Part Four Social and Political Philosophy
Nine Freedom and the Foundation of Right(1)
第四部分 社會(huì)和政治哲學(xué)
第九章 自由與權(quán)利的基礎(chǔ)(1)
METAPHYSICS AND POLITICS
形而上學(xué)與政治
Although most contemporary scholars have declared Hegel’s metaphysics dead, they stress that his social and political philosophy is alive and well. With some justice, they hail Hegel’s Philosophy of Right as a classic in political thought, a work on a par with Plato’s Republic, Hobbes’s Leviathan and Rousseau’s Social Contract.1 But, with some embarrassment, they tiptoe around Hegel’s metaphysics. Since any connection of Hegel’s social and political philosophy with his metaphysics would seem to render it obsolete, most scholars have adopted a non-metaphysical approach.2
? ? 盡管絕大多數(shù)當(dāng)代學(xué)者宣稱(chēng)黑格爾的形而上學(xué)已死，但是他們強(qiáng)調(diào)說(shuō)，他的社會(huì)與政治哲學(xué)仍然活著并且健康良好（well）。他們把黑格爾的《法哲學(xué)》推崇為政治思想中的經(jīng)典，一本可以與柏拉圖的《理想國(guó)》、霍布斯的《利維坦》和盧梭的《社會(huì)契約論》相媲美的著作這多少有些公正合理。1但是令人有些困窘的是，他們躡手躡腳地繞開(kāi)黑格爾的形而上學(xué)。因?yàn)楹诟駹柕纳鐣?huì)與政治哲學(xué)和他的形而上學(xué)的任何關(guān)聯(lián)都會(huì)使它顯得陳腐不堪，于是大多數(shù)學(xué)者選取了非形而上學(xué)的道路。2
However tempting, such an approach is ?atly contrary to Hegel’s own intentions. For, from the very beginning, it was his ambition to provide a metaphysical foundation for social and political philosophy. In his ?rst publication on the topic, his 1802–3 On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, he argued that the main shortcoming of previous systems of natural law is that they had separated natural law from metaphysics. They had failed to recognize that metaphysics is the foundation of the other sciences, and that a discipline has a scienti?c component only to the degree that it rests on such a foundation. Here Hegel self-consciously set himself in opposition to the positivistic spirit of much modern jurisprudence that attempts to free law from metaphysics. The problem with positivism, Hegel argues, is that metaphysics is inescapable, and that in pretending to be free from it we only beg the most basic questions against it.
? ? 無(wú)論多么有誘惑力，這樣一條道路簡(jiǎn)直就是和黑格爾自己的意圖南轅北轍。因?yàn)閺淖铋_(kāi)始，他就野心勃勃地要為社會(huì)與政治哲學(xué)提供一個(gè)形而上學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)。在他關(guān)于這個(gè)話(huà)題的最早出版物中，他1802~1803年的《討論自然法的科學(xué)方式》一文就論證說(shuō)，此前的自然法體系的主要缺點(diǎn)是，它們把自然法同形而上學(xué)分離開(kāi)來(lái)了。它們沒(méi)有能夠認(rèn)識(shí)到，形而上學(xué)是其他科學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)，一個(gè)學(xué)科只有到了它建基于那樣一個(gè)基礎(chǔ)之上的程度，才有了科學(xué)的組成部分。黑格爾論證說(shuō)，實(shí)證主義的問(wèn)題是，形而上學(xué)是不可逃避的，而在自稱(chēng)可以擺脫形而上學(xué)時(shí)，我們只是以未經(jīng)證明的結(jié)論來(lái)證明這個(gè)最基本的問(wèn)題來(lái)反對(duì)它。
Still, there is something to be said for the non-metaphysical approach. If only on a super?cial level, it is possible to understand much in Hegel’s social and political philosophy without his metaphysics. Much in Hegel’s theory is straightforwardly intelligible, as much the result of observation and prudence as speculative logic.? Although the architechtonic structure of the Philosophy of Right – its routine divisions into the dialectical moments of universality, particularity and individuality – re?ects Hegel’s speculative logic, this structure is somewhat arti?cial and arbitrary, more imposed upon than derived from its subject matter. Hegel is indeed often at his best when he lays aside his metaphysics and simply explores his subject matter.
? ? 對(duì)于這種非形而上學(xué)的道路，還有些話(huà)要說(shuō)。如果僅僅在一個(gè)表面的層次上說(shuō)，理解黑格爾的社會(huì)與政治哲學(xué)中許多東西而不需要他的形而上學(xué)，這是可能的。黑格爾理論當(dāng)中有許多是可以直截了當(dāng)?shù)乩斫獾?，既可以理解為觀察與深謀遠(yuǎn)慮的結(jié)果，也同樣可以看作是思辨邏輯的結(jié)果。盡管《法哲學(xué)》的建筑術(shù)結(jié)構(gòu)——它按部就班地劃分為普遍性、特殊性和個(gè)體性的辯證法環(huán)節(jié)——反映了黑格爾的思辨邏輯，但是這種結(jié)構(gòu)總有些說(shuō)不清道不明的矯揉造作與專(zhuān)橫武斷，這與其說(shuō)源自于它的題材，不如說(shuō)是強(qiáng)加于其上的。的確，在黑格爾把他的形而上學(xué)放置于一旁而僅僅探討它的題材時(shí)，他總是處于最佳狀態(tài)。
It is also necessary to note a profound ambivalence on Hegel’s part regarding the foundation of his social and political philosophy.? While he sometimes insists that its foundation lies in his speculative logic, he also stresses that its speci?c doctrines derive entirely from the immanent logic of its subject matter. If Hegel’s method is metaphysical, it is also phenomenological, demanding that we examine each subject for its own sake, apart from all prior principles and preconceived ideas (pp. 159–62). Although each speci?c science derives its foundation from the system as a whole, it should also be self-su?cient, an organic whole in its own right. So if we stress this phenomenological aspect of Hegel’s methodology, it would seem that much in his social and political philosophy should be comprehensible in its own terms.
