它應(yīng)當(dāng)會(huì)成為的樣子（I, 463/145）。

After considering such evidence, it might seem that Hegel is indeed a champion of Realpolitik. But a closer examination of the text shows that this conclusion would be premature. There are three mitigating factors. First, although Hegel emphasizes having power as the central feature of the state, he also maintains that there is a purpose to such power: namely, protecting the rights of its citizens (VD I, 481–2, 520/161–2, 192). The objective of state power is ‘the immutable maintenance of rights’ (I, 543/211), and to prevent the relationships between states degenerating into the rights of the stronger (I, 542/210). Hegel defends a single central state because this is the only means to ensure basic law and order, which is the foundation for freedom, the enjoyment of one’s basic rights and property (I, 550, 555, 556/217, 220, 221). Second, Hegel thinks that the powers of the state should be severely limited, so that it does only what is necessary to organizing and maintaining a central authority and administration. He is a severe critic of both the old absolutist state and the modern revolutionary state for attempting to control everything from above. The state should allow room for the freedom and the initiative of its citizens. Hence he writes: ‘Nothing should be so sacrosanct to the government as facilitating and protecting the free activity of citizens in matters other than this [organizing and maintaining authority]’ (I, 482/ 161–2). Third, Hegel’s defense of Machiavelli is not that he saw the great value of power for its own sake, but that he saw that power is sometimes the only means of eradicating anarchy (I, 556/221).? Machiavelli recognized that the ?rst obligation of the state is to maintain law and order, and that to do so it is sometimes necessary to commit immoral actions. Such extreme measures were only justi?ed, Hegel held, in cases of necessity, where the very existence of law and order was threatened (GW VIII, 259).

? ? 在考察這些證據(jù)之后，似乎黑格爾事實(shí)上就是實(shí)在政治的擁護(hù)者。但是進(jìn)一步細(xì)勘文本就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，下這個(gè)結(jié)論還為時(shí)過(guò)早。有三個(gè)因素可以緩和這個(gè)結(jié)論。首先，盡管黑格爾強(qiáng)調(diào)擁有權(quán)力是國(guó)家的核心特征，但是他也強(qiáng)調(diào)說(shuō)，這種權(quán)力有一個(gè)目標(biāo)：也就是說(shuō)，保護(hù)它的公民的權(quán)利（VD I, 481-482，520/161-162，192）。國(guó)家權(quán)力的目標(biāo)是“不可動(dòng)搖地維護(hù)權(quán)利”（I, 543/211），以及防止國(guó)家之間的關(guān)系蛻變?yōu)楦鼜?qiáng)者的權(quán)利（I, 542/210）。黑格爾之所以捍衛(wèi)唯一的中央國(guó)家，是因?yàn)檫@是確?；緳?quán)利和秩序的唯一手段，它是自由和享有一個(gè)人的基本權(quán)利和財(cái)產(chǎn)的基礎(chǔ)（I, 550，555，556/217，220，221）。其次，黑格爾認(rèn)為，國(guó)家的權(quán)力應(yīng)該受到嚴(yán)重限制，以至于它只能做對(duì)于組織和維持一個(gè)中央權(quán)威和行政而言必不可少的事情。他既是古老的絕對(duì)主義國(guó)家的批評(píng)者，又是現(xiàn)代革命國(guó)家的批判者，因?yàn)樗鼈冊(cè)噲D自上而下地控制一切事物。國(guó)家應(yīng)該給與公民的自由和首倡精神以空間。因此，他寫(xiě)道：“對(duì)于政府而言，真正神圣不可侵犯之事應(yīng)該是像保證和保護(hù)公民的自由行動(dòng)這樣的事情，而非這一點(diǎn)（組織和維持權(quán)威機(jī)構(gòu)）”（I, 482/161-2）。第三，黑格爾為馬基雅維利所作的辯護(hù)不是他看到了權(quán)力的自身價(jià)值，而是他看到了權(quán)力有時(shí)候是根除無(wú)政府主義的唯一手段（I, 556/221）。馬基雅維利認(rèn)識(shí)到，政府的第一義務(wù)應(yīng)該是維持法律和秩序。而為了要做到這一點(diǎn)，有時(shí)候就有必要作出不道德的行動(dòng)。黑格爾強(qiáng)調(diào)說(shuō)，這種極端的尺度僅僅是在必要的時(shí)刻，法律和秩序受到威脅之時(shí)，才能證明其正當(dāng)性（GW，VIII, 259）.