? ? 注意到從黑格爾的角度來(lái)看待他的社會(huì)與政治哲學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)時(shí)的深刻的含糊性，這也是有必要的。盡管他有時(shí)堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，它的基礎(chǔ)在他的思辨邏輯之中，但他同時(shí)會(huì)強(qiáng)調(diào)它的具體學(xué)說(shuō)完全源于這個(gè)題材的內(nèi)在邏輯。如果黑格爾的方法是形而上學(xué)的，那么它也是現(xiàn)象學(xué)的；要求我們除了所有在先的原則和預(yù)先構(gòu)想的觀念之外，為了它自己的目的而考查每一個(gè)主題（第159~162頁(yè)）。盡管每一個(gè)具體科學(xué)都從作為整體的體系中獲得它的基礎(chǔ)，但它也應(yīng)該是自足的，它以其自身就是一個(gè)有機(jī)整體。因此，如果強(qiáng)調(diào)黑格爾的方法論中這個(gè)現(xiàn)象學(xué)的方面，似乎他的社會(huì)與政治哲學(xué)中的大部分東西應(yīng)當(dāng)根據(jù)它自己的術(shù)語(yǔ)才可以理解。
Yet the question remains: How comprehensible? And here the short answer must be: not enough. Whatever the spirit of the phenomenological method, the fact remains that some of the central concepts of Hegel’s political philosophy presuppose, and are only fully intelligible in the context of, his metaphysics. We shall soon see that Hegel’s concept of right rests upon his Aristotelian metaphysics (pp. 210–14), that his concept of freedom is based upon his notion of spirit (p. 201), and that his theory of reason in history is based on his absolute idealism (pp. 263–4).
? ? 但是問(wèn)題依然是：它是如何理解的？在這里，最簡(jiǎn)短的回答必定是：不充分。無(wú)論現(xiàn)象學(xué)方法的精神是什么，事實(shí)仍就是，黑格爾政治哲學(xué)的某些核心概念預(yù)設(shè)了他的形而上學(xué)，而且只有在他的形而上學(xué)的語(yǔ)境中才是完全可理解的。我們很快就會(huì)看到，黑格爾的權(quán)利概念建立在他的亞里士多德式的形而上學(xué)的基礎(chǔ)之上（第210~214頁(yè)），他的自由概念建基于他的精神概念之上（第201頁(yè)），他的歷史中的理性的理論建基于他的絕對(duì)觀念論之上（第263~264頁(yè)）。
THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
自由的概念
All scholars agree there is no more important concept in Hegel’s political theory than freedom. There are good reasons for such rare unanimity: Hegel regards freedom as the foundation of right, as the essence of spirit, and as the end of history. Unfortunately, however, there is no concept of Hegel’s political theory that is more opaque and contentious. Since the concept is so pivotal, obscure and controversial, it is necessary to examine it in a little detail.
? ? 所有的學(xué)者都同意，在黑格爾的政治理論當(dāng)中沒(méi)有比自由更重要的概念了。有許多非常好的理由來(lái)說(shuō)明這種罕見(jiàn)的全體一致：黑格爾把自由看作權(quán)利的基礎(chǔ)，看作精神的本質(zhì)，看作歷史的目的。然而，不幸的是，在黑格爾的政治理論中沒(méi)有一個(gè)概念比自由更含混不清與聚說(shuō)紛紜了。因?yàn)檫@個(gè)概念是如此重要、晦暗不明而又爭(zhēng)論不休，我們有必要稍稍詳細(xì)一點(diǎn)來(lái)考查它。
Hegel has several distinct but related concepts of freedom, which appear in scattered places in his writings. First and foremost, he understands freedom as autonomy, i.e. the power of self-government, the capacity to make and follow one’s own laws. Hence he writes in The Philosophy of World History: ‘. . . only that will which obeys the law is free; for it obeys itself and is self-su?cient [bei sich selbst] and therefore free’ (VG 115/97). Hegel’s idea of autonomy presupposes that the will’s self-imposed laws are rational; I am not free simply by creating and following any law, but the law must be worthy of the assent of any intelligent being. Hence freedom consists in acting according to the laws of reason.
? ? 黑格爾有好幾個(gè)各不相同而又相互關(guān)聯(lián)的自由概念，它們散見(jiàn)于他的著述的不同地方。首先并且最重要的是，他把自由理解為自律，亦即自我統(tǒng)治的力量，為自己立法并遵從自己的法則的能力。因此，他在《世界歷史哲學(xué)》中寫(xiě)道：“……只有那種遵從法則的意志是自由的；因?yàn)樗乃陨?，而且是自足的（bei sich sebst）并因此是自由的。”（VG 115/97）。黑格爾的自律的概念預(yù)設(shè)了，意志加諸自我的法則是理性的；我是自由的，不僅僅是因?yàn)閯?chuàng)造和遵從了任何法律，而且是因?yàn)榉杀仨氈档萌魏斡欣碇堑拇嬖谡叩耐?。因此，自由就存在于依照理性的法則而行動(dòng)之中。
Hegel also conceives freedom as independence or self-sufficiency, i.e.? not depending on anyone other than oneself. He de?nes freedom in these terms when he writes in The Philosophy of World History: ‘. . .? spirit is self-su?cient being [Beisichselbstsein], and just this is freedom. For if I am dependent, I relate to something that is not I and I cannot be without this external thing’ (VG 55/48). A similar account of freedom appears in the Philosophy of Right when Hegel explains that the will is free if ‘it relates to nothing but itself, so that every relationship of dependence on something other than itself falls away’ (§23). This sense of freedom is closely connected with autonomy, for an autonomous being is independent in not depending on anyone else to govern itself.