So, although a closer examination of the Verfassungsschrift does not vindicate Meinecke’s interpretation, it does show that Hegel was much closer to the tradition of Realpolitik than many of his more liberal interpreters allow. If Hegel was still an idealist in politics, he was an idealist of the most realistic kind. He still wanted to overcome the gap between theory and practice; but he recognized that his ideals would have to be achieved through, and not in spite of, the quest for power. We will examine later Hegel’s mature attempt to meet Machiavelli’s challenge in his philosophy of history (pp. 267–70).

? ? 因此，盡管細(xì)致考察《憲法論文》并不使梅涅克的闡釋失效，但是它的確顯示出一種傳統(tǒng)，比他那些自由主義的闡釋者所允許的更加接近實(shí)在政治的傳統(tǒng)。如果黑格爾在政治中也是一個(gè)觀念論者（理想主義者），那么，他就是一個(gè)最具有實(shí)在論色彩的觀念論者。他仍然想要克服理論和實(shí)踐之間的鴻溝；但是他認(rèn)識(shí)到，他的理想不得不通過(guò)——而且不能放棄——尋求權(quán)力才能達(dá)到。我們將會(huì)在他的歷史哲學(xué)中考察晚期黑格爾想要接受馬基雅維利的挑戰(zhàn)的成熟的嘗試（第267-270頁(yè)）。

THE IDEALISM OF A REFORMER

一個(gè)改革者的觀念論（理想主義）

Hegel’s sympathy for Machiavellianism in the Verfassungsschrift seems to leave an insurmountable gap between theory and practice. If politicians act only on their self-interest, if their chief end is to acquire power, then moral ideals seem to have no validity in the political sphere at all – except, of course, as disguises for selfinterest. In the preface Hegel himself seemed to draw just this conclusion (I, 461–4/142–5). Here he expressed his contempt for all idealists who presume to teach the world how it ought to be. His main target was the old legal theorists who refused to admit that the empire had collapsed, and who persisted in trying to ?nd some constitution behind the chaos of its three hundred autonomous states.21 But he also directed his scorn against those radicals and reformers – persons like himself years earlier – who think that they can change the world according to their moral ideals. Against all such idealists Hegel now preached a gospel of bitter resignation, of patient acquiescence. The sole purpose of his tract, he declared, is to know the deeper causes behind the collapse of the empire, and why events must be and cannot be otherwise. If we only knew the necessity behind historical development, he explained, this would promote ‘a(chǎn) calmer outlook and a moderate endurance of it’. What makes us resentful is not reality itself but the thought that reality is not as it ought to be. If, however, we recognize that reality is as it must be, then we will accept that it is as it really ought to be. Here Hegel anticipated his later statement in the preface to the Philosophy of Right that the purpose of philosophy is not to prescribe how the world ought to be but only to reconcile us to why it must be.

? ? 黑格爾在《憲法論文》中對(duì)于馬基雅維利的同情似乎在理論與實(shí)踐之間造成了一道不可彌縫的鴻溝。如果政治家們只是依據(jù)他們的自我利益而行動(dòng)，如果他們的主要目的是獲得權(quán)力，那么道德理想似乎在政治領(lǐng)域壓根兒就沒(méi)有任何有效性——當(dāng)然，除了它只是當(dāng)作幌子。在《序言》中，黑格爾本人得出的正是這個(gè)結(jié)論（I, 461-4/142-5）。在這里，他表達(dá)了他對(duì)于所有想要教導(dǎo)這個(gè)世界應(yīng)該如何成其所是的理想主義者的輕蔑。他主要的靶子是那些老的法學(xué)理論家，他們拒絕承認(rèn)帝國(guó)已經(jīng)崩塌，但卻仍然頑固不化地試圖在三百個(gè)獨(dú)立的國(guó)家的混亂無(wú)序的背后發(fā)現(xiàn)某種憲政。21但是他也對(duì)那些激進(jìn)主義者和銳意改革者——那些人就像稍早些年的他本人——嗤之以鼻，他們認(rèn)為，他們能夠依據(jù)他們的道德理想來(lái)改造這個(gè)世界。與所有這些理想主義者背道而馳，黑格爾現(xiàn)在訓(xùn)誡一種苦澀的順從的福音，容忍的默許的福音。他宣稱，他的論文的唯一目標(biāo)是認(rèn)識(shí)帝國(guó)崩潰背后更深層次的原因，以及這些事件為什么必定如此發(fā)生而不可能呈現(xiàn)其他面目。他解釋說(shuō)，只有我們知道了歷史發(fā)展進(jìn)程背后的必然性，這才會(huì)促進(jìn)“對(duì)于它的更加鎮(zhèn)定自若的展望和不偏不激的忍受”。使我們心懷怨恨的不是實(shí)在自身，而是實(shí)在沒(méi)有和它應(yīng)當(dāng)所是那樣的思想。然而，如果我們認(rèn)識(shí)到，實(shí)在正是如它必定所是那樣，那么，我們就會(huì)接受它實(shí)際上正是如它應(yīng)該所是那樣。在這里，黑格爾已經(jīng)預(yù)示了他后來(lái)在《法哲學(xué)》的序言中的陳述，即哲學(xué)的目的不是為世界應(yīng)該怎樣開(kāi)處方，而僅僅是讓我們和世界為什么必定如此之間達(dá)成和解。

Nevertheless, despite such resignation, Hegel does not reject idealism as such. What he criticizes is a speci?c kind of idealism: that which preaches how things ought to be, or that which ignores the real motivations of human action. But he still upholds another kind of idealism: that which perceives the goals behind historical development. When he gives historical necessity his normative sanction he does not mean to approve any form of historical development at all; he has a very de?nite idea of where history is going and why it ought to be as it must be. Already in the Verfassungsschrift he suggests a central theme of his later philosophy of history: that the end of history is the realization of freedom, and more speci?cally the principle that the people should have some de?nite share in government. The modern principle of representation – that each individual should participate in the state – grew out of the forests of Germany and will eventually dominate the entire modern world (VD I, 533/203).

? ? 話說(shuō)回來(lái)，盡管提倡順從，但是黑格爾并不拒絕理想主義本身。他所批判的只是某種類型的理想主義：這種理想主義訓(xùn)誡事物應(yīng)當(dāng)成為什么樣子，或者它忽略了人類行動(dòng)的真正動(dòng)機(jī)。但是他仍然堅(jiān)執(zhí)另一種類型的理想主義（觀念論），這種理想主義觀察歷史發(fā)展歷程背后的目標(biāo)。當(dāng)他賦予歷史必然性以他的規(guī)范性制裁之時(shí)，他壓根兒不是想同意任何形式的歷史發(fā)展歷程；關(guān)于歷史在哪里發(fā)生，以及它為什么應(yīng)該如其必定之所是那樣，他有一個(gè)確定的觀念。在《憲法論文》中，他已經(jīng)暗示了他后期的歷史哲學(xué)中的核心主題：歷史的目的是自由的實(shí)現(xiàn)，更具體地說(shuō)，是人民應(yīng)該有限地參與到政府之中這個(gè)原則。現(xiàn)代的代議制原則——每一個(gè)個(gè)體都應(yīng)該參與到國(guó)家之中——是從德國(guó)的森林之中產(chǎn)生出來(lái)的，而最終將統(tǒng)治整個(gè)的現(xiàn)代世界（VD I, 533/203）。

Ultimately, then, Hegel never really renounced his ideals; he simply read them into history itself. He could accept the realities of history only because he believed that they were stepping-stones toward progress, means of the realization of the higher ends of reason. The great lesson he learned from the post-revolutionary era is that reason is not an eternal norm above history but the immanent purpose and inner necessity of history itself. Hegel’s famous thesis of the cunning of reason was his rea?rmation of idealism in the face of the harsh realities of the political world. This thesis states that even if politicians act only for their self-interest, they are still the unwitting instruments for the higher purpose of reason, of which they have only a vague presentiment. Hegel’s message was that reason is more cunning than the most cunning political tactician, cleverer than all the wily snares of Realpolitik (pp. 267–70).