? ? 黑格爾也把自由構(gòu)想為獨(dú)立或自足，也就是不依賴(lài)除了自身之外的任何他人。他在撰述《世界歷史哲學(xué)》時(shí)用這些術(shù)語(yǔ)來(lái)定義自由：“……精神是自足的存在（Beisichselbstsein），而且只有這一點(diǎn)才是自由。因?yàn)槿绻沂怯兴蕾?lài)的，那么我就和不是我的東西關(guān)聯(lián)在一起，且如果沒(méi)有這個(gè)外在的東西，我就不能存在?！保╒G 55/48）。關(guān)于自由的類(lèi)似解釋也出現(xiàn)在《法哲學(xué)》中，黑格爾解釋說(shuō)，意志是自由的，如果“它除了與它自身而不與任何東西相關(guān)聯(lián)，那么，每一種依賴(lài)某物而非它自身的關(guān)系就崩塌了”（第23節(jié)）。自由的這種含義與自律緊緊相聯(lián)，因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)自律的存在者是獨(dú)立地而非依賴(lài)任何其他人統(tǒng)治自己。
Finally, in the Philosophy of Right Hegel sometimes formulates positive freedom in terms of self-determination (§§7, 12R, 21). Selfdetermination essentially means two things: (1) that the self, and not forces outside itself, determines its actions; and (2) that in determining itself, it makes itself determinate, turning what is merely potential, intended and inchoate into something actual, realized and organized. When Hegel thinks of freedom as selfdetermination he implies that (1) I have a speci?c essence or nature, which consists in my rationality, and that (2) the process of self-realization, of developing this essence or nature, is natural and necessary (pp. 74–5). Clearly, self-determination is closely connected with autonomy: self-determination means that the self is autonomous because it determines itself into action according to principles it gives itself. For similar reasons, self-determination is also intimately linked with independence: if the self determines itself into action it is independent of causes external to itself.
? ? 最后，在《法哲學(xué)》中，黑格爾有時(shí)依據(jù)自我規(guī)定來(lái)闡述積極自由（第7節(jié)，12節(jié)R, 21節(jié)）。自我規(guī)定本質(zhì)上意味著兩樣?xùn)|西：（1）自我，而不是它自身之外的力，決定了它的行動(dòng)；（2）在規(guī)定它自身之時(shí)，它使他自身變成有規(guī)定的，把僅僅是潛在的、意圖中的和處于萌蘗之中的東西變成某種現(xiàn)實(shí)的、實(shí)現(xiàn)的和有組織的東西。在黑格爾把自由看作是自我規(guī)定之時(shí)，他暗示的是，（1）我有一個(gè)具體的本質(zhì)或本性，它存在于我的理性之中；（2）自我實(shí)現(xiàn)的過(guò)程是發(fā)展這個(gè)本質(zhì)或者本性的過(guò)程，是自然的和必然的（第74-75頁(yè)）。顯而易見(jiàn)的是，自我規(guī)定和自律緊緊聯(lián)系在一起：自我規(guī)定意味著，自我是自律的，因?yàn)樗勒账x予它自身的原則而把它自身規(guī)定為行動(dòng)。處于類(lèi)似的原因，自我規(guī)定也和獨(dú)立有著緊密的關(guān)系：如果自我把它自身規(guī)定為行動(dòng)，那么它就是獨(dú)立于外在于它的各種原因的。
Hegel’s technical formulation for freedom is the will willing itself, i.e. the will having itself for its own object and end (PR §§22, 27). Such language appears paradoxical, but the main point is simple, resting on two straightforward premises. First, Hegel thinks that the very essence of the self consists in freedom. Like Rousseau and Kant, he maintains that the distinctive feature of a rational being is its freedom, more speci?cally, its autonomy, its power to act on universalizable principles. Second, Hegel maintains that we become free only if we are self-conscious that we are free, having the power to make freedom the goal of our actions; a slave who does not know that it is free will never achieve its freedom. Both points together mean that the self will become free only if it makes freedom itself the object and goal of its activity; in other words, the will must will itself. It is in such self-re?exive willing, Hegel further argues, that true independence and self-determination reside. For if the will wills itself, it relates to itself alone, and so it does not depend on anything outside itself.
? ? 黑格爾關(guān)于自由的專(zhuān)業(yè)闡述是遵從著它自身的意志，亦即，把它自身當(dāng)作是它自己的對(duì)象和目的的意志（PR第22，27節(jié)）。這種語(yǔ)言看起來(lái)像個(gè)悖論，但是它的要點(diǎn)是簡(jiǎn)單明了的，建立在兩個(gè)直截了當(dāng)?shù)那疤嵘?。第一，黑格爾認(rèn)為，自我的本質(zhì)就在于它的自由之中。和盧梭與康德一樣，他強(qiáng)調(diào)，一個(gè)理性存在者的獨(dú)特特征是它的自由，更具體地說(shuō)，它的自律——它依照可普遍化的原則而行動(dòng)的力量。其次，黑格爾強(qiáng)調(diào)，只有當(dāng)我們自我意識(shí)到我們是自由的，有力量把自由變成我們行動(dòng)的目標(biāo)的時(shí)候，我們才變成自由的；一個(gè)不知道它是自由的奴隸從來(lái)不會(huì)獲得自由。這兩點(diǎn)合起來(lái)意味著，自我只有當(dāng)它把自由自身變成它的行動(dòng)的目的和目標(biāo)之時(shí)，才會(huì)變成自由的；換句話(huà)說(shuō)，意志必須意愿著它自身。黑格爾進(jìn)一步論證說(shuō)，正是在這樣一種自我反思的意愿中，自由才會(huì)安居下來(lái)。因?yàn)槿绻庵疽庠钢陨?，它就只和它自身相關(guān)聯(lián)。因此，它就不依賴(lài)于在它之外的任何事物。
In §§5–7 of the Philosophy of Right Hegel provides a more detailed account of freedom, specifying three fundamental moments necessary for freedom. These three moments – universality, particularity and individuality – correspond to the structure of the concept in his Logic. In this context they specify three conditions under which a person can be completely free in the world. According to the moment of universality, a free person must have the power of selfawareness, the capacity to abstract from all speci?c situations and to be aware of itself apart from them; it must have the ability to stand back from all courses of actions, to re?ect on di?erent options and their consequences. If a person had no such power, they would not be free because they would have no sense of its own agency, and they would have no power to rationally assess what they should do.? According to the moment of particularity, to be free, a person must choose a particular option and act in a particular situation. Without choosing and without acting a person cannot be free; and to choose and to act they must choose something speci?c and do something speci?c. According to the moment of individuality, the synthesis of the other two moments, a person must, after detaching themselves from and re?ecting on all options, eventually commit themselves to, and ultimately identify themselves with, one option; in other words, they must accept one situation as worthy of their e?ort and commitment. Hegel describes this moment of individuality as one of self-limitation: one limits oneself because, rather than ?eeing all commitments, one accepts one situation in life; and yet one self-limits oneself because one chooses the situation as a result of re?ection and deliberation.