? ? 那么，最終，黑格爾從來(lái)沒(méi)有放棄他的各種理想；他只是把它們讀解進(jìn)歷史本身。他不能接受歷史的諸種實(shí)在，只是因?yàn)樗嘈?，它們是朝向進(jìn)步的進(jìn)身之階，是實(shí)現(xiàn)歷史的更高目的的手段。他從后革命時(shí)代學(xué)到的最大的教訓(xùn)是，理性不是凌駕于歷史之上的永恒規(guī)范，而是歷史自身的內(nèi)在目標(biāo)和內(nèi)部的必然性。黑格爾關(guān)于歷史的狡計(jì)的著名論點(diǎn)是他面對(duì)政治世界中諸種殘酷無(wú)情的實(shí)在時(shí)對(duì)于理想主義（觀念論）的再次肯定。這個(gè)論題認(rèn)為，即使政治家只是為了他們自己的利益而行動(dòng)，他們也仍然不知不覺(jué)地充當(dāng)了理性的更高目的的工具。他們對(duì)于它只有模糊的預(yù)感。黑格爾要傳遞的信息是，與最詭計(jì)多端的政治策士們相比，理性要更加老謀深算，與實(shí)在政治中各種狡猾的圈套相比，理性要更加聰明靈巧（第267-270頁(yè)）。

Hegel’s grand theme of reason in history grew out of not only the disillusionment of Rastatt, but also his attempt to resolve the famous theory–practice dispute of the late 1790s (pp. 31–3). It was his attempt to ?nd a middle path between the extremes of rationalism and empiricism. The rationalists (Kant and Fichte) held that practice should follow theory, or that we ought to change the world to conform to the moral ideals of reason; the empiricists (M?ser, A.W. Rehberg, Friedrich Gentz) countered that theory should follow practice, or that we should determine our political principles by following tradition, precedent and historical experience. Hegel agrees with the rationalists that the principles of the state should be founded on reason; but he disagrees with them that they should be imposed on history. He concurs with the empiricists that good laws and policies should arise from history and adapt to local circumstances; but he parts company with them in their emphasis upon precedent, privilege and tradition as the basis for the law. In short, the main problem for the rationalist is that he emphasizes reason at the expense of history; and the chief di?culty of the empiricist is that he stresses history at the expense of reason.? The middle path between these extremes is that there is reason within history. The fundamental principles of the Revolution – liberty, equality and fraternity – are really the ends of history itself.? The faulty premise behind the false antithesis between rationalism and empiricism is that history consists in nothing more than an accumulation of facts. This gives the rationalist his motive for neglecting history, and the empiricist his excuse for neglecting reason.? What both failed to see is that there is reason in history, that its ?nal purpose is the realization of freedom, the self-awareness that man as such is free.

? ? 黑格爾關(guān)于歷史中的理性這個(gè)宏大主題不僅僅生自它對(duì)于拉斯塔特議會(huì)幻想的破滅，而且也生自他想要解決1790年代晚期著名的理論——實(shí)踐爭(zhēng)論的嘗試（第31—33頁(yè)）。他想方設(shè)法要在理性主義和經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的兩個(gè)極端之間發(fā)現(xiàn)一條中間道路。理性主義者（康德和費(fèi)希特）強(qiáng)調(diào)實(shí)踐應(yīng)該服從理論，或者我們應(yīng)該改變世界以遵從理性的道德理想；經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義者（莫塞爾，A. E.雷伯格和弗里德里?！じ模┓磳?duì)說(shuō)，理論應(yīng)該服從實(shí)踐，或者我們應(yīng)該通過(guò)遵從傳統(tǒng)來(lái)決定我們的政治原則。黑格爾同意理性主義者的是，國(guó)家的原則應(yīng)該建基于理性；但是他反對(duì)他們的是，這些原則應(yīng)該強(qiáng)加諸歷史之上。他與經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義者意見(jiàn)一致的地方是，好的法律和政策應(yīng)當(dāng)從歷史中產(chǎn)生，并且適應(yīng)地方的環(huán)境；但是在他們強(qiáng)調(diào)慣例、特權(quán)和傳統(tǒng)作為法律的基礎(chǔ)之時(shí)，他就和他們分道揚(yáng)鑣了。簡(jiǎn)言之，理性主義者的主要問(wèn)題是，他以歷史為代價(jià)來(lái)強(qiáng)調(diào)理性；而經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義者的主要困難是，他以理性為代價(jià)強(qiáng)調(diào)歷史。在這兩個(gè)極端之間的第三條道路是，把理性置入歷史之中。法國(guó)大革命的基本原則——自由、平等和博愛(ài)——實(shí)際上就是歷史自身的終結(jié)（目的）。在理性主義和經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的虛假對(duì)立背后一個(gè)有瑕疵的前提是，歷史無(wú)非就是一堆歷史事實(shí)的堆積。這就給與理性主義者以忽略歷史的動(dòng)機(jī)，給與經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義者以忽視理性的借口。雙方都沒(méi)有能夠看到，歷史之中是有理性的，歷史的最終目標(biāo)是自由的實(shí)現(xiàn)，自我覺(jué)察到人本身是自由的。

We are now in a better position to understand Hegel’s famous ‘double dictum’ (Doppelsatz) in the preface to the Philosophy of Right.? The double dictum declares: ‘What is rational is actual; what is actual is rational.’ There is probably no other statement of Hegel’s that has created more commentary and controversy; but its basic meaning becomes clear as long as we remember Hegel’s middle path between rationalism and empiricism. The ?rst dictum – that the rational is the actual – means that reason is a self-actualizing end, a purpose that of necessity realizes itself. The rational is not just an ideal about what ought to be but an end that must be. This dictum is directed against conservatives, who tend to dismiss ideals as unrealizable, quixotic or utopian. The second dictum – that the actual is the rational – states that the actual embodies, realizes and develops the idea. It is directed against radicals, who want to sweep away the past for their moral ideals. It is important to note, however, how Hegel explicitly quali?ed the second half of the dictum in his Enzyklop?die (§6). Anxious to avoid the objection that he was sanctioning all forms of the status quo in saying that the actual is rational, he explained that we have to distinguish actuality (Wirklichkeit) from reality (Dasein) or existence (Existenz). Actuality is what of necessity realizes the essence of a thing, and so it is not mere reality or existence, which is contingent. Hence Hegel does not mean to endorse every aspect of the existing social and political world as rational. Crime, poverty and tyranny might be real or exist but they are not actual because they do not realize any ideal of reason.