? ? 在《法哲學(xué)》第5~7節(jié)，黑格爾提供了一個(gè)關(guān)于自由的更加詳細(xì)的解說(shuō)，具體規(guī)定了對(duì)于自由而言必不可少的三個(gè)基本環(huán)節(jié)。這三個(gè)基本環(huán)節(jié)——普遍性、特殊性和個(gè)體性——相應(yīng)于他《邏輯學(xué)》中的概念結(jié)構(gòu)。在這個(gè)語(yǔ)境中，它們具體規(guī)定了世界上的人能夠達(dá)到完全自由的三個(gè)條件。依照普遍性的環(huán)節(jié)，一個(gè)自由的人必須具有自我覺(jué)察的能力，從所有具體的處境當(dāng)中抽離出去并且離開(kāi)處境覺(jué)察到它自身的能力；它必須有能力從任何行動(dòng)的過(guò)程中后退出來(lái)，以反思不同的選擇及其后果。如果人們沒(méi)有這種力量，那么他們就不會(huì)是自由的，因?yàn)樗麄儗?duì)于他們自己的動(dòng)力沒(méi)有任何感覺(jué)，他們也沒(méi)有力量對(duì)于他們應(yīng)該做出的行為進(jìn)行理性的評(píng)估。依照特殊性的環(huán)節(jié)，為了成為自由的，一個(gè)人必須在一個(gè)特定的處境中做出一個(gè)特定的選擇，并且行動(dòng)。如果沒(méi)有選擇和沒(méi)有行動(dòng)，一個(gè)人就不可能是自由的；為了選擇和行動(dòng)，他們必須選擇特定的東西，做某件特定的事情。依照特殊性——另外兩個(gè)環(huán)節(jié)的綜合——的環(huán)節(jié)，一個(gè)人必須在讓自己和所有選擇保持距離，并且對(duì)之進(jìn)行反思后，最終讓自己投身到某個(gè)選擇之中，并且最終把他們自己等同于這個(gè)選擇；換句話(huà)說(shuō)，他們必須接受一個(gè)處境作為值得他們付出努力并全身投入的。黑格爾把這一個(gè)體性的環(huán)節(jié)描述成自我限制的環(huán)節(jié)：一個(gè)人限制他自身，因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)人接受生命中的某一處境，而非在所有承諾之間漂浮不定；一個(gè)人自我限制他自身，還因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)人選擇處境作為反思和深思熟慮的結(jié)果。
Whatever its basis in his logic, Hegel’s analysis of freedom in the Philosophy of Right re?ects his fundamental moral teaching that freedom has to be realized in the world, and cannot be attained by ?ight from it. This is a theme that Hegel had ?rst developed in his Christianity and its Fate when he argued that Jesus doomed himself by ?eeing from the world and seeking redemption in heaven alone. In the Phenomenology Hegel later saw the same problems in stoicism, which preached inner retreat from the vicissitudes of fortune, and in French radicalism, which wreaked destruction because it could not accept any speci?c constitution. In Hegel’s view, Christianity, stoicism and French radicalism were all failed strategies for achieving freedom. Since they attempted to escape the world, they did not struggle against it, and so ultimately succumbed to it.? Hegel’s theme contains a tragic note: the need to reconcile ourselves with the world, to limit ourselves and to commit ourselves to some speci?c situation in life. Yet this tragic teaching always went hand-in-hand with a moral about the need to struggle against the world. Hegel saw that the main problem for realizing one’s freedom in the world is that one has both to struggle and to yield, both to limit oneself and to detach oneself, both to commit oneself yet to remain critical; true freedom lay in ?nding the delicate balance between these extremes.
? ? 無(wú)論在他的邏輯學(xué)中的基礎(chǔ)是什么，黑格爾在《法哲學(xué)》中關(guān)于自由的分析反映了他根本的道德教導(dǎo)，即自由必須在世界上變成現(xiàn)實(shí)，而不可能通過(guò)從世界上逃離而獲得。這就是黑格爾在《基督教及其命運(yùn)》一文中首次發(fā)展出來(lái)的主題，當(dāng)時(shí)他論證說(shuō)，耶穌本人注定要逃離這個(gè)世界，而只尋求在天堂中的救贖。后來(lái)在《精神現(xiàn)象學(xué)》中，黑格爾在斯多葛派和法國(guó)激進(jìn)主義中看到了同樣的問(wèn)題——斯多葛派勸誡從命運(yùn)的變化中撤退到內(nèi)心；而法國(guó)激進(jìn)主義則造成毀滅性的后果，因?yàn)樗荒芙邮苋魏翁囟ǖ膽椪?。在黑格爾眼中，基督教、斯多葛派和法?guó)激進(jìn)主義都是為達(dá)到自由而徹底失敗的策略。因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)噲D逃避這個(gè)世界，所以他們沒(méi)有發(fā)動(dòng)反抗世界的斗爭(zhēng)，因此最終向這個(gè)世界屈服。黑格爾的主題包含著一種悲劇性的音符：必須在我們和世界之間達(dá)成和解，限制我們自己，讓我們自己投身到生活的某些特定處境之中。但是這種悲劇性的教導(dǎo)總是和一種必須反抗世界的道德?tīng)渴植⑦M(jìn)。黑格爾看到，實(shí)現(xiàn)這種自由的主要困難是，一個(gè)人必須既要斗爭(zhēng)，又要屈服，既要限制他自己，又要掙脫他自己，既要全身心投入，又要保持批判；真正的自由就在于在這些極端之間發(fā)現(xiàn)微妙的平衡。
A decisive in?uence in the development of Hegel’s concept of freedom was Kant. We can trace each of Hegel’s formulations back to Kant, who had already written about freedom in terms of autonomy, independence and self-determination.3 It was indeed Kant who ?rst suggested, in the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, that the free will wills itself because it must act according to the idea of freedom (GMS IV, 448). The in?uence of Kant’s concept of freedom upon Hegel is not a matter of conjecture but easily detectable.? In the early Berne writings Hegel made Kant’s principle of autonomy his chief moral ideal, his main weapon in his battle against the positivity of Christianity. And in the Philosophy of Right Hegel explicitly endorsed Kant’s conception of freedom as acting on moral duty: ‘In doing my duty, I am with myself [bei mir selbst] and free. It is the merit and exalted standpoint of Kant’s philosophy in the practical sphere that it has stressed this signi?cance of duty’ (PR §133A).
? ? 在黑格爾的自由概念發(fā)展的歷程中產(chǎn)生決定性影響的是康德。我們能夠把黑格爾的每一個(gè)闡釋回溯到康德那里，在康德的著述中已經(jīng)根據(jù)自律、獨(dú)立和自我規(guī)定等討論自由了。3事實(shí)上，康德在他的《道德形而上學(xué)基礎(chǔ)》中第一次指出，自由意志意愿著自身，因?yàn)樗仨毟鶕?jù)自由的理念而行動(dòng)（GMS IV，第448頁(yè)）。康德的自由概念對(duì)于黑格爾的影響不是出自憑空臆想，而是有案可稽，并俯首可拾。在他的早期伯爾尼手稿中，黑格爾把康德的自律原則變成他的主要的道德理想，他與基督教的實(shí)證性相抗?fàn)帟r(shí)的主要武器。而在《法哲學(xué)》中，黑格爾明白確鑿地推崇依照道德義務(wù)而行動(dòng)這種康德的自由思想：“我在盡義務(wù)時(shí)，我是心安理得（bei mir selbst）而且自由的。著重指出義務(wù)的這種意義，乃是康德實(shí)踐領(lǐng)域的哲學(xué)的功績(jī)與卓爾不群的觀點(diǎn)?！保≒R第133節(jié)補(bǔ)充）
Still, despite these facts, it would be a serious mistake to conclude that Kant’s and Hegel’s concepts of freedom are substantially the same.4 Though they are alike in very general respects, Kant and Hegel give them very di?erent, even con?icting, interpretations.? The most important di?erences are fourfold:
? ? 盡管有如此多的事實(shí)，但是由此推斷說(shuō)，康德的自由概念和黑格爾的實(shí)質(zhì)相同，別無(wú)二致，卻有可能是一個(gè)嚴(yán)重的錯(cuò)誤。4盡管它們?cè)谧钜话愕姆矫娣浅Ｏ嗨?，但是康德和黑格爾賦予它們以截然不同的、甚至相互沖突的闡釋。它們之間最為重要的區(qū)別有如下四點(diǎn)：
? Though Kant and Hegel both see freedom in terms of moral action, and though both think that morality must be founded on reason, they have very di?erent conceptions of reason. Kant’s conception of reason is formal or abstract: the power to determine and act on universalizable principles; Hegel’s conception of reason is material or concrete: the ethos and way of life of a speci?c community.
? ? 一、盡管康德和黑格爾兩人都根據(jù)道德行動(dòng)來(lái)看待自由，盡管他們倆都認(rèn)為道德必須建立在理性的基礎(chǔ)之上，但是他們對(duì)于理性的思考卻有天壤之別。康德的理性觀是形式的或者說(shuō)抽象的：規(guī)定可普遍化的原則并依其行動(dòng)的力量；黑格爾的理性觀是質(zhì)料的和具體的：某一特定共同體的倫理（ethos）和生活方式。
? Though they both conceive freedom as self-determination, they have very di?erent conceptions of the self. Since Kant’s rational self stands above the spheres of society and history, it has its identity apart from other rational selves like itself; it is self-conscious in opposition to other such selves. Hegel, however, understands the self in and through the other; his self realizes itself only through internalizing the other and making it part of its very identity.? Hence, in the Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes self-determination as the entire process by which the self externalizes itself in others and then internalizes them in a wider concept of itself (§7). The proper subject of freedom is therefore spirit, the intersubjective self, the I that is a We and the We that is an I.
? ? 二、盡管他們倆都認(rèn)為自由是自我規(guī)定，但是他們對(duì)于自我的理解也是判然有別。因?yàn)榭档碌睦硇宰晕沂歉吒哒驹谏鐣?huì)和歷史的領(lǐng)域之上的，它除了和它一樣的其他理性自我之外，有它的同一性；它在和其他那樣的自我的對(duì)立中有它的自我意識(shí)。然而，黑格爾是在他者中并且通過(guò)他者理解自我，他的自我只有通過(guò)把他者內(nèi)部化和使它成為它的同一性的一部分才意識(shí)到它自身。因此，在《法哲學(xué)》中，黑格爾把自我規(guī)定描述為自我在他者中把它自身外在化，然后在一個(gè)更廣闊的它自身的概念中把他者內(nèi)在化的整個(gè)過(guò)程（第7節(jié)）。因此，自由的本己的主體是精神，是主體間的自我，是那個(gè)是我們的我和是我的我們。
? Kant conceives of self-determination as the power of reason over sensibility; Hegel, however, understands self-determination as acting according to my whole nature, where there is no con?ict between reason and sensibility. Following Schiller,5 Hegel insists that my desires and feelings have to be integrated into the powers of rational self-determination, so that the self does its duty from inclination and not apart from it, still less contrary to it. Hegel rejected Kant’s more rationalistic and dualistic account of self-determination, because if freedom were acting according to my rationality alone it would be still compatible with a form of constraint: namely, the repression of my desires and feelings. He argued that the sovereignty Kant gave to reason had simply moved the sources of domination inside the self.
? ? 三、康德把自我規(guī)定設(shè)想為在感性之上的理性的力量；然而，黑格爾把自我規(guī)定理解為依照我們?nèi)w的本性而行動(dòng)，在我的本性中，感性和理性之間不存在什么沖突。黑格爾追隨席勒，5堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為，我的欲望和情感必須要整合到理性的自我規(guī)定的力量之中，因此，自我盡義務(wù)時(shí)，是從稟好（inclination）出發(fā)，而非把它排除在外，和它之間的對(duì)立并不那么尖銳。黑格爾拒斥了康德對(duì)于自我規(guī)定的更加理性主義的和二元論的解釋?zhuān)驗(yàn)槿绻赖率莾H僅依照我的理性而行動(dòng)的話(huà)，它就仍舊和某種局限是相容的：也就是說(shuō)，壓制我的欲望和情感。他論證說(shuō)，康德賦予理性的那種主權(quán)僅僅把統(tǒng)治的資源移入到自我內(nèi)部。
? Kant conceives of freedom as independence from the causality of nature, so that the self is the sole cause of its own actions and has the power to do otherwise. Hegel thinks that such independence is illusory: freedom is realized only within the realm of nature and it requires acting according to the necessity of one’s own nature and the universe as a whole. In his understanding of freedom as a form of necessity, as self-awareness of one’s place in the universe as a whole, Hegel’s main debt is to Spinoza.