? ? 我們現(xiàn)在站在一個(gè)更佳的位置上理解《法哲學(xué)·序言》中黑格爾那個(gè)著名“雙向格言”（Doppelsatz）。這個(gè)雙向格言宣稱，“凡是合理的都是現(xiàn)實(shí)的，凡是現(xiàn)實(shí)的都是合理的”。也許黑格爾的名言警句當(dāng)中再也沒(méi)有哪一句比這句產(chǎn)生了更多的評(píng)論與爭(zhēng)議；但是只要我們記住黑格爾在經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義和理性主義之間的中間道路，它的基本意思就昭然若揭。前半句格言——凡是合理的都是現(xiàn)實(shí)的——意味著，理性是一個(gè)自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的目的、一個(gè)必然要實(shí)現(xiàn)它自身的目標(biāo)。合理的不僅僅是一個(gè)關(guān)于應(yīng)當(dāng)如何的理想，而是必定如是的目的。這條格言是專門(mén)針對(duì)那些把理想當(dāng)做絕無(wú)實(shí)現(xiàn)之可能、堂吉訶德式的或?yàn)跬邪钍降臇|西而不屑一提的保守派的。后半條格言——凡是現(xiàn)實(shí)的都是合理的——說(shuō)的是，現(xiàn)實(shí)體現(xiàn)了、實(shí)現(xiàn)了和發(fā)展了理念。它是專門(mén)針對(duì)那些由于它們的道德理想而想要把過(guò)去徹底清除的激進(jìn)主義者。然而，重要的是注意到，黑格爾在《哲學(xué)百科全書(shū)》（第六節(jié)）中是如何明白無(wú)誤地描述這條格言的后半部分的。由于急于避免有人提出異議說(shuō)，他認(rèn)可了所有形式的現(xiàn)狀，因?yàn)樗f(shuō)凡是現(xiàn)實(shí)的都是合理的，黑格爾解釋說(shuō)，我們必須區(qū)分現(xiàn)實(shí)性（Wirklichkeit）和定在（Dasein）或者實(shí)存（Existenz）?，F(xiàn)實(shí)性是必然使一個(gè)事物的本質(zhì)得以實(shí)現(xiàn)的東西，因此，它就不僅僅是實(shí)在或?qū)嵈妫驗(yàn)楹笳呤桥既坏?。因此，黑格爾的意思不是同意現(xiàn)存社會(huì)和政治世界的每一個(gè)方面都是合理的。犯罪、貧困和暴政也許是實(shí)在的或者實(shí)存的，但是它們從來(lái)不是現(xiàn)實(shí)的，因?yàn)樗鼈儾荒軐?shí)現(xiàn)任何理性的理想。

When understood in its historical context, Hegel’s dictum shows itself to be neither radical nor reactionary. It is not radical because it demands that the statesman build on the historical past; and it is not reactionary because it forces him to recognize the progressive forces of history. Hegel’s dictum therefore advises the statesman to seek the middle path of reform. This is indeed just what we expect Hegel to say when we place him in his Prussian context. Although Hegel has often been seen as a spokesman for the Prussian Restoration, several basic facts refute this interpretation. (1) Hegel’s connections in Prussia were not with reactionary court circles, but with the reforming administration of Stein, Hardenberg and Altenstein.? It was indeed Altenstein who called Hegel to Prussia because he was attracted to his reformist views.22 Rather than siding with the reactionaries, Hegel criticized them sharply in his correspondence and in the Philosophy of Right.23 For their part, the reactionary circles in the Prussian court under Count von Wittgenstein harrassed and spied upon Hegel and his pupils.24 (2) Hegel developed the outlines, and even the details, of his organic conception of the state before his association with Prussia in 1818.25 Until 1805, when the foundation of his views had already been laid down, he regarded not Prussia but Austria as the major hope for reform in Germany.26 (3) Rather than glorifying the status quo, most aspects of Hegel’s ideal state were far from a reality in the Prussia of 1820. Indeed, Hegel’s demands for a constitutional monarchy, an elected assembly, local self-government, and a powerful civil service were all defeated by the Prussian reactionaries in 1819. (4) Hegel’s organic state closely resembles the ideals for the reform of the Prussian state put forward by Stein and Hardenberg. Like Hegel, Stein and Hardenberg advocated (a) a bi-cameral estates assembly, (b) more local self-government, (c) more freedom of trade and the abolition of feudal privileges, (d) a constitution ensuring fundamental rights to all citizens and placing limits upon the powers of the monarchy, (e) greater equality of opportunity, so that positions in the army and civil service were open to anyone with su?cient talent, and (f) a more powerful bureaucracy, which did not simply execute the orders of the king and cabinet but which actively formulated government policy.