? ? 四、康德把自由設(shè)想為獨(dú)立于自然的因果性的，因此自我是它自己的行動(dòng)的唯一原因，有力量做任何其他事情。黑格爾認(rèn)為，這種獨(dú)立性是一種幻象：只有在自然的領(lǐng)域才是可實(shí)現(xiàn)的，它必需依照它自己的本性和作為整體的宇宙的必然性而行動(dòng)。在他把自由理解為某種形式的必然性，在對(duì)于它在作為整體的宇宙中的位置的自我覺(jué)察之時(shí)，黑格爾從斯賓諾莎那里受益良多。
Prima facie it might seem that Hegel abandons the concept of freedom as independence when he stresses that the self must live through others and in the world. This seems to amount to the admission that the self has a de facto dependence on others. Hegel indeed thinks that we are dependent on others and the world, and that it is only through such dependence that we become who we are. It is important to see, however, that in recognizing such de facto dependence he does not think he is abandoning the ideal of independence but embracing it; for he argues that true independence comes not from abstracting or ?eeing from the other and the world but in making them part of myself; for if I truly internalize the other and the world, making them part of myself, then my dependence on the other becomes a form of self-dependence. It is ultimately Kant who must abandon his ideal of independence, Hegel argues, because he conceives it completely in abstraction from others and the world, so that it cannot recognize its de facto dependence upon them.
? ? 乍一眼看來(lái)（prima facie），在黑格爾強(qiáng)調(diào)自我必須通過(guò)他者而在世界之中生活之時(shí)，似乎他摒棄了作為獨(dú)立的自由概念。這也似乎意味著，承認(rèn)自我實(shí)際上（de facto）是依賴(lài)于他者的。黑格爾的確認(rèn)為，我們是依賴(lài)他者和這個(gè)世界的，只有通過(guò)這種依賴(lài)，我們才能變成我們之所是。然而，重要的是要看到，在承認(rèn)這種事實(shí)上的依賴(lài)之時(shí)，他并不認(rèn)為他拋棄了獨(dú)立的理想，而是包含了它；因?yàn)樗撟C說(shuō)，真正的獨(dú)立并不是來(lái)自于從他者和世界之中退縮或者逃離，而是使它們成為我自己的一部分；因?yàn)槿绻艺嬲阉吆褪澜鐑?nèi)在化了，把它們變成了我的一部分，那么，我對(duì)他者的依賴(lài)就變成了某種形式的自我依賴(lài)。黑格爾論證說(shuō)，最終必須摒棄他的獨(dú)立理想的是康德，因?yàn)樗耆窃趶乃吆褪澜绲某吠酥性O(shè)想它的，因此他不能承認(rèn)它實(shí)際上對(duì)于它們的依賴(lài)。
A BETRAYER OF LIBERTY?
自由的背叛者？
For better or worse, Hegel has gone down in history as one of the chief champions of a ‘positive concept’ of freedom. Since the distinction between positive and negative liberty is relatively recent, it is anachronistic to apply it to Hegel. Still, it has become such an endemic way of discussing Hegel – by both defenders and detractors alike – that it cannot be ignored. According to Isaiah Berlin’s classical distinction,6 a negative concept of liberty identi?es freedom with lack of constraint or absence of coercion, i.e. with noninterference with any of my actions; hence the less constraint, the more free I am. Negative liberty therefore essentially consists in freedom of choice, having a multiplicity of options. On the other hand, a positive concept of liberty identi?es freedom with a speci?c course of action, such as acting on moral principle, obeying divine commands, or realizing my true self. Such liberty is then compatible with limiting my options, and even with compelling me to do the speci?c action. Positive liberty seems to sanction, therefore, Rousseau’s notorious dictum: ‘forcing a person to be free’. So, not surprisingly, it has been denounced as a threat to negative liberty, as a rationale for totalitarianism or authoritarianism. Interpreted as a one-sided champion of positive freedom, Hegel has been ?ayed and ?ailed by his liberal critics as a potent ‘betrayer of liberty’.
? ? 不論是好是歹，黑格爾已經(jīng)作為一個(gè)積極“自由概念”的主要擁護(hù)者而進(jìn)入了歷史。因?yàn)樵诜e極自由和消極自由之間做出區(qū)分已經(jīng)是比較晚近的事情了，把它運(yùn)用到黑格爾頭上實(shí)在是弄錯(cuò)了時(shí)代。它仍然一直被當(dāng)作一種難以擺脫的討論黑格爾的方式——無(wú)論是他的捍衛(wèi)者還是他的貶低者在這點(diǎn)上殊途同歸——以至于它難以被忽視。依照以賽亞·柏林的經(jīng)典區(qū)分，6消極的自由概念把自由當(dāng)作是缺乏限制或者說(shuō)強(qiáng)制的缺席，也就是說(shuō)，不干涉我的任何行動(dòng)；因此，限制越少，我越是自由。因此，消極自由本質(zhì)上就在于選擇的自由，具有復(fù)數(shù)性的選擇可能性。另一方面，積極的自由概念把自由等同于具體的自由進(jìn)行，比如依照道德原則行動(dòng)，遵從神圣的命令，或者實(shí)現(xiàn)真正的自我。那么，這種自由和限制我的選擇，和強(qiáng)迫我做出某個(gè)特定的行動(dòng)，甚至是可兼容的。因此，積極自由似乎支持盧梭那著名的格言：“強(qiáng)迫某人自由。”因此，毫不奇怪，它被譴責(zé)為對(duì)于消極自由的威脅，集權(quán)主義或者權(quán)威主義的基本原理。黑格爾被闡釋為積極自由的片面的擁護(hù)者，他的自由主義的批評(píng)者把他痛斥為強(qiáng)有力的“自由的背叛者”而大肆撻伐。
The most obvious problem with this interpretation is that it cannot account for one stubborn and incontestable fact: that Hegel himself was an unwavering and unequivocal champion of negative as well as positive liberty. Hegel had a distinction between kinds of freedom that is analogous, though not equivalent, to Berlin’s; and he is explicit and emphatic in upholding both forms of freedom.? Hegel’s own distinction is between what he usually calls ‘formal’ or ‘subjective freedom’ on the one hand, and ‘a(chǎn)bsolute’ or ‘objective freedom’ on the other hand; uncannily, he sometimes even distinguishes between ‘negative’ liberty and ‘a(chǎn)?rmative’ or ‘positive liberty’ (PR §§5, 149A; VG 57/50).7 Formal, subjective or negative freedom involves the power and right of the individual to re?ect upon and choose di?erent courses of action, and to choose that option which best suits its taste, judgment or conscience (PR §§ 121, 185R, 228R, 258R, 273R, 274, 301, 316). On the other hand, absolute, objective or positive freedom involves thinking and acting on rational principle, on laws that are recognized in public life (§§149, 258R). In the Philosophy of Right Hegel shows himself to be a staunch advocate of formal and subjective freedom on many occasions, and he fully recognizes and stresses that such freedom requires non-interference by the government (§§185R, 206R, 260). He repeatedly argues that the chief weakness of the classical polis is that it did not recognize subjective freedom (§§124R, 138A, 185R, 260R, 261R, 262A, 299R), whereas the main strength of the modern state is that it secures individual rights (§§41, 185R, 206R, 260, 262A, 299R).
? ? 這種闡釋最明顯的疑難在于，它不能解釋一個(gè)無(wú)法改變與無(wú)可爭(zhēng)議的事實(shí)，即黑格爾本人是一個(gè)毫不動(dòng)搖與確鑿無(wú)疑的否定性消極自由以及肯定性積極自由的支持者。黑格爾在多種自由類(lèi)型之間做了一個(gè)與柏林相類(lèi)似的盡管并非完全相同的劃分。他毫不含糊地強(qiáng)調(diào)對(duì)于兩種形式的自由都加以支持。黑格爾自己的劃分是在以下兩者之間做出的：一方面是他所謂的“形式的”或“主觀的自由”，另一方面是“絕對(duì)的”或者“客觀的自由”。令人驚詫的是，他有時(shí)甚至劃分了“消極的自由”和“肯定的自由”或“積極的自由”（PR第5節(jié)以下、第149節(jié)補(bǔ)充；VG57/50）7。形式的、主觀的或者消極的自由涉及個(gè)體在對(duì)于不同的行動(dòng)過(guò)程的反思與選擇不同過(guò)程的權(quán)利，以及選擇最合適它的趣味、判斷與良知的選項(xiàng)的權(quán)力與權(quán)利（PR第121節(jié)、185節(jié)附釋、228節(jié)附釋、273節(jié)附釋、274節(jié)、301節(jié)、316節(jié)）。另一方面，絕對(duì)的、客觀的或者肯定的自由涉及依照理性的原則，依照公共生活中得到承認(rèn)的法則而思維與行動(dòng)（第149節(jié)、258節(jié)附釋?zhuān)Ｔ凇斗ㄕ軐W(xué)》中，在許多場(chǎng)合中，黑格爾顯示自己為形式的和主觀的自由的忠誠(chéng)的支持者。他完全承認(rèn)并強(qiáng)調(diào)，這種自由的前提是政府不干預(yù)（第185節(jié)附釋、206節(jié)附釋、260節(jié)）。他反反復(fù)復(fù)論證說(shuō)，古代城邦的主要缺點(diǎn)在于，它不承認(rèn)主觀自由（第124節(jié)附釋、138節(jié)補(bǔ)充、185節(jié)附釋、260節(jié)附釋、262節(jié)補(bǔ)充、299節(jié)附釋?zhuān)F(xiàn)代國(guó)家的主要力量在于，它保護(hù)個(gè)體權(quán)利（第41節(jié)、185節(jié)附釋、206節(jié)附釋、269節(jié)、262頁(yè)補(bǔ)充、199節(jié)附釋?zhuān)?/p>
It is important to recognize that Hegel’s defense of negative liberty was not a late development for him but a constant of his intellectual career, one of the enduring hallmarks of all his political writings. In the Positivity Essay of the Berne and Frankfurt periods he argued passionately that the state has the duty to protect the rights of individuals, such as freedom of speech and conscience. And in the Verfassungsschrift of the late Frankfurt and early Jena periods he protested strongly against the totalitarian state that attempts to control everything from above, leaving no room for individual liberties and local initiatives. Hence the interpretation of Hegel as a onesided protagonist of positive liberty ignores not only a central feature of his mature doctrine but also a pivotal theme of his early writings.
? ? 重要的是要承認(rèn)，黑格爾對(duì)消極自由的辯護(hù)并非他晚期思想的發(fā)展，而是他思想生涯中一以貫之的事，是所有他的政治著述的始終如一的標(biāo)志。在伯爾尼和法蘭克福時(shí)期的《實(shí)證性論文》中，他充滿(mǎn)激情地論證說(shuō)，國(guó)家有義務(wù)保護(hù)個(gè)體的權(quán)利，例如言論自由與良知。在法蘭克福晚期和耶拿早期的《憲法論文》中，他強(qiáng)烈反對(duì)試圖自上而下地控制一切，不給個(gè)體自由與地方首創(chuàng)性留下任何空間的極權(quán)政府。因此，把黑格爾闡釋為積極自由的一邊倒的主角，這不僅忽視了他成熟學(xué)說(shuō)的核心特征，而且忽視了他早期著述中一個(gè)極為重要的主題。
There seems to be some justi?cation, however, for reading at least the mature Hegel along these lines. In the Philosophy of Right (§§15–17), Hegel mounts an argument to the e?ect that negative freedom is not really freedom in the proper sense. He contends that freedom understood as ‘a(chǎn)rbitrariness’ (Willkür), i.e. the power to abstract from all options and to choose between them, contradicts itself because the will is both independent of and dependent on its object. Whatever the merits of this argument, it seems as if Hegel were entirely rejecting freedom in the negative sense for the sake of positive freedom alone.