? ? 如果從它的這種歷史語(yǔ)境中來(lái)理解，黑格爾的格言就顯示自身既不是激進(jìn)的，也不是反動(dòng)的。它之所以不是激進(jìn)的，是因?yàn)樗笳渭乙詺v史的過(guò)去為基礎(chǔ)；它之所以不是反動(dòng)的，是因?yàn)樗鼜?qiáng)迫他承認(rèn)歷史的進(jìn)步的力量。因此，黑格爾的格言建議政治家尋求改革的第三條道路。這就是當(dāng)我們把他置于普魯士的語(yǔ)境之時(shí)期望他所說(shuō)的東西。盡管黑格爾常常被看作是普魯士復(fù)辟的代言人，但是幾個(gè)基本的事實(shí)拒絕這種闡釋。（1）黑格爾在普魯士和反動(dòng)的宮廷圈子沒(méi)有什么關(guān)系，而是和斯泰恩、哈登伯格和阿爾騰斯坦的改良政府之間有聯(lián)系。事實(shí)上是阿爾滕斯坦把黑格爾招往普魯士的，因?yàn)樗缓诟駹柕母牧贾髁x主張所吸引。22黑格爾沒(méi)有與反動(dòng)派并肩戰(zhàn)斗，相反他在通信中和在《法哲學(xué)》中尖銳地批判了他們。23就反動(dòng)派而言，他們?cè)谄蒸斒繉m廷由考恩特·馮·維特根斯坦領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的圈子肆意騷擾和暗中監(jiān)視黑格爾和他的學(xué)生。24（2）黑格爾在他于1818年和普魯士發(fā)生關(guān)聯(lián)之前就已經(jīng)發(fā)展出了他關(guān)于國(guó)家的有機(jī)觀念的綱要，甚至細(xì)節(jié)。25遲至1805年，黑格爾的觀點(diǎn)的基礎(chǔ)就已經(jīng)奠定了，他不是把普魯士而是把奧地利看作是德國(guó)改革的最大希望。26（3）黑格爾非但沒(méi)有為現(xiàn)狀歌功頌德，相反，他的理想國(guó)家的絕大多數(shù)方面都和1820年普魯士的實(shí)況有十萬(wàn)八千里之遙。實(shí)際上，黑格爾對(duì)于立憲君主制、民選議會(huì)、地方自治和強(qiáng)大的行政部門(mén)的所有吁求都于1819年被普魯士的反動(dòng)派挫敗。（4）黑格爾的有機(jī)政府最接近斯泰恩和哈登伯格提出來(lái)的普魯士政府改革的理想。和黑格爾一樣，斯泰恩和哈登伯格支持（a）兩院制的等級(jí)議會(huì)，（b）更多的地方自治，（c）更多的貿(mào)易自由和廢除封建特權(quán)，（d）制定憲法保證所有公民的基本權(quán)利，并且限制君主的權(quán)力，（e）更大的機(jī)會(huì)平等，以便軍隊(duì)和行政機(jī)關(guān)的位置向任何具備足夠才能的人開(kāi)放，（f）更強(qiáng)有力的官僚系統(tǒng)，它并不只是執(zhí)行國(guó)王和內(nèi)閣的命令，而是也積極制定政府政策。

Given all its a?nities with the Prussian Reformation, and all its tensions with the Prussian Restoration, it is tempting to regard Hegel’s theory of the state as the philosophy of the Prussian Reform Movement. This is indeed a more accurate characterization of Hegel’s position. It is important to remember, however, that Hegel developed almost all his ideas before the formation of this movement, so that they are at best only an ex post facto rationalization of it.27

? ? 如果所有這些和普魯士改革派有著親緣關(guān)系，而又和普魯士的復(fù)辟派產(chǎn)生緊張，那么，把黑格爾的國(guó)家理論看作是普魯士改革運(yùn)動(dòng)的哲學(xué)，就很有誘惑力了。事實(shí)上，這也是黑格爾立場(chǎng)的更為準(zhǔn)確的定位。然而，重要的是記住，在這場(chǎng)運(yùn)動(dòng)形成之前，黑格爾已經(jīng)發(fā)展出了幾乎他的全部想法，因此它們充其量只是它的事后的理性化。27