? ? 然而，至少是就依照這些線索解讀成熟的黑格爾而言，似乎存在著某種合理的證明。在《法哲學(xué)》（第15~17節(jié)）中，黑格爾使某個(gè)論證帶有這種意思，在他本來(lái)的意義上說(shuō)，消極自由并非真正的自由。他爭(zhēng)辯說(shuō)，自由被理解為“任性”，也就是說(shuō)，從所有選擇項(xiàng)中退縮回來(lái)并且在它們之間進(jìn)行選擇的權(quán)力，就和它自身發(fā)生矛盾了，因?yàn)橐庵炯泉?dú)立于又依賴(lài)于它的對(duì)象。無(wú)論這個(gè)論證具有什么價(jià)值，似乎黑格爾僅僅為了積極自由的緣故而完全拒絕消極意義上的自由。
When, however, we read these passages more in context, this interpretation proves untenable. It su?ers from several di?culties.? First, the target of Hegel’s argument is not really negative liberty (in Berlin’s precise sense) but the formal liberty that attempts to realize freedom in complete abstraction from all commitment.? Second, Hegel is not criticizing the value of choice as such but, more speci?cally, arbitrariness, where an agent cannot or will not give reasons for taking one option over another. Third, though Hegel does not think that freedom in the sense of arbitrariness is freedom in the full and complete sense, he still does not reject it entirely but retains it as one essential aspect or moment of liberty.? Hegel fully realizes that there are some choices that we make that lack objective reasons and that might be based on nothing more than the personal or individual choices, such as my choice of a speci?c career or mode of dress. But even these choices should be protected by the state, Hegel thinks, because they are part of ‘the in?nite right’ of subjectivity (see pp. 231–3).
? ? 然而，如果我們?cè)谡Z(yǔ)境之中再次閱讀這些段落，這種闡釋證明是站不住腳的。它遭遇到好幾重困難。首先，黑格爾的論證的靶子實(shí)際上不是（確切地伯林意義上的）消極自由，而是實(shí)現(xiàn)從所有事務(wù)中完全撤退出來(lái)的自由的嘗試。其次，黑格爾并不是在批判選擇自身的價(jià)值，而是，更加具體地說(shuō)，在批判任性的價(jià)值，在任性中，一個(gè)行動(dòng)者不能也不愿意給出他做某種選擇而非另一種的理由。再次，盡管黑格爾并不認(rèn)為，任性意義上的自由并非全面而完全意義上的自由，但是他仍然沒(méi)有完全拒絕它，而是把它保留為自由的一個(gè)本質(zhì)的方面或環(huán)節(jié)。黑格爾完全地意識(shí)到，我們所做的某些選擇缺乏客觀的理由，它們建基于其上的東西無(wú)非是個(gè)人的或個(gè)體的選擇，例如，我選擇某個(gè)特定的職業(yè)或者服裝樣式。但是黑格爾認(rèn)為，即使這些選擇也應(yīng)該變成國(guó)家的保護(hù)，因?yàn)樗鼈兪侨^性的“無(wú)限權(quán)利”的一部分（另見(jiàn)第231-233節(jié)）。
Granted that Hegel values negative as well as positive freedom, the question remains whether his use of positive freedom sanctions authoritarianism. The issue here is more complicated than many scholars recognize. At stake is not simply the historical or factual issue whether Hegel acknowledges the value of negative liberty, but two logical or systematic issues: whether Hegel’s concept of positive freedom has authoritarian implications, and whether Hegel can unite both forms of freedom into a single coherent philosophy of the state. It is not su?cient to point out that Hegel intends or wants negative liberty to be upheld; for that leaves the question whether it is compatible with his ultimate principles. The issue is not disposed of simply by claiming that, because autonomy involves the capacity of choice, subjective freedom is the precondition of objective freedom.8 For this begs the question: what if my subjective choice is at odds with the standard of rationality involved in autonomy? The question whether Hegel betrays negative liberty ultimately rests upon whether political institutions, as Hegel envisages them, involve su?cient safeguards for negative liberty. We will consider these troublesome issues in more detail below (pp. 237–43).
? ? 只要黑格爾既重視消極自由也重視積極自由，他對(duì)積極自由的使用是否批準(zhǔn)權(quán)威主義的問(wèn)題就是懸而未決的。這里的問(wèn)題比許多學(xué)者認(rèn)識(shí)到的要復(fù)雜得多。仍舊成為一個(gè)問(wèn)題的，就不是黑格爾是否認(rèn)識(shí)到消極自由的價(jià)值這樣一個(gè)純粹歷史的或事實(shí)的問(wèn)題，而是兩個(gè)邏輯的或者體系的問(wèn)題：黑格爾的積極自由的概念是否具有權(quán)威主義蘊(yùn)含的問(wèn)題，以及黑格爾是否能夠把兩個(gè)形式的自由統(tǒng)一成一個(gè)單一的條理一貫的國(guó)家哲學(xué)的問(wèn)題。僅僅指出下面這一點(diǎn)還不夠，即，黑格爾意欲或者想要支持消極自由，因?yàn)槟钱a(chǎn)生了它是否與他的終極原理相容的問(wèn)題。這個(gè)問(wèn)題不能僅僅通過(guò)宣稱(chēng)以下這一點(diǎn)來(lái)處理，即，因?yàn)樽月缮婕斑x擇的能力，主觀自由是客觀自由的前提條件8。因?yàn)檫@又把將要證明的東西設(shè)為前提了：如果我的主觀選擇與和自律相關(guān)的理性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)不一致，將會(huì)怎么樣？黑格爾是否背叛了消極自由的問(wèn)題最終建立在政治制度——正如黑格爾認(rèn)為它們的那樣——是否牽強(qiáng)足夠保衛(wèi)消極自由的問(wèn)題。我們將在下面更加詳實(shí)地來(lái)討論這些令人棘手的問(wèn)題（第237—243節(jié)）。
